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Rural landscapes are transitioning from productivist to multifunctional uses, which implies that 
planning has to address the conflicts emanating from our need to protect the natural environment 
and promote social well-being. Yet, multifunctional landscape planning has remained elusive in 
both theory and practice. My doctoral research draws on the governance of working landscapes – 
an example of multifunctional landscapes – to address this gap. My aim is to shed light on the 
elements of governance necessary for protecting the natural environment and supporting the social 
well-being of rural communities. Specifically, I (1) propose a conceptual framework for the 
working landscapes approach, (2) examine the conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable 
working landscapes, and (3) examine approaches for addressing risks in the management of 
working landscapes. My research used two main strategies of inquiry, including an integrative 
review and a case study. The case study was drawn from the South of the Divide region in 
Southwestern Saskatchewan, Canada.  
The integrative review found that the working landscapes approach has the following features: (1) 
it focuses on integrating social well-being and environmental protection within the landscape, (2) 
it involves collective action among multiple actors, and (3) working landscapes shape and are 
shaped by their social-ecological context. These features make the approach an important option 
for addressing conflicts resulting from environmental protection and social well-being. However, 
the effectiveness of the working landscapes approach is impeded by socio-economic challenges 
such as the higher costs involved in managing working landscapes, conflicting interests among 
stakeholders, environmental and policy risks and uncertainties, a lack of appropriate knowledge, 
and mistrust among stakeholders. These challenges are addressed using multiple governance 
configurations in different contexts involving the state, market, and communities. Nevertheless, a 
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synthesis of these governance configurations suggests that certain common elements – trust, 
facilitative leadership, equity, local autonomy, and incentives – are critical for the sustainability of 
working landscapes.  
In a case study of the South of the Divide region, I applied my conceptual framework of working 
landscapes to examine the conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable working landscapes. 
I found that four governance conditions (i.e., facilitative leadership, local autonomy, trust, and 
incentives) connected by five mechanisms (i.e., institutional disruption, institutional crafting and 
drift, brokerage or bridging, program uptake, and alleviation of fear of harm) produced positive 
management outcomes in the South of the Divide. The most plausible pathway is that dissatisfied 
actors disrupt the existing governance arrangements and create new ones that reflect their desire 
for local autonomy. Local autonomy, in turn, creates an atmosphere for local actors to form 
coalitions and build trust; trust enhances program uptake and the co-design and co-implementation 
of incentives, which then alleviates land managers’ fear of harm from participating in species at 
risk conservation programs. While these conditions and mechanisms were deemed essential for 
ensuring the sustainability of working landscapes, it emerged that environmental risk factors, 
particularly droughts, were also critical determinants of the sustainability of the South of the 
Divide.  
I then examined the approaches used to address drought in the South of the Divide. Drawing on 
the experiences of land managers in the South of the Divide, I confirmed that drought affects the 
ability of land managers to meet both social well-being and environmental protection goals in 
working landscapes. Specifically, within the result-based conservation agreement framework – an 
approach used by the South of the Divide Conservation Action Program Inc. to implement species 
at risk conservation in the region – drought affects land managers by limiting their ability to 
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achieve ecosystem targets and forcing them to incur extra costs (i.e., extra management and 
opportunity costs) to meet ecosystem targets. Furthermore, I found that the incentive structure, 
which allows for a pro-rata reduction and the design of environmentally adaptive outcome 
indicators, helps reduce risks. Also, trust among actors and local autonomy facilitates continuous 
engagement among actors to address the uncertainty and unpredictability associated with droughts.   
Collectively, this research enhances our understanding of how to address the conflicts emanating 
from our need to protect the natural environment and promote social well-being in the following 
ways. First, it advances a framework for the working landscapes approach. This framework will 
help guide empirical case studies on the working landscapes approach, further its theoretical 
understanding, and contribute to enhancing policy aimed at increased social well-being and 
environmental protection. Second, my research identifies two opportunities to enhance the 
prospects of policies that seek to address human-nature conflicts. The opportunities are (1) top-
down regulations can enhance their likelihood for success by creating room for further institutional 
work at the local level (creating new institutions and forming coalitions to further local interests) 
and (2) focusing on underlying mechanisms, rather than only governance conditions, enhances 
policy prospects. Third, my research supports the proposition that multilevel institutional 
arrangements can help focus planning interventions on both place and function. Multilevel 
institutional arrangements allow for reconciling the dilemma of addressing the place-centred needs 
of people and respecting the interconnectedness of ecological systems (function-centred). Fourth, 
my research shows that social well-being and environmental protection can provide normative 
guiding principles for planning in rural environments, which contributes towards developing a 
normative theory for rural-environmental planning. In practice, it can guide the development of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Why governance of working landscapes?  
The fight against the twin challenges of global climate change and biodiversity loss will partly be 
won or lost in working landscapes. Working landscapes are rangelands, forests, and cultivated 
fields managed for human well-being and environmental protection (Huntsinger and Sayre 2007; 
Kremen and Merenlender 2018). These landscapes are critical in the fight to protect the 
environment because they are both the cause and solution to these environmental threats. Yet, until 
recently, working landscapes have been perceived as drivers and not the solution. As rightly 
observed by Kremen and Merenlender (2018, 362), "working landscapes maintain biodiversity, 
[mitigates climate change], provide goods and services for humanity, and support the abiotic 
conditions necessary for sustainability and resilience." Kremen and Merenlender's (2018) 
definition suggests that working landscapes can indeed be part of the solution to these global 
environmental threats. This recognition signifies at least three significant shifts in planning and 
policy thinking, which also form the foundation of what will be described in this dissertation as 
the working landscapes approach. First,  it embodies a departure from the framing of productive 
activities such as agriculture to be in constant conflict with environmental protection (Henle et al. 
2008; Martinet and Barraquand 2012; Shackelford et al. 2015). Instead, the working landscapes 
approach acknowledges the interdependence and trade-offs between these productive activities 
and environmental protection and explores how to maximize multiple benefits within the 
landscape (Kremen and Merenlender 2018; Naugle et al. 2020). Second, the working landscapes 
approach hinges on complementarity with strict nature reserves or protected areas rather than a 
call for the conversion of strict reserves and wildlands, as suggested in some literature (e.g., 
Wuerthner 2014). Thus, it sees both protected areas and working landscapes as opportunities to 
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maximize environmental protection and human well-being. Third, the working landscapes 
approach calls attention to the need to work across property rights regimes (Brockington et al. 
2018; Kremen and Merenlender 2018). Working across property rights regimes and property 
boundaries often raise concerns of trust, economic efficiency, and social justice that must be 
addressed. These three shifts collectively have implications for the governance and institutional 
change (Paavola 2007) required to effectively manage working landscapes (Brockington et al. 
2018).  
1.2 Research focus and objectives 
The potential of the working landscape approach to help protect the environment and support 
human well-being simultaneously is no longer in question. Several studies have shown that 
working landscapes supply multiple ecosystem services, including critical habitats and migratory 
corridors for species, carbon sinks, and sources of food, fibre and timber (Polasky et al. 2005; 
Mitchell et al. 2013; Chanchani et al. 2016; Eastburn et al. 2017; Kremen and Merenlender 2018). 
These multiple ecosystem services are needed for social and ecological resilience and 
sustainability. However, the promise of the working landscape approach has been impeded by 
several socio-economic challenges (Kremen and Merenlender 2018). Direct challenges include the 
higher costs involved in managing working landscapes for both well-being and environmental 
protection (Naidoo et al. 2006; Kremen and Merenlender 2018), conflicting interests among 
stakeholders (Bergmann and Bliss 2004; Ferranto et al. 2013; Ferranto et al. 2014; Roche et al. 
2015; Farley et al. 2017; Ellis 2019), and land-use changes in favour of industrial and urban 
development (Daniels 1997; Daniels 2000). Indirect challenges that impede the effectiveness of 
policies meant to address these direct challenges include environmental and policy risks and 
uncertainties (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010; Derissen and Quaas 2013), a lack of appropriate 
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knowledge (Naugle et al. 2020), and mistrust between stakeholders (Bergmann and Bliss 2004; 
Reed et al. 2013; Henderson et al. 2014).  
In the literature on working landscapes, governance has been suggested as a process to foster 
collaboration among the diversity of actors to address the challenges associated with the working 
landscapes approach (France and Campbell 2015; Brockington et al. 2018; Ellis 2019). 
Governance implies "…the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve 
conflicts over environmental resources" (Paavola 2007, 94). The governance of working 
landscapes emphasizes "rights to resources, the rules controlling their use, and the arrangements 
by which these are forged, enforced, and revised" (Brockington et al. 2018, 1257). The focus on 
governance also brings attention to management – i.e., the “…resources, plans, and actions…” 
(Lockwood 2010, 755) that are geared towards “… analyzing and monitoring, developing and 
implementing measures to keep the state of a resource [environment] within desirable bounds” 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009, 355). Management is important because it is the realm within which the 
outcomes and impacts of working landscape policies manifest. In this regard, governance is 
perceived as a process that facilitates sustainable management (Lockwood 2010) of working 
landscapes.   
Despite the crucial role of governance in ensuring the success of working landscapes, effective 
governance of working landscapes remains elusive in the literature (Brockington et al. 2018). A 
critical reason for the obscurity of governance of working landscapes in the literature is the lack 
of a conceptual framework to guide research. Frameworks provide a common vocabulary for 
facilitating descriptive, diagnostic, and prescriptive enquiries about a phenomenon (McGinnis and 
Ostrom 2014; Bennett et al. 2018). Therefore, the lack of a framework for the working landscape 
approach has hindered theory building, systematic analysis of case studies, and guidance for 
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practitioners. While an integrative framework for the working landscapes approach remains 
elusive, the literature suggests that the success of the approach requires a transition in governance 
from command-and-control approaches to one that embraces collaboration, networks, and 
incentives (Barry et al. 2007; Brockington et al. 2018; Kremen and Merenlender 2018). However, 
the processes of governance transition or change that influence sustainable working landscapes are 
not well understood. Furthermore, the literature shows that risk factors, including natural 
conditions (e.g., climate change) and human factors (e.g., the uncertainty of the policy 
environment), can hinder sustainable working landscapes (Zabel and Roe 2009; Matzdorf and 
Lorenz 2010; Burton and Schwarz 2013; Osbeck et al. 2013). However, limited known empirical 
studies are available on how working landscape initiatives address these risk factors. These 
knowledge gaps underpin my dissertation, which is guided by the following research question and 
objectives.  
Question: How can we govern working landscapes for human well-being and environmental 
protection?  
Objective 1: to propose a framework for the working landscapes approach. 
Objective 2: to examine the conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable working 
landscapes.  
Objective 3: to examine approaches for addressing risks in the management of working 
landscapes.  
In addressing these research objectives, I examined the governance of a grassland working 
landscape in the South of the Divide (SoD) region in Southwestern Saskatchewan. I found that 
working landscapes face unique governance challenges, including payment of costs, addressing 
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inequities, distrust, managing environmental risks, and addressing cross-scale mismatches. These 
challenges can be addressed by better understanding the conditions and mechanisms that foster 
sustainable working landscapes. In this regard, the governance change from command-and-control 
to collaborative, multilevel, and incentive-based approaches has helped improve the management 
of working landscapes. However, further governance transition may be required to enhance 
management outcomes and the sustainability of working landscapes.  
1.3 Empirical context  
The study was conducted in the South of the Divide (SoD) region in Southwestern Saskatchewan, 
Canada. The SoD is a working landscape characterized by human habitation, active productive 
activities (e.g., ranching and crop production), and environmental protection (e.g., species-at-risk 
management programs). I selected the SoD for the study because of: (1) the availability of multiple 
ecosystem services relevant for human well-being and environmental protection, (2) the magnitude 
of social-economic and environmental challenges facing the working landscape, and (3) the recent 
governance transition that occurred in response to the needs of the working landscape. These 
factors make the SoD an important context for studying the governance of working landscapes.  
The SoD is among the few places within the Northern Great Plains containing a sizable amount of 
Canada’s remaining intact native grasslands (WWF 2016b; WWF 2016a). In addition, as of 2014, 
the SoD was home to at least 13 species at various levels of risk of extinction (Environment and 
Climate Change Canada, 2016). As a result of these characteristics, the SoD was listed as one of 
the 11 priority areas identified by the federal government of Canada as part of its pan-Canadian 
approach for transforming species at risk conservation (Environment and Climate Change Canada 
2018). Furthermore, much of the land in the area is working landscapes managed by private land 
managers for crops and livestock production.  
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The region’s importance for both conservation and production makes it prone to several of the 
social-economic challenges that confront working landscapes (Chapter 4). There is a history of 
conflict between land managers, who are perceived to be destroying the environment, and 
government conservation organizations (Pittman 2019). This perception has made land managers 
in the region apprehensive of conservation organizations, especially those with a regulatory 
authority. Also, until recently, the institutional framework in the region has been top-down and 
focused on punishing land managers for declines in species populations. The instatement of the 
emergency protection order (EPO) for the Greater Sage Grouse in 2013 is one of the major 
highlights of this governance regime. This relationship between land managers and the government 
led to several problems, including mistrust, injustices and inequities, and negative impacts on 
livelihoods. These challenges are also compounded by the prevalence of drought in the region. 
Between 1900 and 2014, Canada’s Prairies experienced ten severe droughts (Bonsal et al., 2020). 
With greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions projected to increase, the occurrence of severe droughts 
will likely increase (Bonsal and Regier, 2007; Bonsal et al., 2011, 2020). These challenges must 
be addressed to ensure the sustainability of the working landscape.   
Fortunately, there has been a recent transition in governance to help address these problems. This 
transition is characterized by the use of incentives, collaboration, and multilevel institutional 
arrangements. This transition has had an overall positive impact on the management of the working 
landscape as land managers voluntarily engage in managing their lands for species at risk. This 
progressing in governance over the years, which led to the emergence of species at risk 
management outcomes, provides a unique opportunity to examine the conditions and underlying 
mechanisms in the governance system that resulted in the management outcomes. It also gives us 
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an opportunity to understand how the new governance framework helps overcome the risk factors 
that affect the working landscape approach.  
1.4 Structure and contribution of the thesis  
This dissertation follows the manuscript-based format, and it consists of three standalone 
manuscripts (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). Table 1.1 provides an overview of the three manuscripts. The 
other Chapters (2, 3 and 7) are designed to discuss key concepts, theories, and methods. The 
manuscripts collectively contribute to advancing the theory and practice of the working landscapes 
approach. Chapter 2 discusses the key concepts and theories that underpin the dissertation, and 
Chapter 3 describes the research design. 
Chapter 4 (Manuscript 1) proposes a conceptual framework for the working landscapes approach 
(Objective 1). This manuscript develops a conceptual framework for the working landscapes 
approach through a comprehensive review and synthesis of the governance dimension of working 
landscapes. The framework focuses on the local scale and how the local is embedded within 
multilevel governance arrangements. In the framework, the working landscapes approach is 
structured in terms of the social-ecological context, the key ingredients, collective action, and a 
linking mechanism. These elements, together, explain the social and ecological processes 
underpinning the approach and their impacts on social well-being and environmental protection.  
Chapters 5 (Manuscript 2) and 6 (Manuscript 3) apply the framework differently. Chapter 5 
examined the link between governance (exemplified in the framework by key ingredients) and 
management (exemplified in the framework as collective action) to identify the mechanisms and 
the institutional change processes that lead to sustainable management of working landscapes. This 
study is the first to adopt a mechanism-based approach to unpack the relationship between 
governance and management. The manuscript finds that a transition from top-down command-
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and-control governance to one that fosters collaboration and multilevel interactions facilitates 
positive management outcomes for species at risk in working landscapes. However, this transition 
occurs under several governance conditions (e.g., facilitative leadership, trust, local autonomy, and 
incentives) which are connected by several mechanisms (e.g., institutional disruption, institutional 
crafting and drift, brokerage, program uptake, and alleviation of fear of harm). Overall, the paper 
finds that while the transition has had a positive impact on species at risk management, there is 
potential for improved outcomes when all the governance conditions or key ingredients important 
in the working landscape are addressed (e.g., equity).  
While Chapter 5 examined the governance change processes that facilitate the management of 
species at risk in the region, it did not address the social-ecological context factors that also affect 
species at risk management in working landscapes. Chapter 6 responds to this gap by examining 
the influence of environmental risks (an example of a social-ecological context factor under the 
framework) on species at risk management (a collective action issue) and how the new governance 
arrangements in the SoD help address these risks. The study used drought as an example of 
environmental risks and a Result-based conservation agreement program implemented by the 
South of the Divide Conservation Action Program (SODCAP) as an example of the new 
governance arrangements in the region. It finds that environmental risks affect land managers 
involved with Results-based Agreements both by limiting their ability to achieve ecosystem targets 
and by forcing them to incur extra costs (i.e., extra management and opportunity costs) in their 
attempt to meet ecosystem targets under drought conditions. It also revealed that SODCAP, under 
the new governance arrangements, adopts a participatory and result-enhancing approach to 
environmental risk management. This approach helps protect land managers against the negative 
impacts of environmental risks and leads to better outcomes for species at risk management. 
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Chapter 7 provides a concluding synthesis of the three manuscripts and highlights their collective 
contributions to both theory and practice. The limitations of the current research and directions for 
future research are also highlighted.  




Manuscript title  Journal 
(Target)  
Status Objective addressed  







to propose a 
framework for the 
working landscapes 
approach 
5 Opening the black box 
between governance and 
management: a 
mechanism-based 
explanation of how 
governance affects the 
management of species at 
risk 
Ambio Submitted 
to journal  
to examine the 
conditions and 
mechanisms that foster 
sustainable working 
landscapes 
6 Adaptive co-management 
of environmental risks in 
Result-based Agreements 
for the Provision of 
Environmental Services: a 
case study of the South of 





Published  to examine approaches 
for addressing risks in 




Chapter 2: Literature review  
2.1 Introduction 
My doctoral research broadly contributes to the planning of sustainable human-nature relations in 
rural environments using a working landscapes perspective. Therefore, this chapter is structured 
to describe the history and planning thinking underpinning contemporary approaches to planning 
sustainable human-nature relations and how the working landscapes perspective can provide useful 
lessons for advancing such efforts. I begin by exploring the challenges planners face when 
attempting to integrate social-economic development and environmental protection (section 2.2). 
I also introduce ‘sustainability planning’ as the most promising framework for addressing these 
challenges. In particular, I argue that rural-environmental planning, which has received the least 
attention among planning scholars (section 2.3) and has recently undergone a multifunctional 
transition, will benefit from applying the sustainability planning framework. Furthermore, I 
introduce the working landscapes approach as a useful example that is situated within the 
sustainability planning framework and could offer important lessons for advancing the planning 
for sustainable human-nature relations. Finally, I use governance as a context, a set of theories, 
and practices that rural-environmental planners can rely on to diagnose problems, make and 
implement plans relating to sustainable human-nature relations.  
2.2 Planning sustainable human-nature relations   
The planning project has evolved around people’s relations with others and the natural 
environment (Healey 2016; Campbell and Zellner 2020). However, for more than half of the 
twentieth century, when the planning project took shape, the physical fabric of the city 
(beautification), management of urban expansion, and addressing social inequities between the 
elites, the working class, and the poor took centre stage. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that 
the real concern about the negative environmental impacts of economic growth and resource 
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exploitation became apparent and spurred action on the front of human relations with the natural 
environment. Towards the end of the twentieth century, and following the release of the 
Brundtland report in 1987 (Brundtland 1987), the planning profession became very much aware 
of the challenge of managing people’s relationship with the natural environment. Writing in 1996, 
Campbell (1996, 296) argues that “…planners face tough decisions about where they stand on 
protecting the green city, promoting the economically growing city, and advocating social justice.” 
Essentially, Campbell recognizes that environmental protection (symbolized by the green city) has 
become a central goal of planning, alongside economic growth and social justice (Figure 2.1). 
However, he also recognizes how interconnected these goals are through the conflicts these 
separate planning goals generate. He thus argues that planners must address three main conflicts: 
the resource conflict, which results from the need for economic growth and environmental 
protection; the property conflict, which results from the need for social equity and economic 
growth; and the development conflict, which results from the need for social equity and 
environmental protection. Though extremely oversimplified, Campbell’s planner’s triangle 
provides a useful framework for understanding the complex nature of planning decisions, and in 




Figure 2.1. The triangle of conflicting goals for planning and the three associated conflicts.   
Source: Campbell (1996)  
 
Despite the enthusiasm that accompanied the environmental protection goal of planning, planning 
struggled to escape its history of promoting the development of cities at the detriment of the natural 
environment (Campbell 1996; Wheeler 2004). Part of the challenge was how to reconcile the 
conflicts emanating from the three distinct goals of planning. A search for a common ground led 
planners to embrace the notion of sustainability as a pathway that leads to the “elusive centre” of 
the planner’s triangle. In what is now commonly referred to as sustainability planning (Wheeler 
2004; Wong and Goldblum 2008; Wheeler 2016), scholars agree that planning must address the 
3Es (environmental protection, economic development, and equity). For some, sustainability is the 
new, radical, and transformative planning paradigm that holds the key to a better future (Wheeler 
2016). Yet, the attractiveness of the sustainability planning idea has raised pessimism and new 
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conceptual challenges. Notable among these challenges is how to define and operationalize 
sustainability. As Campbell argues, the sustainability craze will not be any different from the 
1950s’ belief in comprehensive planning if concrete steps are not taken to redefine and 
operationalize sustainable development. The efforts to define and operationalize sustainability in 
planning are ongoing; however, two efforts are worth noting here.  
2.2.1 Wheeler’s Sustainability Planning theory  
The first effort at operationalizing sustainability planning is Wheeler's (2004, 2016) view of 
sustainability planning as a paradigm shift characterized by (1) result-oriented problem solving, 
(2) a long-term perspective, (3) an ecological thought, (4) a focus on place, and (5) active 
involvement of the public in problem-solving. First, result-oriented approaches to problem-solving 
imply that planning must be proactive and establish explicit targets based on existing and 
anticipated problems and work towards achieving them. Some of these sustainability goals have 
become common knowledge to most planners. For example, society must work to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, it must address social injustices, and it must reverse the rapid loss of 
biodiversity. However, there are other local or place-specific goals such as supporting rural 
employment and traditional lifestyles and promoting age-friendly communities that planners must 
proactively integrate into planning decisions over the long term. Both common and place-specific 
goals cannot be achieved through the business-as-usual approach where planners ‘muddle through’ 
(as this approach has been found to be too slow to meet sustainability targets) (Rees 2010; Moos 
2017). Rather, they require that planners take a long-term perspective (see below) that recognizes 
the power of planning to create desired future conditions (Freestone 2012; Moos 2020). Thus, the 
result-oriented approach to sustainability planning stands in contrast with the idea of “muddling 
through” (Lindblom 1959) and other short-sighted incremental approaches to planning. Second, 
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as a long-term perspective, Wheeler argues that sustainability planning must create institutions and 
methods of analysis that focus on long-term change and discourage incentives for short-term 
thinking. This implies dethroning existing structures that gratify short-term accomplishments (e.g., 
economic growth indicators such as GDP and the use of discount rates, which assume that the 
economic consequences of actions in the present are worth more than similar actions in the future). 
It also implies the development of approaches to better demonstrate how short-term action would 
and could lead to long-term results (e.g., ecological footprint analysis) (Rees 2010). Third, 
sustainability planning is underpinned by an ecological thought – “the ability to understand the 
dynamic, evolving, radically contingent, and interdependent nature of human and natural systems.” 
(Wheeler 2016, 56). This ecological worldview hinges on a strong desire to develop common 
values and rules that can facilitate survival on earth (a small planet) – an acceptance of the limits 
of growth. For planners, an ecological worldview “emphasizes communication and education to 
help evolve understanding; advocacy planning to achieve shared goals; evolving incentives and 
mandates between different levels of government.” Also, because the ecological worldview takes 
a holistic perspective of the world – i.e., the web of life, it is concerned with linking the different 
scales of planning through multilevel institutions and collaborations (Wheeler 2004). Wheeler 
juxtaposes this ecological paradigm with modernist and post-modernist approaches to planning, 
which emphasized rational-comprehensive planning and decentralized local planning, respectively 
(Table 2.1). Fourth, Wheeler indicates that planning without attention to place attachment often 
leads to indiscriminate exploitation of natural ecosystems and a lack of stewardship ethic. In his 
view, sustainability planning focuses on territory rather than function, enhancing a sense of place, 
promoting local environmental stewardship, and supporting place-oriented identities. The focus 
on place also helps align planning actions to local needs such as the type of employment and 
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lifestyle. Finally, sustainability planning requires the active participation of everyone, especially 
underrepresented groups, in problem-solving. This implies attention to value-sensitive advocacy, 
institutional entrepreneurship, and grassroots mobilization to solve problems.  
Table 2.1. Modernist, post-modernist, and ecological worldviews of planning  






Values Universal values 
based on modern 
science 
Pluralistic values 
based on cultural and 
cognitive traditions 
Acknowledges pluralism but 
also a shared core value set 




problems down into 
constituent parts; 




multiple ways of 
viewing the world 
Focuses on interrelationships 









Ecological science; chaos 
theory; systems theory; social-








Emphasizes flexible and 
evolving relationships between 












Emphasizes communication and 
education to help evolve 
understanding; advocacy 
planning to achieve shared 
goals; evolving incentives and 
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gain consensus on 
directions 
mandates between different 
levels of government 
Source: Wheeler (2016, 56) 
2.2.2 Campbell’s procedural and substantive pathways to sustainability  
Unlike Wheeler, who focused on defining a worldview of sustainability planning, Campbell 
outlines practical – procedural and substantive – pathways for planners to achieve sustainable 
development. Campbell’s first point is that sustainability planning calls for a shift in focus from 
“adversarial confrontation” (e.g., pricing externalities) to conflict negotiation, which he argues 
provides win-win outcomes. However, he also acknowledges that conflict negotiation may have 
its limitations in everyday planning. For example, in some cases, problem-solving may require an 
either-or approach or an all-or-nothing dispute (e.g., whether to build a hydroelectric power plant 
or not). Even in those circumstances where finding common ground appears impossible, conflict 
negotiation can still help find compromises or identify joint gains (Forester, 2016). Secondly, 
Campbell argues that in addition to procedural paths like conflict negotiation, planners can achieve 
sustainability through substantive pathways. For example, he suggests that land use and design 
approaches that seek to obtain a balance between the built and unbuilt environments can help 
resolve the conflict between economic and environmental interests. He emphasized the need for 
spatial interconnectivity for both wilderness and built areas. Campbell also proposes 
bioregionalism as a framework for attaining sustainability. Bioregionalism calls for “the rescaling 
of communities and the economy according to the ecological boundaries of the physical region” 
(Campbell 1996, 307). It is believed that the “ecological determinism” associated with 
bioregionalism enhances environmental awareness as the residents are connected to the ecological 
resources. In this regard, Campbell agrees with Wheeler that “place” is crucial for sustainability 
planning. Campbell, however, cautions that too much emphasis on ecological determinism can 
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sometimes overlook the interdependent nature of societies. In many ways, Campbell’s substantive 
approaches to sustainability align themselves to the ecological worldview (Table 2.1), while his 
procedural pathways provide practical steps to help address the conflicts arising from addressing 
plural interests.  
In sum, planning has historically struggled to find approaches to effectively address challenges 
relating to human-nature relations. However, the sustainability planning theory offers a promising 
framework that better engages with both the human and natural systems. The promise of the 
sustainability planning framework lies in its (1) focus on the ecological worldview, which 
emphasizes the complex interdependence of human and natural systems – this better responds to 
the need to address human (social-economic) and environmental challenges in concert; (2) 
emphasis on better connections between long-term, result-oriented planning goals and short-term 
planning actions – this helps avoid planning actions that lead to unsustainable long-term 
environmental outcomes; (3) emphasis on a balance between plural values or interests and shared 
goals – this helps direct plural values towards common ends; (4) focus on place – this helps align 
planning actions with the needs of the local people and take advantage of their local knowledge 
and environmental stewardship ethic; (5) focus on institutional change – this calls for evolution of 
planning institutions to better respond to the multilevel and interdependent nature of environmental 
problems; and (6) focus on conflict negotiation – this helps achieve consensus or at least joint 
gains involving human-nature conflicts.  
2.3 Situating rural-environmental planning in the sustainability planning framework  
For the majority of the public (some planners included), planning is all about cities and, to some 
extent, the peripheries of these cities. ‘The rural’ has historically been marginalized, especially in 
planning theory (Selman 1995; Hibbard and Frank 2019). The reasons for this marginalization are 
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varied. First, the contemporary form of planning arose in response to the rapid urbanization 
experienced during the industrial revolution (Hibbard and Frank 2019). At the same time, rural 
planning issues such as the management of natural resources (e.g., soils, forests, minerals, and 
water) and the reformation of local community institutions were also emerging. Unfortunately, as 
Selman (1995) argues, most of these rural planning issues emerged as concerns of public, private, 
and voluntary agencies. The lack of direct links to local planning authorities meant that planners 
did not have to provide solutions for them. Second, responding to the demands of modernism in 
the 1950s, rural primary production became highly industrialized. This industrialization and the 
need to connect primary production to industries disconnected agriculture from natural resources 
management and local communities (Hibbard et al. 2015). The result was the widespread concern 
of the destruction of the natural environment which occurred in the late 1970s. Responding to these 
concerns, the environmental movement began to emphasize environmental protection without 
regard to the effects on rural employment, livelihoods, and lifestyle (Hibbard et al. 2015). These 
two forces – industrialization and the environmental movement – further decoupled production 
and environmental protection. This resulted in further separation of environmental protection and 
rural agriculture as independent fields studied by conservationists, rural sociologists, and 
agricultural economists (Selman 1995). Third, the second wave of urbanization which intensified 
in the 1970s and the associated conversion of rural land led to the re-conceptualization of ‘the 
rural’. Planners began to think about the city-region as the appropriate scale for planning. Thus, 
the rural became just a part of the city-region that was yet to be developed, sources of leisure for 
urban dwellers, and suppliers of ecosystem services (Hibbard and Frank 2019). However, as recent 
studies have shown, rural areas – places between cities – are important and deserve theoretical 
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attention by planning scholars (Harrison and Heley 2015; Frank and Hibbard 2016; Gallent and 
Gkartzios 2019).  
Rural planning “…is interpreted broadly as policy, place-making, regulation and design 
interventions that shape rural places.” (Gallent and Gkartzios 2019, 5). This conception of rural 
planning is a departure from traditional conceptions of rural planning as focusing on addressing 
the negative impacts of physical change (e.g., the threats of urbanization on rural lands) through 
top-down command-and-control strategies. It embraces emerging concerns of multilevel 
interactions, the need for collaboration among the diverse actors operating within the rural and 
natural resources space, and the need to address multiple planning goals (i.e., the three Es of 
planning). Among the varied reasons that make rural planning a useful endeavour, Scott et al. 
(2019, 1) rightly suggest that “managing land-use change and mediating between competing 
interests in the use of land is central to the rural planning challenge, particularly given threats to 
natural resources and importance of balancing global challenges with local demands and needs.” 
Similarly, Hibbard et al. (2015) argue that contemporary rural planning focuses on integrating 
production, environmental protection, and consumption within the rural landscapes. These foci of 
rural planning are aligned with the important role that rural areas play in addressing global 
environmental challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss, among others.  
The environmental focus of contemporary rural planning draws parallels with the emergence of 
the environmental protection goal in planning theory and practice (section 2.2). In particular, it has 
shifted the focus of rural planning from sectoral policymaking (mainly agriculture and 
conservation) and the protection of agricultural lands from urban ‘invasion’ towards an integrated 
approach. Rural planning is increasingly concerned with addressing multiple, often contested goals 
of planning, including production, protection, and consumption (Hibbard et al. 2015; Frank and 
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Hibbard 2016). Some scholars have referred to this change as a transition from productivist (i.e., 
rural areas as centres of primary production) to multifunctional uses or “multifunctional transition” 
(McCarthy 2005; Holmes 2012). This multifunctional transition has posed new challenges to rural 
planners who are in search of common ground to reach the elusive centre of the planners’ 
sustainability triangle. I argue that the sustainability planning theory (section 2.2) provides a useful 
framework for guiding such efforts for several reasons. To begin with, “the multifunctional 
transition demands that planning takes into account the future economic, social, and environmental 
consequences of contemplated actions.” (Frank and Hibbard 2016, 250). This indicates the need 
for a long-term perspective and better connections between long-term planning and short-term 
actions as proposed by sustainability planning theories. Second, the need to mediate conflicting 
interests in rural planning (Gallent and Gkartzios 2019) cannot be achieved through adversarial 
planning. Lessons from our past experiences of command-and-control resource governance in 
rural areas (Cox 2016; Long et al. 2018; Abrams et al. 2020) suggest that more consensus-based 
approaches and conflict negotiation present better opportunities for success. Third, rural-
environmental planning advocates for the recoupling of rural production and conservation with 
communities (Frank and Reiss 2014). This suggests a focus on place as an important principle for 
planning. There are advantages for focusing on place in rural contexts, including enhancing local 
environmental stewardship and promoting sustainable rural livelihoods. Forth, planning 
institutions are not structured to fit contemporary rural planning challenges. For example, 
environmental regulations and conservation incentives that are commonly used to integrate 
conservation and production in rural areas are considered issues of concern to NGOS and higher-
level (federal and provincial) government agencies. This calls for institutional change to better 
meet the rural planning challenges.  
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2.4 The multifunctional landscapes planning gap and the promise of the working 
landscapes approach   
The multifunctional transition of rural environments has come with new challenges for planners. 
Notable among them is the need to integrate social-economic development and environmental 
protection and restoration in rural landscapes (Hibbard et al. 2015). This challenge is not 
insignificant. Rural planners are often required to not only resolve the obvious conflict between 
conservation and social-economic development through zoning and physical design, but they must 
also address issues of mistrust, costs, equity, knowledge access and knowledge integration, and 
scale mismatches that hinder efforts to integrate development and conservation (Cash et al. 2006; 
Pittman and Armitage 2016; Ayambire et al. 2021). Unfortunately, even the sustainability planning 
framework, which has the greatest promise to address the emerging rural-environmental planning 
challenges (section 2.3), still lacks appropriate strategies to deal with these complex issues. For 
example, while writing about UK’s rural planning system, Paul Selman observes that 
multifunctional-landscape plans were the missing link in sustainability planning (Selman 2002). 
This limitation is not only relevant to the UK alone. In other parts of the world that appear to be 
embracing multifunctional landscape planning, the efforts seem to focus exclusively on 
environmental protection or social-economic development (Hibbard et al. 2015).  
I use the working landscapes approach (section 2.5) as an attempt to situate the sustainability 
planning framework within rural multifunctional landscapes. The approach could offer important 
lessons for advancing the planning for sustainable human-nature relations in the following ways: 
(1) the procedural approaches that can foster effective integration of diverse interests in rural 
multifunctional landscapes, (2) the substantive long-term goals and related short-term actions that 
can guide multifunctional landscapes planning practice, (3) the institutional change required to 
foster multifunctional landscapes planning, and (4) emerging innovative techniques that planners 
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can adopt to integrate social-economic development and environmental protection in 
multifunctional landscapes. In the next section (section 2.5), I introduce the working landscapes 
approach and demonstrate its utility for informing sustainable human-nature relations.   
2.5 The working landscapes approach 
Working landscapes are generally defined as rangelands, forests, and cultivated fields that are 
managed for human well-being and environmental protection through collective action (Table 2.2). 
These landscapes must already be in use for human productive activities (e.g., forestry, ranching, 
crop farming) and do not imply the conversion of protected areas or wild lands. Working 
landscapes are a typical example of multifunctional landscapes in that they supply multiple 
ecosystem services that may conflict with each other. For example, working landscapes provide 
critical habitats for wild species, enhance landscape connectivity for migratory species, serve as 
carbon sinks, provide food, fibre, timber, leisure, and employment for the many people that live 
and work on them (DeFries et al. 2007; Hansen and DeFries 2007; Huntsinger and Sayre 2007; 
Sayre 2007; Chazdon et al. 2009; Reiter et al. 2021). Also, working landscapes and protected areas 
represent typical examples of the sectoral policymaking (with working landscapes signifying 
production and protected areas representing conservation) that followed the industrial revolution 
(Hibbard et al. 2015; Frank and Hibbard 2016; Frank and Hibbard 2017). Therefore, the working 
landscapes approach, which advocates for the integration of development and conservation within 
single landscapes and also to connect working landscapes and protected areas in a matrix form 
(Kremen and Merenlender 2018), exemplifies the multifunctional transition in rural areas. 
In addition to the multifunctionality of working landscapes, the approach engages with some of 
the critical questions that rural planning scholarship requires to advance sustainable human-nature 
relations. For example, the working landscapes scholarship addresses the challenges and benefits 
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of integrating production and conservation (Brook et al. 2003; Olive 2016; Farley et al. 2017), the 
institutional change required to advance this integration (Henderson et al. 2014; Pascual et al. 
2014; Sikor et al. 2014; Farley et al. 2017; Pittman 2019), and the innovative policies and 
incentives required (Ayambire et al. 2021; Ayambire and Pittman 2021). These features make the 
working landscapes approach a useful example for informing multifunctional landscape planning 
in rural environments.  
Table 2.2. Sample definitions of working landscapes  
Definition  Source (s) 
"Conservation in working landscapes maintains biodiversity, provides goods 
and services for humanity, and supports the abiotic conditions necessary for 
sustainability and resilience."… "Working lands conservation emphasizes 
the critical role of managing the matrix for species conservation to 




"The term working landscape generally refers to agricultural lands 




"… "working landscapes" thus carries the weight of a vast and diverse array 
of "ecosystem services" that humans both rely on and alter for better or 
worse. In this sense, it proposes as an ideal the synergistic combination of 
commodity production with the provision of public benefits of various 
kinds." 
(Huntsinger and 
Sayre 2007, 3) 
"When most people talk about the 'Working Landscape' they are referring to 
the land actively used in productive agriculture and forestry. Yet to many 
Vermonters, the working landscape also means additional public values it 
provides, including aesthetics, contributions to the tourism economy, and its 
central role in building a common sense of place and the Vermont quality of 
life. These values are all hard to quantify, but vital to the personal identity of 
Vermonters." 




2.6 Advancing sustainable human-nature relations through governance  
Conventional top-down command-and-control strategies fail to address the complex challenges in 
working landscapes and many other contexts involving human-nature relations (Holling and Meffe 
1996; Cox 2016). At the same time, traditional citizen participation, a common approach adopted 
by planners, is fraught with challenges that hinder the fulfillment of genuine participation (Gaventa 
2002; Fischer 2012).  
Whereas citizen participation in the governmental process has traditionally focused on 
measures designed to support and facilitate increased public access to information about 
governmental activities, efforts to extend the rights of the citizens to be consulted on public 
issues which affect them, and to see that the broad citizenry will be heard through fair and 
equitable representative political systems, participatory governance seeks to deepen this 
participation by examining the assumptions and practices of the traditional view that 
generally hinders the realization of a genuine participatory democracy. (Fischer 2012, 2).  
This is especially true in rural landscapes where their multifunctionality gives rise to tensions over 
resource extraction and conservation among diverse stakeholders (wicked problems), some of 
which must not only be heard but must actively take part in shaping decisions and actions 
(Henderson et al. 2014). In this regard, governance emerged as “a new space for decision-making” 
(Fischer 2012, 1) that helps deepen participation by permitting: (1) the entry of multiple actors 
outside of the state into the decision-making space, (2) innovative approaches to problem-solving, 
and (3) emphasis on interactive and collaborative processes and the blurring of the boundaries 
separating the state, market, and the civil society (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Ansell and Gash 
2008; Driessen et al. 2012; Bennett and Satterfield 2018; Stoker 2018).  
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Planning is usually conceived as an instrument to implement aspects of governance goals or as a 
form of governance practice (Pierre 1999; Healey 2009; Campbell and Zellner 2020). This 
conception sees governance as a framework within which planners intervene in complex 
sustainability problems through the ‘professional practice of planning.’ However, governance can 
also be perceived as a context, a set of theories, and processes or practices which planners use to 
diagnose problems, make and implement sustainability solutions. I use governance in line with 
this second view as a context (i.e., rules, regulations, and institutional arrangements that enable 
effective management of resources), a process, and a set of theories (Pittman and Armitage 2016) 
that explain the interaction between multiple stakeholders and how those interactions translate into 
or affect sustainable outcomes. Using governance this way allows for a deeper exploration of 
conventional governance theories and propositions (e.g., effective environmental governance is 
needed to foster effective management) that can inform planning scholarship and practice. It also 
helps situate planners within the governance system to understand how their interactions with 
others can impact the natural environment. This is particularly important for rural environments 
where many have perceived the task of managing multifunctional landscapes as the work of non-
profits and higher-level government organizations rather than planners.  
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Chapter 3: Research design  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research design used to complete the study. It starts by describing the 
knowledge claims underpinning the research, followed by the strategies of inquiry and data 
collection and analysis techniques employed (Figure 3.1). Overall, the research design follows the 
qualitative research design advanced by Creswell (2009). The methods employed for the study are 
briefly described below and discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
3.2 Knowledge claims  
“Policy analysis and planning are practical processes of argumentation” (Fischer and 
Forester 1993, 2).  
 
Knowledge claims refer to the worldviews that underpin research, including what is there to be 
known, how to know it, how to obtain the knowledge and the specific procedures available for 
obtaining the knowledge (Creswell 2009). These broad worldviews influence how researchers go 
about gathering and contributing to knowledge (Creswell 2009). Many paradigms exist that 
underpin the claims researchers make about knowledge; however, my research is guided by the 
paradigm of pragmatism. Pragmatism is an alternative paradigm that positions itself somewhere 
outside of the metaphysical debate between positivism/post-positivism and constructivism 
(Morgan 2014). It avoids the unending controversy regarding truth and reality and orients itself 
towards solving real-life problems (Feilzer 2010; Frey 2018). Thus, "[t]ruth is what works at the 
time and not based on the dualism between reality independent of the mind (as with postpositivism 
and critical paradigms) and within the mind (as with constructivist and deconstructivist 
paradigms)" (Frey 2018).  
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Pragmatist planners believe that researchers can gain important knowledge through learning from 
and reflecting on the everyday experiences of practitioners (Ansell 2001; Healey 2009; Forester 
2013). Similarly, practitioners can learn from their experiences and refine the approaches they use 
in professional practice. Thus, as Dewey argued, the process of “…developing knowledge of the 
world and acting in the world were all part of the same process of learning and discovering through 
experience” (Healey 2009, 280). In addition, these experiences can then help confirm or refine the 
theories researchers use (i.e., the theory-in-use) to orient their original research (Forester 2013). 
This is reflected in how I draw on the practical experiences of land managers and NGOs on the 
governance of working landscapes to inform planning and environmental governance theory.  
Methodologically, pragmatism rejects the notion of philosophical loyalty and instead places the 
'research problem' at the centre of the research (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006; Creswell 2009). 
According to pragmatists, the focus of research should be about determining the methods that are 
well-suited to the research problem of interest (Frey 2018). Therefore, a researcher should not be 
bounded by the two extremes of positivism and constructivism, with their associated quantitative 
and qualitative methods, respectively. Because of this flexibility regarding the choice of methods 
(i.e., a methodological plurality), pragmatism is mostly associated with mixed-methods research 
(Feilzer 2010; Frey 2018). It must be noted, however, that pragmatism is not naturally aligned to 
any specific methods. Another distinguishing feature of pragmatism is that it is real-world and 
practice-oriented (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Thus, the research questions pragmatists seek to 
answer should be identified from and have relevance to real-life problems rather than factitiously 
and arbitrarily set by the researcher (Johnston 2009; Kaushik and Walsh 2019). In this regard, my 
research is aligned with pragmatism because the research questions I seek to answer emanated 
from close interaction with practitioners who desired responses to practical questions. My interest, 
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therefore, is to adopt the variety of methods that are appropriate for addressing these questions 
rather than limiting the choice of methods to certain philosophical traditions, including post-
positivism and constructivism. Thus, I select methods, collect data, and interpret the results based 
on the pragmatism research paradigm.  
3.3 Strategies of inquiry  
I use two strategies of inquiry throughout this dissertation. First, I use an integrative literature 
review (Torraco 2005; Rocco and Plakhotnik 2009) to develop a framework for the working 
landscapes approach (Objective 1). An integrative literature review is "a form of research that 
reviews, critiques, and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such 
that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated" (Torraco 2005, 356). Integrative 
reviews are methodologically rigorous, permits the combination of knowledge from different 
research traditions and fields, and allows for the creation of a preliminary holistic understanding 
of an emerging phenomenon (Rocco and Plakhotnik 2009; Snyder 2019). I use the integrative 
literature review approach to help craft a framework for the working landscapes approach, drawing 
on the following: 1) the challenges and opportunities for integrating environmental protection and 
production in working landscapes, and 2) existing institutional solutions used in promoting 
environmental protection and production on working landscapes.  
Second, I use a case-oriented approach to gather empirical data to examine the conditions and 
mechanisms that foster sustainable working landscapes (Objective 2). Also, I use the case-oriented 
approach to gather empirical data to investigate how programs based on the working landscape 
approach address risk factors associated with the management of working landscapes (Objective 
3). Case studies allow for an in-depth and multi-faceted investigation of complex issues in their 
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real-life settings. This makes it appropriate for a phenomenon like the governance of working 
landscapes that is highly linked with people's lived experiences.  
3.4 Data collection  
I collected qualitative data in relation to the strategies of inquiry outlined in section 3.3: integrative 
reviews and case study. The data collection process is summarized below and further explained in 
the individual manuscripts (Chapters 5 and 6).  
3.4.1 Data searching for integrative review  
An integrative review of literature emphasizes rigorous methods and transparent data collection 
and analysis criteria (Whittemore and Knafl 2005). I combined a variety of data sources to help 
discover the variety of literature on working landscapes. These data sources include academic 
databases (e.g., Scopus and Web of Science). In addition, I consulted experts from fields that 
engage with the working landscape scholarships for suggestions on studies that might be useful 
for the study purpose. I briefed these experts (four in total) about the study and requested inputs 
regarding relevant studies from their respective fields. Bodies of scholarship that were included 
are environmental governance and policy, environmental economics, and environmental justice. 
These bodies of scholarship are included based on a survey of the literature to identify potential 
bodies of scholarships that might be relevant for understanding the governance of working 
landscapes. In total, 110 articles and six (6) reports were included in the study (Appendix E).  
3.4.2 Primary data collection   
I collected primary qualitative data using in-depth interviews (n=14 ranchers), focus group 
discussions (n=2, 5 and 4 people per group, respectively), participatory observation, and strategic 
project committee meetings to address objectives two and three. Empirical data collection for the 
project took place over three months from May-July 2019. The sample size is relatively small, 
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considering the total number of beef farmers in the region (N=728) (Statistics Canada, 2016). 
However, because I was interested in ranchers with experience with SODCAP’s conservation 
programs, this sample covered many of the conservation leaders in the region. In addition, I 
collected the data until I reached theoretical saturation (Suddaby, 2006). The interview and FGD 
participants were purposively selected from ranchers in the SoD area involved with community 
pastures, grazing corporations, or grazing cooperatives (n=4) participating in SODCAP’s 
conservation programs. Ranchers were selected in consultation with SODCAP and other key 
informants involved with managing local community pastures, grazing corporations, or 
cooperatives. These ranchers were known as "good managers" who were actively engaged in 
conservation. They also are known to have multiple species at risk on their properties. In total, 23 
ranchers were either interviewed or participated in the FGDs (Appendix D).  
Aside from the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, I undertook participatory 
observation of habitat monitoring and the recruitment of land managers into the SODCAP’s 
conservation programs. The purpose of the observation of the recruitment exercise was to gather 
data on what land managers considered important in deciding to participate in working landscape 
conservation. The observation of the habitat monitoring process provided a basic understanding of 
how results were determined as part of SODCAP’s conservation programs and compensation 
payment. I also held one meeting with SODCAP’s project committee to corroborate findings from 
the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.   
3.4 Data analysis  
I used two main analytical techniques throughout the thesis: (1) qualitative analysis (Chapters 4 
and 6) and (2) process tracing (Chapter 5). The qualitative analysis followed the basic coding and 
analysis processes for qualitative data outlined in Creswell (2009). For the primary data (i.e., 
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interviews and focus group discussions), I first transcribed the data verbatim. The transcribed data 
were then organized under individual questions or themes and read through to gain a general 
understanding of the responses. Second, I coded the data using the NVivo qualitative data analysis 
software. Both inductive and deductive processes were used in the coding, where some themes 
were determined a priori through the review of the literature, and new themes were included as 
and when they emerged during the coding. Third, the coded data were segregated into themes and 
descriptions. Finally, the themes and descriptions were analyzed to identify interrelationships and 
then subjected to interpretation. I followed a similar approach for the literature review (Chapter 
4), except that I did not have to transcribe any data. Thus, I skipped the first step in Creswell’s 
qualitative data coding and analysis process.  
I used process tracing – a qualitative approach that helps identify mechanisms that link input 
conditions to outcomes within single cases (Beach and Pedersen 2019) in Chapter 5 to identify the 
mechanisms and conditions that foster sustainable working landscapes. I began by identifying the 
input (e.g., governance) and output (e.g., management outcomes) conditions that exemplify 
sustainable working landscapes in the case region. This was followed by an inductive process that 
to identify the various conditions and mechanisms that connect governance to management 


























Figure 3.1. Research Plan  
3.6 Research Ethics  
The study adhered to the University of Waterloo's ethical guidelines and the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. The research was reviewed and 
approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics (ethics #31500). Table 3.1 
summarizes the ethical issues addressed.  
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Table 3.1. Ethical issues and approaches used to address them 
Ethical consideration  How it will be addressed  
Informed and prior consent to participate  Research respondents were made to 
understand the objectives of the research as 
well as their rights to opt out of the study at 
will. They were given a consent document to 
read and agree to participate before I 
proceeded to engage them.    
Anonymity and confidentiality of respondents  Participants were assured of their anonymity 
during the consenting process, and the data 
collected were encrypted to avoid 
unauthorized access. The data has also been 
de-identified to avoid any possible revelation 
of identity. 
Research reporting and community benefits   The benefits of the research to participants and 
the community were clearly articulated to the 






Chapter 4: Working Landscapes Approach: A Conceptual 
Framework 
Raphael Ayambire, Jeremy Pittman, Michael Drescher, Juan Moreno-Cruz & Andrea Olive   
 
4.1 Chapter Summary   
The working landscape approach is gaining rapid recognition for its potential to help address 
global environmental crises such as climate change and biodiversity loss and support social well-
being. Yet, the working landscapes approach still lacks a comprehensive conceptual framework to 
guide further research and practice. This article provides such a framework through a 
comprehensive review and synthesis of the governance dimension of working landscapes. The 
framework is built on five premises, including (1) the working landscapes approach focuses on 
simultaneously achieving social well-being and environmental protection goals within the 
landscapes, (2) it is concerned with fostering collective action among multiple actors to deliver 
sustainable outcomes, (3) the social-ecological context affects and is affected by the working 
landscape in question, (4) five key ingredients – equity, facilitative leadership, local autonomy, 
incentives, and trust – are essential for facilitating collective action in working landscapes, and (5) 
collaborative and multilevel interactions enhance governance fit in working landscapes. Our 
framework focuses on the local scale and how the local is embedded within multilevel governance 
arrangements. We hope that the framework we are proposing will help guide empirical case studies 
on the working landscapes approach, further its theoretical understanding, and contribute to 
enhancing policy aimed at increased social well-being and environmental protection.   
4.2 Introduction  
International commitments to advance sustainability through protected area designation continue 
to lag current and future sustainability thresholds (UNEP-WCMC and IUNC 2016). At the same 
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time, recent efforts to increase the amount of land under protection are more challenging than ever 
(Palomo et al. 2014; Jones et al. 2018; Hermoso et al. 2019b; Hermoso et al. 2019a). As a result, 
scholars and environmental groups have turned to working landscapes to complement protected 
areas (DeFries et al. 2007; Hansen and DeFries 2007; Chazdon et al. 2009; UNEP-WCMC and 
IUNC 2016; Drescher and Brenner 2018). The term ‘working landscape’ refers to rangelands, 
forests, and cultivated fields managed for human well-being and to protect the natural environment 
(Huntsinger and Sayre 2007; Kremen and Merenlender 2018). In this regard,  the term describes 
an approach to environmental management where land managers adopt management approaches 
that foster production and still maintain the ecological integrity of the landscapes to support wild 
species and mitigate climate change (Kremen and Merenlender 2018). However, due to the socio-
economic conflicts involved in managing land for human well-being and environmental 
protection, working landscapes are inherently associated with policy approaches that attempt to 
address the impasse between production and environmental protection (Cannavo 2007). We use 
the term “working landscapes approach” to encompass the environmental management approaches 
and the associated policy actions that support their implementation.  
The increasing interest in the working landscapes approach as a way to promote sustainability is 
evident in the growing amount of scholarship addressing the potential of the approach to promote 
human well-being and environmental protection (Polasky et al. 2005; McGranahan 2008; Kral et 
al. 2015; Chanchani et al. 2016; Eastburn et al. 2017; Kremen and Merenlender 2018; Baudron et 
al. 2019; Buotte et al. 2020). These studies suggest that the working landscapes approach is 
effective for enhancing sustainability by complementing protected areas through serving as critical 
habitats for wild species, carbon sinks, promoting soil health, and enhancing landscape 
connectivity, among others (Chanchani et al. 2016; Eastburn et al. 2017; Kremen and Merenlender 
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2018; Buotte et al. 2020). Yet, enhancing the potential of the working landscapes approach for 
promoting sustainability requires an understanding of the governance processes that underpin its 
success or otherwise (Estrada-Carmona et al. 2014; Brockington et al. 2018). This has remained 
unaddressed. In addition, the approach still lacks a comprehensive conceptual framework that 
brings together its different elements.  
Our aim in this article, therefore, is to propose a conceptual framework for the working landscapes 
approach focusing on its governance dimension. Our framework is built on five premises, which 
are as follows: (1) the working landscapes approach focuses on simultaneously achieving social 
well-being and environmental protection goals within the landscapes, (2) the working landscapes 
approach is concerned with fostering collective action among multiple actors to deliver sustainable 
outcomes, (3) the social-ecological context affects and is affected by the working landscape in 
question, (4) five key ingredients – equity, facilitative leadership, local autonomy, incentives, and 
trust – are essential for facilitating collective action in working landscapes, and (5) collaborative 
and multilevel interactions enhance governance fit in working landscapes. The first three premises 
are based on conceptual propositions put forward for enhancing the sustainability of working 
landscapes, while the final two premises are drawn from the emergent challenges confronting the 
working landscapes approach and the governance responses identified in the literature. In the 
following sections, we first explain these premises before synthesizing them into an integrated 
conceptual framework for the working landscape approach that is broad enough to work in 
different social and ecological contexts.   
The working landscapes approach can be applied at diverse scales and levels, including at sub-
national (i.e., local and regional) and cross-boundary levels. However, the framework we describe 
in this paper focuses on the local scale and how the local is embedded within multilevel governance 
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arrangements. Our focus on the local scale to frame the working landscapes approach is in response 
to the need for local resource users to actively participate in shaping policies that affect their lives 
and livelihoods (Armitage et al. 2020), especially given that the management of working 
landscapes is ultimately undertaken by local landowners and land managers. We hope that our 
framework for working landscapes approach will guide questions like 1) what enhances or inhibits 
the success of working landscapes at the local level? and 2) how can initiatives based on the 
working landscapes approach be designed, from an institutional perspective, to enhance success 
within diverse contexts? The framework is also expected to help advance interdisciplinary 
scholarship on working landscapes by facilitating empirical case studies on the approach. 
4.3 Methods  
We employ an integrative review methodology to develop the framework for the working 
landscapes approach. An integrative literature review is "a form of research that reviews, critiques, 
and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks 
and perspectives on the topic are generated" (Torraco 2005, 356). The integrative review has 
several differences from other forms of reviews but mainly because it focuses on generating or 
refining a theory, hypothesis, or a framework from existing literature (Whittemore and Knafl 2005; 
da Silva et al. 2020). Integrative reviews also allow for a combination of diverse forms and sources 
of data as well as empirical and theoretical research (da Silva et al. 2020). The integrative review 
we adopted in this paper follows the five steps outlined by Whittemore and Knafl (2005). The five 
steps include (1) problem identification and question formulation, (2) literature search, (3) data 
evaluation, (4) data analysis and (5) presentation or synthesis.  
Three main research questions guided this review: (1) how is the working landscapes approach 
defined? (2) what are the governance challenges confronting working landscapes? and (3) what 
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governance arrangements are used to address the challenges in working landscapes? We searched 
for relevant literature from SCOPUS and Web of Science. We chose SCOPUS and Web of Science 
because they cover a wide range of literature. This wide coverage helps us draw on several journals 
and databases to obtain relevant data for the topic.  
We searched the databases using a single search string, “working landscape” OR “working land.” 
Restricting the search to papers that explicitly mention “working landscapes” or “working lands” 
could omit some relevant data on working landscapes. However, because we are interested in 
exploring the conceptualization of the working landscape approach, we deemed it necessary to 
focus on studies that explicitly address the concept. We also complemented the systematic search 
with bibliographic searching and solicitation from four experts in fields that commonly engage 
with working landscapes (e.g., environmental governance, species at risk conservation policy, 
environmental economics, and environmental justice).  
The search returned 414 papers (293 from SCOPUS and 121 from WoS). We removed duplicates 
(156), leaving a total of 258 papers. These remaining papers were screened for inclusion using the 
following criteria: (1) the papers must be written in the English language, 2) they must be peer-
reviewed, 3) the papers must be relevant to working landscapes – defined broadly as land managed 
for social well-being and environmental protection, and 4) the papers must address issues of 
governance. After the screening, one hundred and ten (110) papers were included for analysis 
(Appendix E).  
The data analysis followed three steps. We first conducted open coding to identify all possible 
relevant themes (Plummer et al. 2012). The themes were broadly grouped under the three research 
questions. Thus, themes related to the conceptualization of the working landscapes approach were 
coded under “definitions,” themes related to challenges were coded “challenges,” and themes 
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under governance arrangements were coded “governance.” The second stage involved 
identification of sub-themes within the three broad themes. Three sub-themes emerged under 
“definitions,” framed under section 4.4 as the three propositions for the sustainability of working 
landscapes. Four sub-themes emerged under “challenges” (section 4.5), and three sub-themes 
emerged under “governance” (Section 4.6). Five key issues (Table 4.2) were further identified 
under the governance sub-theme “key ingredients.” To identify the key ingredients, we focused on 
issues that were reported as ‘important’ (including related concepts such as necessary, crucial, 
relevant, drivers, motivators, conditions, etc.) for the success of working landscape initiatives.    
The third stage involved an axial coding to identify patterns within the three separate thematic 
areas and between them (Pittman and Armitage 2016). To analyze patterns within and between 
themes, we focused on the presence of patterns and the direction of relationships. The 
“governance” themes appeared to be responding directly to the “challenges” themes. This 
relationship was summarized into two premises: (1) five key ingredients – equity, facilitative 
leadership, local autonomy, incentives, and trust – are essential for facilitating collective action in 
working landscapes and (2) collaborative and multilevel interactions enhance governance fit in 
working landscapes. These two premises, collectively, were related to the propositions under the 
“definitions” theme by acting as the social processes that facilitate the sustainability of working 
landscapes. These patterns of relationship are shown by the arrows in Figure 4.1.  
4.4 Conceptualizing the working landscapes approach: three propositions for sustainability 
The working landscapes approach aims to integrate the goals of sustaining people’s well-being 
and protecting the natural environment on lands already used for human productive activities (e.g., 
forestry, ranching, crop farming) through collective action. Our conception of the working 
landscapes approach is undergirded by three central propositions, including that the approach (1) 
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seeks to integrate social well-being and environmental protection in a working landscape, (2) 
involves collective action among multiple actors, and (3) is applicable on lands that are already 
used for productive human activities and not intended to promote the expansion of agriculture, 
etc., into currently intact areas. We expand on each of these three propositions in the following 
sections.  
4.4.1. Integration of multiple goals: social well-being and environmental protection   
The working landscapes approach aims to integrate the well-being of people and environmental 
protection within the landscape in a mutually agreeable way. Well-being is used here in line with 
the social conception of well-being. According to this conception, well-being refers to “[a] state 
of being with others and the natural environment that arises where human needs are met, where 
individuals and groups can act meaningfully to pursue their goals, and where they are satisfied 
with their way of life” (Armitage et al., 2012, p. 3; adapted from McGregor, 2008). The social 
conception of well-being is different from the conventional use of well-being, which perceives 
well-being as individualistic and basic needs-oriented because it nests individual needs within a 
broader social context of needs (Bennett et al. 2015). Nesting individual need within the broader 
social context is essential because individual needs are not universal and may sometimes conflict, 
yet there is often the need to reconcile these varied needs to achieve sustainability. The social 
conception of well-being provides the necessary tools to help reconcile and integrate the different 
individual needs. Also, social well-being recognizes that well-being is both a process and an 
outcome (Ansell and Gash 2008). In line with this, social well-being is multidimensional, 
encompassing material, relational, and subjective dimensions (White 2010). The material 
dimension of well-being focuses on an individual’s access to their physical needs, including 
income, assets, and the ecosystem services provided by the natural environment. Because access 
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to materials is affected by broader social structures (e.g., how land-use regulations affect farming 
or ranching), a crucial component of the material dimension of well-being is how social structures 
help distribute these materials fairly or otherwise. It is also concerned with whether environmental 
policies restrict access to material resources (Brueckner-Irwin et al. 2019) and whether there are 
alternative options (e.g., economic incentives) to help meet people’s material well-being needs. 
The relational dimension focuses on the social interactions among people and broader social 
structures (i.e., organizations and rules) that determine an individuals’ actions and influence in 
society (Ansell and Gash 2008). Therefore, relational issues are increasingly concerned with 
whether individuals and groups can participate, maintain their autonomous rights, and influence 
decisions affecting their lives or in their pursuit of well-being (Brueckner-Irwin et al. 2019). The 
subjective dimension of well-being directs attention to cultural values, identity, beliefs, and norms. 
In working landscapes, lifestyle attributes such as landowners’ or land manager’s sense of pride, 
their culture of ranching, and their moral obligation to steward the land for future generations can 
sometimes rank above profit-maximization (Ayambire et al. 2021). These subjective elements are 
crucial because they translate into people’s level of (dis)satisfaction or preferences towards 
policies (Brueckner-Irwin et al. 2019).   
Environmental protection is used broadly to refer to the maintenance of the ecological integrity of 
an ecosystem through the preservation and restoration of its natural features and functions or the 
introduction of new features to support the survival of specific ecosystem components (OECD 
2007). It is a broad term that encompasses various activities, including less-consumptive 
behaviours, pollution control, climate change mitigation, and biodiversity conservation, among 
others. However, for the purposes of this paper, activities that come under the umbrella of 
environmental protection may include soil conservation, habitat management, pollution control, 
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species at risk management, climate change mitigation, and the protection of biodiversity. The 
working landscapes approach may aim to address one or more of these environmental protection 
issues depending on the goals of the initiative. In fact, in many circumstances, working landscape 
initiatives address multiple environmental protection goals. For example, the South of the Divide 
Conservation Action Program Inc. (SODCAP), a conservation program in southwestern 
Saskatchewan that is based on the working landscapes approach, undertakes habitat restoration, 
native grassland management, and invasive species control, among others within the working 
landscape (SODCAP Inc., 2017).  
These environmental protection goals sometimes conflict with productive activities, such as 
ranching, forestry, and farming, activities that contribute to social well-being. The conflict results 
from the fact that undertaking environmental protection activities such as habitat management or 
climate change mitigation can ‘harm’ land managers in the form of reduced profits, increased 
management costs, or threaten certain lifestyles of landowners and land managers (referred to as 
land managers’ fear of harm) (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2016; Hossu et al. 2018; 
Reiter et al. 2021). Addressing this conflict is central to the working landscapes approach 
(Cannavò 2007). But how can this conflict be addressed? As we demonstrate in this paper, the 
conflict can be addressed using various governance arrangements and policies directed towards 
alleviating land manager’s individual and collective fear of harm (section 4). However, these 
policies and strategies may generally include providing incentives (Innes and Frisvold 2009) and 
enhancing the participation of diverse stakeholders in decision-making (Pascual et al. 2014; Martin 
et al. 2016; Olive 2016; Drescher and Brenner 2018). In addition, the policies and strategies should 
seek to engender collective action among the diverse actors, as collective action is an essential 
requirement for the sustainability of working landscapes (section 2.2).  
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Premise 1: The working landscapes approach focuses on integrating social well-being and 
environmental protection  
 
4.4.2 Collective action among multiple actors: state and non-state actors  
Collective action becomes necessary when the contribution of more than one actor is required to 
accomplish a given outcome (Sandler 2015). The theory of collective action was introduced by Mancur 
Olson (1965) and later popularized by Elinor Ostrom, who employed the theory to study how groups 
of natural resource users can self-organize to manage common-pool resources or public goods in a 
manner that helps them to escape the so-called tragedy of the commons (Cox et al. 2016; Partelow et 
al. 2020). However, the theory’s importance hinges on its ability to elucidate the drivers of cooperation 
among people in collective action situations and the social and ecological factors that influence 
collective action itself. In this regard, collective action has gained broader application in many policy 
and resource governance endeavours (Muradian and Rival 2012; Muradian 2013; Partelow et al. 2020).  
In this paper, we employ the collective action concept to explain the voluntary participation of multiple 
actors in undertaking environmental protection activities (e.g., species at risk conservation and climate 
change mitigation) or in the production of public ecosystem services (e.g., increasing biodiversity and 
carbon sequestration) on private, communal, and public working landscapes (Raymond 2006; 
Muradian 2013; Potoski and Prakash 2013). The effective provision of public ecosystem services or 
environmental protection in working landscapes requires the co-operation of many actors, including 
landowners or land managers, government, industry, environmental non-governmental organizations, 
communities, Indigenous actors, and the general public (Chazdon et al. 2009). Yet, the private interests 
of these actors, the large number of actors involved, and the non-excludable nature of most ecosystem 
services often make them prone to free-riding problems (Muradian and Rival 2012; Muradian 2013; 
Potoski and Prakash 2013). This makes collective action imperative for the working landscapes 
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approach. Aside from the need for collective action to foster environmental protection by eradicating 
free-riding problems, collective action can also contribute to social well-being by identifying and 
addressing the well-being factors that hinder or facilitate collective action. For example, a lack of 
participation in decision-making or misrecognition of people's identities can be perceived as injustices 
and lead to the refusal of landowners to enrol in conservation programs based on the working 
landscapes approach (Pascual et al. 2014; Martin et al. 2016; Olive 2016; Drescher and Brenner 2018). 
Similarly, landowners may refuse to enrol in conservation programs if their incomes are reduced unless 
adequate incentives are provided to accommodate the opportunity costs (Innes and Frisvold 2009).  
Collective action within the context of working landscapes can occur in multiple ways, such as between 
state and non-state actors, between different state actors, and between different non-state actors. 
Collective action between state and non-state actors is necessary when part or the whole of the 
working landscape belongs to or is under the management of private individuals or groups. For 
example, in the South of the Divide region, Saskatchewan, where about 46 percent of the grassland 
working landscape belongs to private individuals, the co-operation of these private landowners is 
required to effectively manage species-at-risk (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2016). Many 
similar examples exist across the world, including in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (Miller et 
al. 2001; Kaimowtz 2008; DeClerck et al. 2010), the Brazilian Amazon (Soares-filho et al. 2014), the 
Altar Valley in Arizona (Sayre 2007) and many others. Such need for co-operation is the reason behind 
the introduction of incentive schemes to foster voluntary participation in habitat management 
programs on both public and private lands. It is also the reason behind the introduction of grass 
banking initiatives in several parts of North America to help link conservation in private and public 
working landscapes (Gripne, 2005; Tack et al., 2019; Ayambire et al., 2021). Collective action may also 
be necessary between different state actors, especially where the spatial boundaries of a landscape 
extend beyond one political jurisdiction or where the functions of different state actors in relation to 
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the landscape intersect (e.g., agriculture and conservation). In the Milk River Watershed, the working 
landscape falls under the jurisdiction of three different governments: the provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan and the state of Montana (MRWCC, 2013). As a result, there is inter-jurisdictional co-
operation in managing the watershed (see the Milk River Transboundary State of the Watershed 
Report). Sometimes, collective action between state actors may occur across different scales and levels 
of governance (e.g., the Okanagan Valley (Parrott et al. 2019)). Finally, collective action is necessary 
among different non-state actors. The commonest form of collective action is needed between 
different land managers within the working landscape. Ferranto et al. (2013) refer to co-operation 
between different landowners or land managers in a working landscape as cross-boundary co-
operation. Cross-boundary co-operation involves land managers accounting for the “plans and 
practices of adjacent or nearby properties when making management decisions about their land” 
(Ferranto et al. 2013, 1083). This form of collective action is crucial for enhancing spatial coordination, 
a factor necessary for maximizing the production of public ecosystem services in working landscapes 
(Parkhurst et al. 2002; Hanley et al. 2012).  
To summarize, collective action is the intermediate outcome of institutional configurations that aim 
to integrate social well-being and environmental protection in working landscapes. However, the 
nature of the collective action and the actors involved are dependent on the scale and level of interest. 
At the local scale, where the interest of institutions is to incentivize co-operation among the actors 
directly involved in the management of the working landscape, collective action involves 
understanding what hinders or motivates land managers to participate (e.g., sign contracts, share 
information, reserve adjacent lands etc.) in the production of public ecosystem services. Therefore, at 
this scale, the working landscapes approach is concerned with understanding how to incentivize 
landowners to enrol and participate in voluntary environmental programs aimed at providing public 
ecosystem services (Ferraro 2008; Innes and Frisvold 2009; Potoski and Prakash 2013; Drescher et al. 
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2017). Actions often anticipated in working landscapes at the local scale include enrolment in 
programs, information sharing, learning, and environmentally friendly land management (Innes and 
Frisvold, 2009; Parrott et al., 2019; Reed, 2008; Sayre, 2007).  
Premise 2: Collective action enhances the sustainability of working landscapes by contributing to social well-being and 
environmental protection  
 
4.4.3 Social-Ecological context of working landscapes: productive human activities and social and 
ecological influences  
The last element of our definition focuses on the social-ecological context of working landscapes. 
The social-ecological context emphasizes both the character of the landscape itself and its 
interactions with other related SESs. Regarding the character of working landscapes, there is often 
confusion in the literature as to whether the working landscapes approach advocates for the 
domestication of wildlands (Wuerthner 2014) or the management of lands that are already actively 
used for human productive activities (Kremen and Merenlender 2018). We argue in line with 
Kremen and Merenlender (2018) that the working landscapes approach is a recognition that strictly 
protected areas alone can not meet the sustainability thresholds required to protect the natural 
environment and that working landscapes have the potential to complement protected areas (Jones 
et al. 2018; Hermoso et al. 2019a). Therefore, the working landscapes approach is only applicable 
on lands already used for human productive activities such as ranching, forestry, and crop 
cultivation (Kremen and Merenlender 2018). However, the actions occurring on working 
landscapes affect and are affected by broader social, political, economic, and biophysical factors 
beyond the landscape where they take place (DeClerck et al. 2010; Charnley et al. 2014; Pascual 
et al. 2014; Dawson et al. 2017). Thus, while it is crucial to understand the social and ecological 
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interactions within the working landscape, it is equally important to understand how the broader 
context interacts with the landscape of interest.  
There are two main ways in which understanding the social-ecological context is important in the 
working landscapes approach. First, collective action activities at the local level are influenced by 
social and ecological events occurring at higher levels of social and environmental structure. For 
example, several landowner-focused conservation initiatives in working landscapes like the USDA 
Sage Grouse Initiative and the South of the Divide conservation action program in Saskatchewan 
are inspired or supported by federal government policies such as the US Farm bill and Canada’s 
Greater Sage Grouse Recovery Strategy of 2014, respectively (Environment Canada 2013; Smith 
et al. 2016; Pittman 2019; Naugle et al. 2020). Indeed, these decisions are sometimes influenced 
by international frameworks on environmental protection (Busch and Jörgens 2005), such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Paris Agreement. In addition, funding for 
incentivizing voluntary collective action on working landscapes sometimes emanates from the 
Federal government. Aside from social influences, ecological factors such as climate change or 
extreme weather events can have a profound influence on what management actions are possible 
in working landscapes. For example, evidence abounds that drought can affect the ability of 
ranchers to manage rangelands for critical habitats and still maintain their levels of income (Zabel 
and Roe 2009; Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010; Rolfe et al. 2018; Ayambire and Pittman 2021). 
Second, the broader context determines what is considered socially and ecologically fit or 
acceptable (DeCaro and Stokes 2013; Meek 2013; Epstein et al. 2015; Bennett et al. 2018). On the 
social side, several studies have suggested that landowners in working landscapes prefer local 
autonomy and flexibility in the management of their lands (Sorice 2012; Henderson et al. 2014; 
Stroman and Kreuter 2016; Gooden and Grenyer 2019; Pittman 2019). But it is not just the 
48 
 
preferences of landowners that matter in the working landscapes approach. The acceptance of 
policies from the public, who mostly fund working landscapes initiatives through public tax 
dollars, is crucial for gaining financial and political support for working landscapes (Biénabe and 
Hearne 2006; Olive 2015; Buxton et al. 2021). On the ecological side, Kremen & Merenlender 
(2018) suggest that working landscapes are expected to support protected areas by, for example, 
enhancing habitat connectivity and providing in-situ habitat for species. Therefore, depending on 
the character of the adjoining land uses (e.g., protected area, a watershed), the type of management 
required on the working landscape will likely differ (DeFries et al. 2007; Hansen and DeFries 
2007; Warrier et al. 2020).  
Premise 3: The social-ecological context affects and is affected by the working landscape in 
question 
 
4.5 Overview of the empirical scholarship: emergent governance challenges in working 
landscapes 
The most important challenge confronting working landscape conservation is how to identify the 
kinds of governance that are effective for working landscapes in different contexts (Brockington 
et al. 2018). Studies examining governance solutions relevant to specific regions must begin with 
a knowledge of the nature of governance challenges in working landscapes. Indeed, a growing 
body of scholarship exists that highlights the challenges confronting working landscapes. These 
challenges have centred around the right to use resources and in what ways, the rules that control 
resource use, and how the rules are designed and enforced (Agrawal et al. 2008; Brockington et 
al. 2018). Through a survey of the working landscapes scholarship, we have identified four broad 
categories of challenges related to governance facing working landscapes. We explain each of the 
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challenges below, focusing on how they can inform the design of governance solutions for working 
landscapes.    
4.5.1 Cost and compensation 
Managing land for both environmental protection and well-being comes with a cost, especially on 
lands originally managed purposely for profit (Kremen and Merenlender 2018). This cost comes 
in varied forms, such as opportunity cost, management cost, transaction cost, acquisition cost, and 
damage cost (Naidoo et al. 2006; Pittman and Ayambire 2020). These costs, if not compensated 
for, may negatively affect people’s well-being and hinder collective action. For example, as Innes 
and Frisvold (2009) argue, landowners may refuse to enrol in conservation programs if their profits 
are reduced. Sometimes, landowners may enrol in conservation programs and fail to deliver 
optimum ecosystem services or environmental protection outcomes due to higher costs 
(Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010; Ayambire and Pittman 2021). Therefore, it is imperative for 
agencies employing the working landscapes approach to identify and compensate actors affected 
by higher costs.  
Indeed, land managers and private landowners generally want to be compensated for supplying 
public ecosystem services or undertaking environmental protection activities, in working 
landscapes, that benefit the wider public (Brook et al. 2003; Olive 2016; Farley et al. 2017). 
However, some private landowners may see the sustainable management of land as a responsibility 
and a demonstration of citizenship (stewardship ethos) (Henderson et al. 2014; Pittman 2019). 
Therefore, this stewardship ethos must be balanced with the utilitarian approach to land 
management (Ayambire et al. 2021). Suggestions that the public accepts to fund the cost associated 
with compensation payments presents a real opportunity for addressing the utilitarian needs of 
landowners (Biénabe and Hearne 2006; Olive 2015; McCune et al. 2017). However, users of the 
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working landscapes approach continue to grapple with how to determine the appropriate amount 
of compensation that will entice collective action (Engel et al. 2008; Ferraro 2008) and 
demonstrate additionality (Wunder 2005; Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Pates and Hendricks 
2020). There are no straightforward approaches for addressing these challenges since costs vary 
depending on several context factors, such as the nature of the service provided, environmental 
risk factors, and the alternative forgone uses. As suggested by Ayambire and Pittman (2021), 
context-specific factors such as cost in the working landscapes approach can only be addressed 
through meaningful participation built on trust among the various actors. Also, recent scholarship 
suggests that it may be better to focus attention on broader contextual factors that will facilitate 
collective action rather than seeking to determine exact amounts of compensation to entice 
collective action (Farley et al., 2017; Henderson et al., 2014; Pittman, 2019; Ayambire et al., 2021). 
This is because actors in working landscapes may have other priorities when considering 
participating in collective action activities. For example, landowners in southern Saskatchewan 
(Pittman 2019) and in the Plains and Prairie Pothole Ecoregion (PPPE) in the US (Sweikert 2017; 
Gigliotti and Sweikert 2019), in addition to the compensation for the extra cost, also desire 
autonomy and legal assurances that restrictions will not be placed on their properties. Therefore, 
compensation for cost should be treated as part of a broader suite of policy instruments and 
incentives designed to incentivize collective action (Muradian 2013; Ayambire et al. 2021). 
4.5.2 Equity  
Issues of equity permeate several aspects of the working landscapes approach, including 
uncompensated costs (distribution), disregard for people’s identities, knowledge systems, and 
ways of life (recognition), and lack of participation (procedure). Inequities in these varied forms 
hinder collective action in working landscapes and deny decision-makers valuable information to 
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enhance effective governance. For example, a lack of participation in decision-making or 
misrecognition of people's identities can be perceived as injustices and lead to the refusal of 
landowners to enrol in conservation programs based on the working landscapes approach (Pascual 
et al. 2014; Martin et al. 2016; Olive 2016; Drescher and Brenner 2018). Similarly, Pascual et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that including equity in the design of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
programs can provide valuable feedback that affects governance and ecological outcomes. The 
authors, therefore, cautioned against “equity-blind” PES programs. Nonetheless, many existing 
programs based on the working landscapes approach are ‘partially equity-blind.’ Procedural equity 
and recognition have been relegated to the background despite several pieces of evidence pointing 
to the usefulness of multidimensional equity in enhancing environmental protection and social 
well-being (Pascual et al. 2014; Martin et al. 2015; Martin et al. 2016; Olive 2016; Olive and Rabe 
2016). There is optimism that increasing global attention to multidimensional equity as a meta-
norm in environmental governance will facilitate its diffusion to the local level (Lawless et al. 
2020). However, this will require effective multilevel and collaborative governance arrangements 
that promote learning across scales.   
4.5.3 Knowledge access and integration and the role of trust  
Land management approaches used in working landscapes are “knowledge – rather than 
technology-intensive” (Sayre and Seibert 2015; Kremen and Merenlender 2018). Yet, knowledge 
of complex and dynamic systems like working landscapes is often elusive. Knowledge in working 
landscapes is distributed among many actors, and no single actor has all the knowledge (Berkes 
2010; Armitage et al. 2012a; Pittman and Armitage 2016). In this regard, managers of working 
landscapes are challenged with accessing the relevant knowledge and integrating it to facilitate the 
effective management of working landscapes. Access to knowledge involves identifying the 
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knowledge needs, where to obtain knowledge, and having the ability to obtain it. Knowledge 
integration involves engaging the different sources of knowledge in decision-making (Pittman and 
Armitage 2016). A major challenge with knowledge access and integration in working landscapes 
is the lack of trust between the different sources of knowledge concerned with the governance of 
working landscapes. Ferranto et al. (2014) argue that private landowners in California distrust 
information that emanated from conservation and environmental groups with a regulatory 
authority. This is partly due to landowners’ past experiences with the command-and-control 
regulatory regimes and the tendency of governments to place restrictions on environmentally 
sensitive working landscapes (Bergmann and Bliss 2004; Ferranto et al. 2013; Farley et al. 2017). 
Therefore, the lack of trust deters landowners from accessing and utilizing scientific knowledge 
from conservation and environmental groups. In contrast, “trained experts” have the tendency to 
leverage technical knowledge over other forms of knowledge, especially landowners’ local 
ecological knowledge (Charnley et al. 2007; Armitage et al. 2012a). This underutilization of local 
ecological knowledge further increases a lack of trust and denies decision-makers valuable 
information that could enhance the social and ecological outcomes of working landscapes. A key 
proposition in the working landscapes scholarship to address these challenges is the need for 
knowledge co-production (Naugle et al. 2020). Co-production works best when actors agree to a 
shared vision regarding both outcomes and processes and are willing to collaborate towards 
achieving the vision. But more importantly, co-production requires that government organizations 
work to rebuild trust by promoting their predictability (Naugle et al. 2020). Trust can also be built 
by involving bridging organizations that can link different knowledge holders, integrate 
knowledge, and make it accessible to the various knowledge users (Berkes 2009; Armitage et al. 
2012a; Crona and Parker 2012; Rathwell et al. 2015).  
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4.5.4. Multifunctionality, Scale, and Fit  
A central feature of working landscapes is their multifunctional nature – i.e., they provide multiple 
ecosystem services flows that benefit catchment of different sizes or actors at different spatial 
scales (Kremen and Merenlender 2018; Frei et al. 2020). For example, a grassland working 
landscape serves multiple ecosystem functions such as forage for livestock, conservation of soil 
and water resources, recreational amenities, global carbon sequestration, and species at risk 
habitats (An et al. 2017). Some of these ecosystem functions (e.g., carbon sequestration and 
endangered species habitats) benefit actors at spatial scales outside the physical limits of the 
grassland working landscape in question. Because the provisioning of these ecosystem functions 
involves both direct and opportunity costs (Paavola 2016), it is fair that beneficiaries from outside 
the physical limits of the ecological resource contribute to paying for the cost. This calls for 
governance to match the different spatial scales where the provision and consumption of the 
ecosystem services take place (Gibson et al. 2000; Cash et al. 2006; Pittman and Armitage 2016). 
Also, in many circumstances, working landscapes require collective management, yet existing 
environmental conservation programs in working landscapes often focus more on incentivizing 
individual landowners (Parkhurst et al. 2002). These are referred to as the problems of spatial fit 
– “finding the appropriate spatial match between institutions and the environmental problem” 
(Armitage et al. 2012a, 248). Working landscapes also face problems of social fit – the ability of 
institutions to match social processes and characteristics of the actors. For example, when policy 
and management proposals conflict with land managers’ beliefs, norms, and behaviours, they are 
less likely to accept them (DeCaro and Stokes 2013). These challenges suggest that working 
landscapes likely require collaboration among the multiple actors and multilevel linkages between 
the different levels and scales of interest.  
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4.6. Governance responses  
4.6.1 A typology of governance arrangements in working landscapes   
Environmental governance refers to “…the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions 
to resolve conflicts over environmental resources” (Paavola 2007, 94). For working landscapes, 
governance is commonly concerned with “changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, 
institutions, decision-making, and behaviours” (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, 298) that are directed 
towards alleviating actors’ fear of harm and enhancing collective action. A defining character of 
(environmental) governance, as opposed to ‘government,’ is the involvement of multiple actors 
and the changing role of the state in environmental decision-making (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; 
Armitage et al. 2012a). In line with this, Lemos & Agrawal (2006) argue that there is an emergence 
of several hybridized forms of governance arrangements centred around the relationship between 
communities, the state, and market actors. These hybridized forms of governance are even more 
present in working landscapes where there are a variety of land ownership types, multiple actors 
and interests, and multifunctionality of uses with potential spatial and temporal governance 
mismatches. In working landscapes, actors typically maintain part of their autonomous rights and 
give away others to facilitate co-operation with other actors in the production of ecosystem 
services (Ménard 2011). Consequently, the working landscapes literature is inundated with a 
variety of governance arrangements, often described by the policy instruments used, designed for 
specific goals and contexts (Ayambire et al., 2021). By organizing these different policy 
instruments according to the actors involved, the nature of interactions among actors, and the type 
of land ownership or property rights regimes, we identified at least six forms of governance 
arrangements commonly found in working landscapes (Table 4.1).  
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It is crucial to note that the different forms of governance arrangements (Table 4.1), especially the 
actors involved and nature of interactions, are not meant to be precise descriptions of how they 
operate. Rather, they are descriptions of ‘core features’ – or features that are almost always present 
– as reported in the existing scholarship. The relationships are much more nuanced, and new actors 
continue to emerge even within well-established partnerships. NGOs, for example, are 
increasingly acting in the community-government (or policy) interface (Evans and Wellstead 
2013). Also, many PPPs, PSPs, and co-management arrangements operate within a governance 
framework established by state regulations or multilateral environmental agreements. For 
example, the South of the Divide conservation action program (SODCAP Inc) emerged from 
Canada’s Federal Government’s Greater Sage Grouse Recovery Strategy (Pittman 2019). Also, 
the nature of incentive schemes used in working landscapes is sometimes determined by 
government policy or international trade charters (e.g., conservation incentives should not be trade-
distorting) (Hasund, 2013; Ayambire et al., 2021).  
Table 4.1. A typology of governance arrangements in working landscapes  
Forms of 
arrangements   
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4.6.2 Key Ingredients  
The variations in the governance arrangements in working landscapes across different contexts 
(section 4.6.1) suggest that empirical generalizations will not be possible; however, one can derive 
a set of core elements that are common and portray the different arrangements (Ostrom, 2001 as 
cited in Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004). These common elements form the key ingredients for 
successful governance arrangements in working landscapes (Table 4.2). The key ingredients are 
framed as collective responses to the governance challenges identified under section 4.5 of this 
paper. Each of the key ingredients is explained below and summarized in Table 4.2. These 
elements are not mutually exclusive. For example, Selinske et al. (2017) observed that economic 
incentives would fail if there were no trust between the paying agency and the private landowners. 
Similarly, incentives designed without regard to local autonomy (Pittman 2019) or justice-as-
recognition (Olive 2016) may fail to attract landowners (Henderson et al. 2014). Therefore, 
underlying these key ingredients is an understanding that each of them is important but must be 
considered in concert with the other elements and the social-ecological context when designing 
governance arrangements for working landscapes. While each key ingredient is important, we do 
not suggest that all of them will be equally necessary in all circumstances. Depending on the 
priorities of actors and the social-ecological context, certain ingredients may be deemed more 






Equity is both fundamental (virtue or ego) and instrumental for attaining social well-being and 
environmental protection (Law et al. 2018). The fundamental view of equity posits that equity is 
valuable regardless of whether it impacts social well-being and environmental protection in 
working landscapes. On the other hand, the instrumental view of equity focuses on the impact of 
inequities on social well-being and environmental protection. Both views are crucial in the 
working landscapes approach because people’s decision to undertake collective action activities is 
both influenced by ethics (fundamental equity) and how decisions and actions affect them 
(instrumental equity). For example, increasing equity in decision-making processes, recognition, 
and socio-economic outcomes can enhance landowners’ acceptance of conservation policies 
(Pascual et al. 2014; Sikor et al. 2014; Olive 2016). Similarly, people (e.g., landowners) who hold 
sympathetic views (fundamental) about inequities towards certain groups (e.g., Indigenous 
peoples) may protest by avoiding collective action. This is because people's sense of responsibility 
towards others and moral anger predict pro-environmental intentions (Reese and Jacob 2015). In 
many situations, people simultaneously hold fundamental and instrumental views of equity (Law 
et al. 2018), making it difficult to differentiate between which views are influencing their 
behaviours or actions. Enhancing fundamental and instrumental equity involves understanding 
what equity issues are important to people within specific contexts and working to address them. 
Also, funding agencies can make equity a precondition for issuing grants to program managers.  
Facilitative leadership  
Leadership has received little attention in the working landscapes literature; yet, it remains a 
critical element for facilitating collective action (Ansell and Gash 2008). Meine & Nabhan (2015) 
highlights the critical leadership role that Aldo Leopold played in the success of the Coon Valley 
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Cooperative Conservation Initiative, one of the earliest examples of collaborative conservation in 
working landscapes. Similarly, Smith and Sterritt (2007) highlighted the important role of leaders 
in fostering collaboration in the Great Bear Rainforest. They argued that in complex socio-
environmental problems involving conflicting interests among stakeholders, “leadership—far 
more than innovations in process or institutions—that ultimately will enable us to find our common 
ground” (Smith and Sterritt 2007, 14). Facilitative leaders may emerge spontaneously in response 
to unfavourable governance conditions (e.g., to disrupt top-down governance arrangements) 
(Pittman 2019) or maybe deliberately designed by public institutions to foster collaboration and 
collective action (Ansell and Gash 2008).  
Local autonomy  
Local autonomy contributes to grassroots participation and collaboration, incorporation of local 
knowledge into management, and increases the overall tendency for local actors to self-organize 
to address collective action problems (Brook et al. 2003; Ostrom and Basurto 2011; Sorice et al. 
2013; Pittman 2019). Therefore, local autonomy is important for enhancing cross-boundary co-
operation among land managers and for increasing acceptance of policies made by public agencies. 
As Pittman (2019) demonstrates in the South of the Divide region in Saskatchewan, local 
autonomy develops through a process of institutional work (led by local actors) associated with 
struggles to change the dominant top-down command-and-control regulatory regime. However, 
local autonomy can also be developed through deliberate attempts by government agencies to 






Incentives are crucial for alleviating land managers’ fear of harm (i.e., fear of reduced profits, 
restrictions, increased management costs, and lifestyle changes) and motivating collective action. 
Incentives may be economic (e.g., tax credits, cost-sharing, annual payments), legal (e.g., 
assurances), or social (e.g., public recognition). In many circumstances, different land managers 
prefer different incentives or a combination of incentives depending on their prevailing situation 
and plans. Therefore, having a suite of incentives that allows land managers to choose from is 
likely to increase social acceptability and enhance collective action (Ayambire et al. 2021). In 
addition, incentives must be designed with the active involvement of all actors to increase their 
responsiveness to the local context and enhance take-up (Reed et al. 2013).  
Trust  
Trust is important for any form of collective action, especially in the working landscapes approach, 
where actors often give away some of their autonomous rights to facilitate collective action 
(Ménard 2011). For example, private landowners will only grant access to their properties if they 
trust that conservation agencies would not place restrictions on their land. In this regard, the 
existence of trust allows landowners to accept to be vulnerable (Hamm et al. 2016; Hamm 2017) 
to collective action activities that contributes to social well-being and environmental protection. 
Trust has several dimensions (Table 4.2), most of which are directed towards the institutions 
initiating collective action activities (e.g., public and private conservation agencies). Therefore, 
enhancing the trustworthiness of institutions is a critical step towards building trust (Hamm 2017). 
Also, bridging organizations can help increase trust by serving as intermediaries between 
distrusting parties (Berdej and Armitage 2016; Berdej et al. 2019).  
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Table 4.2. Key ingredients for the working landscapes approach 
Key 
ingredients   
Description  Key References  
Equity  Equity emphasis the need to move beyond 
incentives and examine the issues of power, 
historical injustices, and participation in decision-
making (Martin et al. 2016; Olive 2016). Equity 
encompasses distribution, procedure, and 
recognition. It enhances legitimacy, acceptance, 
and accountability (Pascual et al. 2014).  
(Cooke et al. 2012; Reed 
et al. 2013; Olive 2016) 
Facilitative 
leadership  
Facilitative leadership implies a less-intrusive 
approach where the leader’s role is limited to 
ensuring the integrity of the governance processes 
(Ansell and Gash 2008). It involves protecting and 
promoting the interests of weaker groups (Ansell 
and Gash 2008) and organizing diverse actors 
towards a common end (Meine and Nabhan 
2015).  
(Smith and Sterritt 2007; 
McGee et al. 2010; Meine 
and Nabhan 2015) 
Incentives  Incentives are motivators that are designed to 
guide actors towards desired actions or outcomes 
(Uphoff and Langholz 1998; Cetas and Yasue 
2016). They are focused on redistributing costs 
and benefits associated with the supply of public 
ecosystem services or incentivizing collective 
action (Muradian 2013).  
(Brook et al. 2003; 
Sorice et al. 2013; 
Henderson et al. 2014; 
Sweikert 2017; Ingram 
2018; Pittman 2019) 
Local 
autonomy  
Autonomy refers to the ability of local actors (e.g., 
land managers) to determine rules and manage 
lands according to their local knowledge without 
higher authorities reprimanding or placing 
restrictions on their lands (Ostrom, 2014; 
Schlager, 2002). It is often associated with 
grassroots-oriented programs, the need for legal 
assurances, and result-based conservation 
agreements.  
(Brook et al. 2003; 
Ostrom and Basurto 
2011; Sorice et al. 2013; 
Pittman 2019) 
Trust  Trust is having confidence in positive outcomes 
regarding another actor’s conduct (Bergmann & 
Bliss, 2004). Trust may be determined by the 
competence and integrity of the government or 
program delivery agent, congruence of values 
(Kitt et al. 2021), residual (dis)trusts (Bergmann 
(Brook et al. 2003; 
Bergmann and Bliss 
2004; Ferranto et al. 
2013; Reed et al. 2013; 
Henderson et al. 2014; 
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& Bliss, 2004) and interpersonal trust (Graham 
2014).    
Olive 2015; Farley et al. 
2017) 
 
Premise 4: Five key ingredients – equity, facilitative leadership, local autonomy, incentives, 
and trust – are essential for facilitating collective action in working landscapes  
 
4.5.3 Enhancing governance fit through collaborative and multilevel interactions  
Aside from the five key ingredients (section 4.5.2), the literature suggests that enhancing 
governance fit – i.e., the “…coherence between governance systems and the social-ecological 
systems in which they are embedded.” (Pittman et al. 2015, 487)  is essential for the sustainability 
of working landscapes. The working landscapes approach faces several forms of governance 
misfits relating to the social and ecological nature of the working landscape (Young 2003; Epstein 
et al. 2015). These misfits can be addressed through active collaboration among the diverse actors 
and multilevel governance arrangements that connect the different levels of social organization 
that relate to the working landscape. Collaboration refers to the involvement of multiple actors in 
decision-making towards generating, integrating, and diffusing diverse knowledge among actors 
and balancing opposing interests (Ansell and Gash 2008; Bodin 2017). Collaborative interactions 
are characterized by deliberations among actors towards consensus-building (Ansell and Gash 
2008) or a temporary normative order (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004). These interactions occur 
among land managers or communities in a working landscape, among civil society groups, and 
among governments. Examples of collaborative interactions in practice include land managers 
gathering to share experiences relating to biodiversity-friendly management methods (social 
learning) (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008) or advocating for local autonomy (Pittman 2019). Similarly, 
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groups of conservation NGOs can partner to address issues of common interest as is present in 
SODCAP Inc. (i.e., Ranchers Stewardship Alliance, Sustainable Canada) (Pittman 2019). Also, 
different national or provincial governments may collaborate to manage working landscapes that 
cross jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., the Milk River transboundary watershed management) 
(MRWCC, 2013). The social interactions in the working landscapes approach may also be 
multilevel. Multilevel interactions are necessary for linking producers of ecosystem services at the 
local level to consumers spread out over larger spatial scales (Paavola 2016). Multilevel 
interactions are characterized by decentralized policymaking where international charters and 
federal policies dictate provincial and municipal level policies regarding working landscapes. 
Multilevel interactions also occur through federal, provincial, and municipal funding schemes that 
are geared towards instigating local actions in working landscapes.  
Premise 5: Collaborative and multilevel interactions enhance governance fit in working 
landscapes  
 
4.7. Synthesis: a framework for the working landscapes approach  
The working landscapes approach begins with an intentional identification of a need to manage 
working landscapes for environmental protection and social well-being. We use intentionality to 
differentiate the working landscape, as a policy approach, from environmental stewardship, which 
may be a spontaneous or unplanned act by an individual land manager. This need is usually an 
environmental protection concern (e.g., species extinction risks, land degradation, or pollution) 
and the associated potential for the working landscape to help address the concern. However, the 
working landscapes approach may also be implemented as a precautionary measure to avoid 
environmental degradation. In complex SES like working landscapes, the need alone does not 
provide enough information to help policymakers make informed decisions. Instead, it is important 
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to have a more thorough understanding of the social-ecological context to understand what factors 
are linked to the need and would have a bearing on the design of institutional solutions (Bodin 
2017; Bennett et al. 2018; Bennett and Satterfield 2018). For example, there is a history of 
animosity or residual distrust between many private working landscape owners and government 
due to past command-and-control regimes (Holling and Meffe 1996; Bergmann and Bliss 2004; 
Ferranto et al. 2013). Understanding this history would inform how policymakers can proceed with 
trust-building processes. Similarly, external factors such as extreme weather events (e.g., drought) 
are known to have an influence on environmental management outcomes such as habitat health 
(Loisel and Elyakime 2006; Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010; SODCAP Inc. 2017; Ayambire and 
Pittman 2021). This implies that policymakers will need to accommodate risks posed by these 
external factors in the design of economic incentives. Understanding the social-ecological context 
also has to encompass the property regimes, actors involved, motivations, capacities, and power 
relations (Bennett et al. 2018). Therefore, the need and the social-ecological context shape actions 
that must be taken to make the key ingredients (Table 4.2) fit or to be effective for a specific 
working landscape. Furthermore, working landscape problems are collective action problems 
(section 4.4.2) – i.e., they are focused on incentivizing the voluntary participation of multiple 
actors in the production of public ecosystem services that are prone to free-riding (Muradian and 
Rival 2012; Potoski and Prakash 2013). Therefore, central to the design of institutional solutions 
is the goal of ensuring that individual actors perform actions towards the collective interest. This 
implies that the key ingredients need to be designed to enhance positive interactions among the 
actors, which will, in turn, contribute to social well-being and environmental protection outcomes 
(Figure 4.1). The outcomes produced by the working landscapes approach may have an impact – 
negative or positive – on other SESs. For example, working landscapes may assist in the dispersal 
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of wild species across protected areas. Or land managers who participate in a specific working 
landscape initiative may transfer their knowledge to other landscapes.  
Finally, fundamental to the working landscapes approach is a process of social interaction 
described here as collaborative and multilevel interactions (Figure 4.1). This social interaction is 
crucial because it is the backbone that holds the different components of the working landscapes 
approach together.  Collaborative and multilevel interactions connect all the components of the 
working landscapes approach together through a multidirectional relationship. For example, trust 
is required for effective collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2008; Bodin et al. 2020); however, 
collaboration can be used as a tool for building trust (Bryson and Crosby 2006; Bodin 2017). 
Similarly, the social well-being of individuals may determine whether they continue to support 
collaborative relationships or not. However, collaboration is necessary for enhancing social well-
being in working landscapes. In other words, each of the components influences and is influenced 


















Figure 4.1. A conceptual framework for the working landscapes approach  
 
4.8. Conclusion and applications of the framework  
This paper integrated past research on environmental governance, collective action theory, 
environmental justice, and social-ecological systems to propose a conceptual framework for the 
working landscapes approach. The framework is intentionally broad to facilitate its application in 
different social and ecological contexts. In applying the framework, two of its elements are 
essential – the key ingredients and the linking mechanism – because they outline the social 
processes which are critical for shaping human actions in a working landscape. In addition, the 
framework emphasizes the importance of the social-ecological context in shaping the design of 
governance solutions for working landscapes. We believe that regardless of the commonalities as 
gleaned from across several hybrid governance arrangements, their implementation on the ground 
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will ultimately differ based on the context. Therefore, policymakers, NGOs, and other users of the 
working landscapes approach will need to apply this framework with keen attention to local 
context factors that are connected to the key ingredients and the linking mechanism. The 
framework is also a response to calls for research on the governance approaches that work for 
working landscapes (Brockington et al. 2018). Guided by this framework, scholars can now 
investigate or theorize relationships between different elements of the framework, examine how 
certain key ingredients emerge from the social-ecological context, and evaluate programs based 
on the working landscapes approach. We hope that in this way, the broad framework we are 
proposing will help guide empirical case studies on the working landscapes approach, further its 
theoretical understanding, and contribute to enhancing policy aimed at increased social well-being 




Chapter 5: Opening the black box between governance and 
management: a mechanism-based explanation of how governance 
affects the management of species at risk   
5.1 Chapter summary   
Good governance is needed to foster good management of the environment. Yet, the link between 
environmental governance and environmental management has received very little research 
attention. In this paper, we adopt a mechanism-based framework to unpack the link between the 
governance and management of species at risk or endangered species in a working landscape. 
Using species at risk management in the South of the Divide region of southwestern Saskatchewan 
as a case study, we identified four governance conditions connected by five mechanisms to 
produce management outcomes. The governance conditions include facilitative leadership, local 
autonomy, trust, and incentives. The five mechanisms include institutional disruption, institutional 
crafting and drift, brokerage or bridging, program uptake, and alleviation of fear of harm. We 
discuss how using a mechanism-based approach could help us better understand the processes 
within the governance system that trigger particular management outcomes. For example, in this 
case study, dissatisfied actors disrupt the existing governance arrangements and create new ones 
that reflect their desire for local autonomy. Local autonomy, in turn, creates an atmosphere for 
local actors to form coalitions and build trust; trust enhances program uptake and the co-design 
and co-implementation of incentives, which then alleviates land managers’ fear of harm from 
participating in species at risk management. Our study also suggests that top-down institutions that 
create room for further institutional work can become acceptable at the local level and enhance 
species at risk management. We conclude that a mechanism-based explanation can be useful for 
opening the black box connecting environmental governance and management, and by so doing, 
offer valuable recommendations to guide policy.  
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5.2 Introduction  
Good governance is considered a prerequisite for good management of the environment (UNEP 
2002; Lockwood et al. 2010; Bennett and Satterfield 2018). Yet, the link between (environmental) 
governance and (environmental) management has largely remained conceptually blurred (Pahl-
Wostl 2009; Lockwood 2010) and empirically untested. In this paper, we adopt a mechanism-
based approach to empirically examine the link between the governance and management of 
species at risk in the South of the Divide (SoD) region in Southwestern Saskatchewan. Governance 
refers to "…the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over 
environmental resources" (Paavola 2007). It involves actors, actor constellations or networks 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009), and power and authority relations (Lockwood 2010) that help formulate and 
implement environmental policies. Environmental management, on the other hand, involves 
“…resources, plans, and actions…” (Lockwood 2010, 755) that are geared towards “… analyzing 
and monitoring, developing and implementing measures to keep the state of a resource 
[environment] within desirable bounds” (Pahl-Wostl 2009, 355). Despite their differences, 
governance and management are sometimes used synonymously (Pahl-Wostl 2009), perhaps due 
to their practical similarities (Armitage et al. 2012a) and the conflation of governance and 
management functions by some actors – i.e., actors who engage in both governance and 
management activities. This lack of practical distinction about how the two activities are related 
has been taken for granted. This paper, however, is based on the premise that having a clear 
understanding of how governance is linked to management is essential for identifying mechanisms 
which policymakers can activate within the governance system to generate “an outcome of 
interest” (Mahoney 2001) or to facilitate changes in management.  
70 
 
There is no denying that the form of governance has implications for how actors respond to the 
management of environmental resources. For example, the working landscapes scholarship 
illustrated how a command-and-control regulatory regime results in adverse behaviour among 
private landowners and land managers towards species at risk conservation (Michael 2000; Innes 
and Frisvold 2009). On the other hand, more collaborative forms of governance that involve (1) 
the use of incentives, (2) limited restrictions on private property, (3) recognition of land managers 
as stewards, and (4) recognizing local context have been relatively successful in enhancing positive 
behaviour and increased (voluntary) participation of land managers in species at risk management 
(Reed et al. 2013; Henderson et al. 2014). Nonetheless, a critical question that remains is why 
actors respond better to more collaborative forms of governance. Past research suggests that certain 
conditions must exist within the governance system to facilitate good management. For example, 
Ayambire et al. (forthcoming) identified five conditions, including trust, incentives, leadership, 
equity, and autonomy, which mediate the interactions between governance and management to 
facilitate action among actors, especially landowners and land managers in working landscapes. 
Similar conditions have been identified in several other environmental policy and governance 
domains  (Hysing 2009; Pittman et al. 2015; Berdej and Armitage 2016). However, the explicit 
linkages between these conditions – i.e., the mechanisms – are not known. Yet, these mechanisms 
are the entities that need to be activated by policymakers to generate “an outcome of interest” 
(Mahoney 2001) or, in our context, to facilitate changes in environmental management.  
This paper contributes to our understanding of the conditions and their linkages within the 
governance system that facilitate management by answering the following research question: what 
mechanisms link governance and management of species at risk? We apply a process-tracing 
methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2019) to inductively identify these mechanisms in a grassland 
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working landscape in the SoD region. We draw on multiple qualitative approaches such as in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), document analysis, and secondary data analysis 
to examine the conditions and their linkages that connect governance to species at risk 
management. The paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce mechanisms as the entities that 
link environmental governance to management. This is followed by a description of the study 
context and the research methods we used. Finally, we present the results of an empirical 
examination of species at risk management in the SoD as an outcome of governance to identify 
the mechanisms.  
5.3 What links governance to the management of the environment? 
The differences and relationships between environmental governance and environmental 
management are ones that have been taken for granted. This is a bold claim given that several 
authors have acknowledged their differences in both environmental governance and natural 
resource management scholarships (e.g., Stoker 1998; Ludwig 2001; Lockwood 2010; Armitage 
et al. 2012). However, beyond acknowledging their differences, no research has been conducted 
to examine their linkages and draw lessons for policy. This has resulted in misguided application 
of both concepts in scholarly and policy spheres. For example, part of the literature conflates 
governance and management or treats them as alternatives (Holling and Meffe 1996; Ludwig 
2001). This conception, for example, has suggested that management cannot withstand wicked 
environmental problems and should be replaced with participatory and inclusive approaches that 
rely on dialogue, incorporation of traditional knowledge, and learning (Ludwig 2001). 
Interestingly, these ‘new ways’ of solving environmental problems are also described as 
governance (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Armitage et al. 2012a). Another example of the conflation 
of both management and governance is when governance and management solutions are 
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recommended for addressing environmental problems without specifying any order. Indeed, both 
governance and management failures contribute to environmental problems, and both are needed 
for designing solutions. However, we are concerned that conflating governance and management 
solutions without indicating any form of ‘order’ or process – i.e., whether one solution precedes 
or influences another – makes it difficult for policymakers to act. In other words, policymakers 
usually act on the mechanisms (Mahoney 2001) rather than the plethora of governance and 
management conditions often presented as solutions.  
Our conception of the relationship between environmental management and environmental 
governance is in line with Lockwood (2010). Lockwood (2010) argues that management is “a 
product of applied governance.” This suggests a unidirectional relationship emanating from 
governance to management. However, in practice, management may provide feedback through 
monitoring to inform governance changes (Boyle et al. 2001; Folke et al. 2005). Lockwood further 
indicates that effective governance enables management outputs and outcomes. However, it is 
unclear how and why effective governance enables management outputs and outcomes. We 
contend that governance enables management through a process, which we refer to as mechanisms 
(Figure 5.1). Mechanism-based explanation is relatively new in environmental governance and 
management scholarship (e.g., Biesbroek et al. 2014; Biesbroek et al. 2017; Filbee-Dexter et al. 
2018; Baird et al. 2019). However, it has the potential to help study topics like the relationship 
between governance and management that were formally black-boxed or grey-boxed1 (Beach 
2016; Biesbroek et al. 2017). Mechanism-based explanations emerged out of criticism of existing 
 
1 Black-boxed means that the causal processes linking inputs and outcomes are completely ignored, while grey-boxed 
implies a partial attempt to uncover these causal processes. Grey-boxing may result from equating mechanisms to 
intervening variables (Beach 2016). In the context of governance and management, black boxing means no attempt has 
been made to identify the causal processes linking the two, and grey boxing implies an attempt to use a ‘laundry list’ of 
governance conditions as the mechanisms that explain management.  
73 
 
approaches that use the correlation between a set of governance conditions (e.g., incentives, trust) 
and management responses as the basis for making policy and governance recommendations 
(Namugumya et al. 2020). These correlational approaches failed to clarify the causal processes 
through which the independent variables (e.g., the governance conditions) combine to affect a 
dependent variable (e.g., management) (Mahoney 2001).  
We use mechanism to mean “… a set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an 
effect not inherent in any one of them” (Hernes 2005, 74). Our emphasis is on “a set of interacting 
parts” and the fact that no single part can generate the effect produced by the set. Talking about 
parts, Biesbroek et al. (2014) argue that mechanisms involve entities and their activities 
(undertaken individually or in concert with other entities) that produce an observed outcome. In 
environmental governance, these entities could be perceived as the “… actors or organizations 
whom each have their specific characteristics such as values, belief systems, and experiences”. 
(Biesbroek et al. 2014, 109). Activities are the actions undertaken by the entities that produce 
change (Beach 2016). According to this reading, environmental governance scholars have done 
extremely well by identifying the variety of actors that affect and are affected by environmental 
governance decisions. Similarly, they have studied several activities and conditions produced by 
these actors that facilitate sustainable management of the environment (e.g., trust, incentives, 
leadership, and equity). However, identifying actors, conditions, and activities alone does not 
satisfy the second part of our definition – i.e., these individual components, acting alone, are not 
enough to enable management (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Rather, it is the way they are 
combined within specific contexts that result in management responses. Therefore, in studying the 
governance-management nexus, the utility of the mechanism-based approach lies in its ability to 
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explain the combination of entities, their activities, and the conditions they create in the 






Figure 5.1. Governance enables management through mechanisms  
5.4. Methods  
5.4.1 Research design: process tracing  
Process tracing is a qualitative approach that helps identify mechanisms that link input conditions 
to outcomes within single cases (Beach and Pedersen 2019). Process tracing has several 
advantages, including its ability to provide plausible explanations of phenomena in complex 
situations involving multiple intervening variables (Spijkers and Boonstra 2017), its suitability for 
studying governance processes (George and Bennett 2005), and to open black boxes that other 
qualitative and quantitative methods fail to do (Biesbroek et al. 2014). Due to these strengths, we 
use process tracing to uncover the mechanisms that link species at risk governance and species at 
risk management in the SoD region. There are three main approaches to process tracing: (1) theory-
building or inductive, (2) theory-testing or deductive, and (3) explaining outcomes (Beach and 
Pedersen 2019). However, due to the limited existing mechanisms or theoretical explanations of 
the link between governance and management, we inductively identify these mechanisms from a 
variety of data sources. Therefore, the approach we take here bears semblance to theory-building 
or inductive process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2019) – a similar 
approach is adopted by Biesbroek et al. (2014).  
Entities + activities 
+ conditions 
        Mechanisms  
Governance  Management  
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Even though we adopt an inductive approach to process tracing, it is important to note that we 
have some “theoretical priors” (Biesbroek et al. 2014) about the conditions that influence 
management in working landscapes (Ayambire et al., forthcoming). These conditions – trust, 
facilitative leadership, equity, incentives, and local autonomy – are factors that mediate the 
interactions between the governance system and management outcomes in working landscapes. 
Therefore, our aim is to identify (1) which of these conditions are present in the SoD region, (2) 
how these conditions interact to bring about or influence species at risk management outcomes, 
and (3) what is/are the underlying mechanism(s). Inductive process tracing aims to identify “one 
or more potential causal paths [from an empirical case) which can then be rendered as more general 
hypotheses for testing against other cases” (Bennett and George 1997, 17). Therefore, by going 
beyond general governance conditions to identify their interactions and underlying mechanisms, 
we seek to further the discussion on: (1) how scholars can understand the governance processes 
that generate particular management outcomes and (2) how policymakers can generate desired 
changes in management.  
5.4.2 Case study context 
The SoD is a region within Saskatchewan, Canada and is one of the 11 priority areas identified by 
the federal government of Canada as part of its pan-Canadian approach for transforming species 
at risk conservation (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018). Even though the region has 
been recognized as important critical habitat for several species at risk and has some of the few 
remaining intact native grasslands within the Northern Great Plains (WWF 2016b; WWF 2016a), 
it was only from early 2015 that management outcomes for species at risk were observed in the 
region. However, this has followed several years of multilevel institutional work and the delivery 
of several management activities and outputs (e.g., preparation of species recovery strategies and 
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action plans) (Pittman 2019). Today, the SoD boasts several conservation programs that support 
species at risk management (SODCAP Inc. 2016). Available reports from these conservation 
programs help us track management outcomes in the form of the number of land managers actively 
involved in species at risk management and the recovery status of species and their critical habitats. 
This progressing in governance over the years, which led to the emergence of species at risk 
management outcomes, gives us a unique opportunity to examine the conditions and underlying 
mechanisms in the governance system that resulted in the management outcomes.   
5.4.3. Data collection and analysis  
We drew on multiple data sources to trace the link between governance and management in the 
SoD region. These data sources include relevant legislation at both the Provincial (e.g., the 
Provincial Lands Act, the Wildlife Habitat Protection Act, the Wildlife Act) (Appendix C) and the 
Federal (e.g., the Species at Risk Act) government levels. Other relevant documents include 
species at risk recovery strategies (e.g., the Greater Sage Grouse recovery strategy) and reports 
and action plans from government and non-governmental agencies interested in species at risk 
management in the region (e.g., SODCAP). These data sources were qualitatively coded using a 
combination of both inductive and deductive content analysis (Pittman 2019). We used the 
governance conditions – trust, facilitative leadership, equity, incentives, and local autonomy – as 
the main themes to guide the deductive analysis, whiles the interactions between the conditions, 
the actors involved, and the underlying mechanisms were identified inductively. During the 
analysis, we were also interested in identifying timelines of events that culminated into specific 
governance conditions and the management of species at risk. These timelines and events help us 
identify the ‘critical junctures in the process (George and Bennett 2005; Beach 2016). The results 
were triangulated with in-depth interviews (n=14) and focus group discussions (n =2, 5 and 4 
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people per group, respectively) with ranchers in the region. The sample size is relatively small, 
considering the total number of beef farmers in the region (N=728) (Statistics Canada, 2016). 
However, because we were interested in ranchers with experience with SODCAP’s RBA, this 
sample covered many of the conservation leaders who participated in the program. In addition, we 
collected the data until we reached theoretical saturation (Suddaby, 2006). We also consulted with 
SODCAP’s project advisory committee to corroborate the findings from the interviews, FGDs, 
and document analysis. The participants were ranchers who actively participate in species at risk 
management.    
In identifying the critical junctures, we made one significant assumption that actual species at risk 
management started after outcomes (i.e., starting from when land managers began to deliberately 
manage lands for species at risk) were observed in the region. This assumption is important for 
our analysis because, in species at risk management, the challenge has always been how the 
governance system can translate management inputs (e.g., money and knowledge) and outputs 
(e.g., species recovery strategies and action plans) into outcomes (e.g., farm-level or landscape-
level conservation actions) (Miller et al. 2001; Innes and Frisvold 2009; Ciuzio et al. 2013; 
Ferranto et al. 2013; Potoski and Prakash 2013; Stroman and Kreuter 2016). For example, 
governments have been relatively successful in designing recovery strategies and action plans for 
species at risk – examples of management outputs. However, the challenge has been getting 
landowners and land managers to implement the actions at the landscape or farm level. Therefore, 
even though we are interested in the mechanisms that link governance and management of species 
at risk, our analysis focused on the mechanisms that link governance to management outcomes 
(Figure 5.2).  
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5.5 Results  
The case study shows that there are multiple governance conditions that facilitate the management 
of species at risk, and these conditions likely reinforce each other to facilitate management. 
Furthermore, the conditions are connected through five (5) underlying mechanisms, which 
translate into the management outcomes. Also, the management conditions were produced through 
several years of institutional work involving state actors at the federal level and non-state actors at 
the local level. This section first examines the governance conditions present in the region and the 
underlying mechanisms that connect these governance conditions to management outcomes.  
5.5.1 Governance conditions  
Ayambire et al. (forthcoming) suggest that some governance conditions – trust, facilitative 
leadership, equity, local autonomy, and incentives (Table 5.1) – are needed to facilitate effective 
management in working landscapes. This section diagnosis whether and how these conditions 
manifest in the SoD. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the governance conditions present. The 
results were triangulated using document analysis, in-depth interviews, and focus groups. We also 
consulted with SODCAP’s project advisory committee to corroborate the findings from the 
interviews, FGDs, and document analysis. To identify the governance conditions, we first allowed 
the ranchers to freely explain or discuss the motives and the conditions that motivated their 
participation in species at risk management. This approach gave us the opportunity to uncover any 
likely governance conditions that we did not pre-empt. However, to enable us to address all the 
governance conditions we pre-empted, we asked follow-up questions on governance conditions 
that we felt had not been addressed by research participants. As shown in Table 5.1, all the 
governance conditions, except for equity (which, in the view of research participants, centred on 
Indigenous rights), were present in the region (see discussion below). While it is not within the 
scope of the current paper to rank the governance conditions in order of importance, it is crucial 
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to note that nearly all interview participants noted the relevance of local autonomy, trust, and 
incentives for their participation in species at risk management. More importantly, as indicated by 
the interview excerpts below, most interviewees frequently mentioned these conditions together 
and sometimes suggesting that they are inseparable.  
“Everything that happens, there is a direct effect to my bottom line, the prices are up, calf prices go 
down, it still costs that amount of dollars to put that dugout, to build that fence. So, you know, 
funding, if we can get some outside funding [incentives] and help manage the resource that's there, 
look after the species at risk, I mean, that's a benefit for everybody”. “… But it's not just the money, 
you know, we think about the fact that these agreements by SODCAP are non-restrictive. That is 
huge for us because we need to have some autonomy”. (Interview participant 1) 
“The good part of it, as I understand is, it is result-based and not prescriptive. It gives the manager 
of the corporation the flexibility to do what they see fit to meet the results… if you don't meet the 
results, you don't get the payment; but at least you don't get penalized. I like a lot of the work that 
SODCAP does”. “… and I think part of the issue is we trust some of the people on the board 
[SODCAP]. So, I don't think our beef is with SODCAP. I think they're on our side”. 
(Interview participant 2)  
Facilitative leadership was mostly mentioned as a key condition by ranchers who played leading 
roles in advocating for local autonomy and designing incentive programs. This appears to suggest 
that some of the ranchers might take the leadership role played by their colleagues for granted. 
This may not be surprising because Ayambire et al. (forthcoming) also found that facilitative 
leadership, despite its importance, has received the least attention among the governance 
conditions reported in the working landscapes literature in relation to land managers. We believe 
that the ranchers might be more easily reminded of the conditions that have immediate effects on 
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their individual well-being than of the sacrifices of others. However, this is not to suggest that 
leadership was not considered important to the ranchers whom themselves did not play leadership 
roles. In fact, during one focus group discussion, a significant amount of time was committed to 
appreciating ranchers who played facilitative leadership roles after one rancher raised the issue of 
leadership and the sacrifices of their colleagues. 






Facilitative leadership is important for ensuring and maintaining the 
integrity of the governance processes (Ansell and Gash 2008). It helps 
organize diverse actors towards a common end whiles protecting the 
interests of weaker actors and groups (Meine and Nabhan 2015). These 
types of leaders are also described as institutional entrepreneurs (Baird 
et al. 2019). In the SoD, facilitative leadership occurred after the 
Emergency Protection Order (EPO) for the Greater Sage Grouse (GSG) 
was instated in 2013. During this period, the ranchers felt portrayed as 
criminals who perpetuated the extinction of the GSG. As a reaction, two 
NGOs (the Rancher’s Stewardship Alliance and Sustainable Canada) 
came together and led the ranchers to actively work towards a change in 
the way species at risk management was done in the region (Pittman 
2019). It is because of their leadership role that resulted in the apparently 
more important role currently played by ranchers in conservation 
governance in the region.  
Local autonomy Autonomy is the ability of the ranchers and their associated local groups 
to determine rules and manage their land according to their local 
knowledge without higher authorities reprimanding or placing 
restrictions on their lands (Ostrom, 2014; Schlager, 2002). Local 
autonomy was the ultimate outcome of the leadership actions undertaken 
by Rancher’s Stewardship Alliance and Sustainable Canada. An 
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important sign of the emergence of local autonomy, according to the 
ranchers, is the increased voice that land managers now have in 
decision-making processes. This is evident in the representation of land 
managers in decision-making roles within conservation organizations in 
the region. However, the ranchers believe that more institutional work 
is still needed to enhance ultimate autonomy. For example, some 
ranchers cited the provision in SARA (section 80) that allows the federal 
government to instate an EPO to protect a listed species as a sign that 
they have not yet attained absolute autonomy.  
Trust  Trust is having confidence in positive outcomes regarding another 
actor's conduct (Bergmann & Bliss, 2004). Ranchers consistently 
alluded to their relationship with SODCAP as a sign of trust between 
conservation agencies and land managers. They also believe that the 
decision by SODCAP to implement result-based conservation 
agreements was a sign that SODCAP also trusts in the ranchers to 
deliver positive results for species at risk. Finally, trust was deemed an 
important precondition for the co-design and co-implementation of 
incentive schemes that respect ranchers’ local autonomy. Nonetheless, 
like local autonomy, ranchers were still apprehensive about allowing 
free access to their land, citing fears that the government might instate 
another EPO in the region.  
Incentives  Incentives are motivators that are designed to guide actors towards 
desired actions or outcomes (Uphoff and Langholz 1998; Cetas and 
Yasue 2016). In SoD, incentives were generally mentioned regarding 
economic incentives, even though legal and social incentives are also 
important. The ranchers believed that the incentives were a recognition 
of their good stewardship and provided them with monetary support to 
manage the land for both livestock and species at risk. They indicated 
that one of the most important outcomes of the institutional work that 
they have undertaken over the years is the design of incentive schemes 
that respect their autonomy and enhances trust. Thus, the 
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implementation of the incentive schemes represented a penultimate 
stage of the governance processes that led to management outcomes 
(Figure 5.2).  
Equity  Equity emphasises the need to move beyond incentives and examine the 
issues of power, historical injustices, and participation in decision-
making (Martin et al. 2016; Olive 2016). Equity did not feature as a 
critical condition for the emergence of the management outcomes in the 
region. However, both ranchers and SODCAP felt it was critical to 
further enhance the management of species at risk.  
Source: Adapted from Ayambire et al., (forthcoming).  
While the issue of equity did not feature as a key condition that motivated ranchers’ participation 
in species at risk management, SODCAP’s advisory committee indicated that it was under 
discussion, and projects were underway to, for example, include issues of Indigenous rights. Also, 
some ranchers acknowledged the importance of equity, often noting that it would be good to 
address Indigenous rights issues as part of the incentive programs. The focus on Indigenous rights 
issues alone under equity is an indication of the importance that people in the region attach to the 
matter. It also suggests that the ranchers may have narrowly defined equity as focusing on 
Indigenous rights. For example, other issues such as participation, recognition, gender, and 
distribution of rewards, which we anticipated would be considered as equity issues in the region, 
were surprisingly not mentioned under equity even after prompts. Three reasons likely explain this 
outcome. First, the ranchers also perceived the incentive schemes as a recognition of their good 
stewardship. Second, because the ranchers in the region form a close community, and many of 
them form part of ranching corporations and co-operations, issues of disparities in incentive 
payments are easily dispelled. Third, ranchers perceived local autonomy as the ultimate outcome 
of participation. Therefore, participation did not seem to them an important condition for their 
involvement in species at risk management, but local autonomy was.  
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5.5.2 Mechanisms  
The second part of the analysis focused on identifying the interactions or connections between the 
different governance conditions and the underlying mechanisms that link them to management 
outcomes. In identifying the connections between the governance conditions, we examined the 
key events (and their timeliness) associated with each governance condition. We also examined 
whether each preceding condition had any influence on the next condition. The result of this 
analysis is an ordering of the governance conditions beginning with the creation of the federal 
Species at Risk Act (SARA) – Canada’s foremost legislation on species at risk management – in 
2002 and ending with the time when the first management outcomes were observed (corresponding 
with the time when ranchers began to deliberately manage land for species at risk) (Figure 5.2). 
While we began the analysis from the creation of SARA, the first critical juncture was the 
instatement of the Emergency Protection Order (EPO) for the protection of the Greater Sage 
Grouse in 2013. Each of the preceding governance conditions influenced the emergence of the 
succeeding condition, indicating a single pathway towards the emergence of management 
outcomes (Figure 5.2). However, all the governance conditions continue to progress towards 
management outcomes, indicating that none of the conditions has stopped operating, and all still 
contribute to the management outcomes observed in the region today. More importantly, all the 
conditions were connected to management outcomes through a series of mechanisms. We explain 




Figure 5.2. Conditions and mechanism linking governance to species at risk management  
 
5.5.2.1 Mechanism A – Institutional disruption 
Institutional disruption has its roots in organizational studies but has recently been applied to study 
institutional change in environmental governance (Patterson and Beunen 2019; Pittman 2019). 
Institutional disruption comes from the notion that there are some actors whose interests may not 
be satisfied by the existing institutional structures and are watching for windows of opportunity to 
disrupt the existing institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). In the case study, the local actors, 
mainly landowners, land managers, and local NGOs (e.g., Ranchers Stewardship Alliance and 
Sustainable Canada), were dissatisfied by the instatement of the EPO2 by the federal government 
of Canada and organized themselves to disrupt the existing top-down and command-and-control 
 


































resource governance regime. As indicated by the quote below, at the time of this research, ranchers 
were still apprehensive about interacting with federal government agencies.  
“I'll do an interview with you guys. But if the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was here, they 
wouldn't be here. If the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was here, no! They have that regulate 
and penalize approach” (Interviewee 5).  
The local NGOs led the process by providing information sessions, meetings, and media advocacy 
to convey their dissatisfaction and court public support. They also positioned themselves as viable 
organizations that can lead or actively participate in the governance of species at risk in the region 
by forming coalitions (Pittman 2019). In addition, due to the federal government’s increased 
commitment to conserving species at risk in the region as signified by the instatement of the EPO 
(Wark 2020), the local actors saw another window of opportunity to advocate for an alternative 
form of conservation governance which was more collaborative and incentive-based. In this 
regard, these leaders could be seen as institutional entrepreneurs (Baird et al. 2019). Ultimately, 
the institutional disruption was successful and resulted in the crafting of new institutions to lead 
conservation governance in the region. Other existing institutions changed roles or took on 
additional roles in the process (Table 5.2).  
5.5.2.2 Mechanism B – Institutional crafting and drift  
The institutional disruption that took place created a pathway for more local involvement in 
conservation governance and the emergence of local autonomy. The local autonomy demanded 
that local actors were well-positioned to take on more responsibility in conservation governance. 
This resulted in the creation of new institutions and some other institutions changing roles to 
include conservation issues (Table 5.2). The creation of new institutions is referred to as 
institutional crafting (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Patterson and Beunen 2019), and the changing 
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roles of existing institutions are referred to as institutional drift (Glückler and Lenz 2018). The 
crafting and drifting of institutions were significant because they paved the way for some amount 
of local autonomy to emerge. Most of the members of these institutions are landowners and land 
managers who desired to have control over or influence conservation governance that affect their 
lands. This autonomy further enhanced collaborations and institutional innovations – i.e., 
brokerage – leading to trust-building.  
Table 5.2. Institutional Crafting and Drift in the SoD 




The SSGA is a non-profit 
organization created in 1913 to 
represent the cattle industry on 
the legislative front. One could 
summarize their historic role as 
one that focused on protecting 
the economic interests of their 
members.  
Due to the perceived threats posed 
by the EPO, SSGA became an active 
advocate for incentive-based 
conservation in the region. They 
recently partnered with SODCAP to 
administer the SARPAL program. 
Sustainable Canada 
(SC) 
N/A SC was created in response to the 




Alliance, Ca (RSA) 
The RSA was created in 
response to SARA (Pittman 
2019). It is an alliance of 
ranchers who manage their 
lands for livestock and wild 
species.  
While RSA appeared to be already 
advocating for the interest of their 
members since the creation of 
SARA, they became more involved 
in species at risk conservation after 




South of the Divide 
Conservation Action 
Program (SODCAP) 
N/A SODCAP is a collaborative 
partnership involving land managers, 
conservation organizations, and 
government. SODCAP was created 
to implement actions relating to the 
South of the Divide Multi-Species 
Action Plan. SODCAP is currently 
the focal point for most issues 
relating to species at risk 





Like the SSGA, the grazing 
corporations and cooperatives 
were created to coordinate 
cattle ranching and advocate for 
the interest of their members in 
Crown lands.  
Since the inception of the incentive-
based conservation governance, 
grazing corporations and 
cooperatives are now involved in 
negotiating contracts with SODCAP, 
undertaking management for species 
at risk and assisting in monitoring 




Land managers and riders were 
formally hired to focus on 
sustaining livestock 
production. Their role was 
primarily to promote the 
economic interests of the 
corporations and cooperatives.   
In the new arrangements, land 
managers also focus on addressing 
issues of species at risk. As a result, 
they now receive training on species 
at risk management. 
Ranchers  Ranchers primarily managed 
their lands for profit, even 
though most of them are 
environmentally conscious.  
Like land managers, ranchers now 





5.5.2.3 Mechanism C – Brokerage or bridging  
An important result of the institutional crafting and drifting that occurred in the region was the 
opportunity created for the different local actors to collaborate. However, these organizations still 
needed a common platform to collaborate more effectively for species at risk management. In this 
regard, the creation of SODCAP as a partnership to implement the South of the Divide Multi-
Species Action Plan was a welcome act for these local organizations. SODCAP is a bridging 
organization that brings together several actors, including land managers, non-profits, and the 
government. Though federally inspired, SODCAP has become more grassroots-oriented due to the 
higher involvement of local actors in decision-making (Pittman 2019). Brokerage or bridging 
refers to a mediating unit that connects previously disparate social arenas (McAdam et al. 2008; 
Biesbroek et al. 2017). Bridging organizations are increasingly important for liaising with multiple 
actors to solve problems that they would originally not be able to solve acting alone (Brown 1991). 
Bridging is particularly important in conservation governance because it fosters trust-building, the 
integration of multiple sources of knowledge, social learning, conflict resolution, and collaboration 
(Berkes 2009; Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2015; Berdej and Armitage 2016; Berdej et al. 2019). While 
SODCAP performs most of the functions of bridging organizations, it was its trust-building role 
that featured prominently during the interviews and FGDs. Land managers constantly referred to 
the implementation of non-prescriptive conservation programs as a sign that SODCAP knows 
them and trusts their stewardship. They also cited their participation in key decision-making as an 
important indication that they were considered important in species at risk management. Perhaps, 
more important is that SODCAP and the resultant trust it created paved the way for the co-design 
and co-implementation of the incentive programs. In fact, most land managers would not have 
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participated in species at risk management had it not been for the trust in SODCAP, as shown in 
the quotes below.  
“I think one of the reasons why we did the agreement was because they [SODCAP] are so easy to 
work with, you know, they're in it for our best interest, and we have the same ideas of wanting to 
preserve the land and keep it going the way that we have been – they've been obviously seeing the 
good in that.” (Interviewee 3). 
“Initially [before SODCAP], let's say, I was driving out in my place and saw the Sage grouse; the 
last person that was going to know about it is an environmentalist. You could just imagine the 
ramifications of what could happen if you had something like that on your land” (Interviewee 4). 
“If there's no trust between the parties, they shouldn’t be together. The most important thing is the 
trust of the people and not the paper contract.” “…if not because of SODCAP, we wouldn’t be here 
talking to you” (FGD 2).  
5.5.2.4 Mechanism D – Program uptake 
The trust among the different actors and in SODCAP contributed to them (particularly SODCAP 
and SSGA) co-designing and co-implementing incentive schemes under SARPAL. SARPAL is an 
initiative funded by Environment and Climate Change Canada with the aim of improving 
conservation programming in agricultural regions across Canada. SARPAL uses multiple 
innovative programs, including result-based conservation agreements, habitat management 
agreements, and niche marketing programs (Pittman 2019; Reiter et al. 2021) that are incentive-
based and producer-oriented. Therefore, despite its federal orientation, SARPAL is a significant 
departure from the previous command-and-control tendencies inherent in the EPO and other 
applications of SARA (Pittman 2019). We describe the process of local organizations collaborating 
among themselves and with the federal government to design and implement incentive programs 
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as ‘program uptake.’ This mechanism was the penultimate one and paved the way for the first 
management outcome – land managers deliberately managing their lands for species at risk – to 
manifest.  
5.5.2.5 Mechanism E – Alleviation of the fear of harm  
One of the most important concerns of land managers is the fear that species at risk management 
would harm them. Harm to landowners and land managers mostly includes a reduction in their 
profits and restrictions placed on their lands (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2016; 
Hossu et al. 2018; Reiter et al. 2021). Therefore, before signing up for conservation programs, land 
managers look for assurances that they will not be harmed through restrictions or reduction in 
profits. Because the incentives under SARPAL provided compensation to land managers for the 
reduced profits resulting from the participation in species at risk management, the fear of reduced 
profits was alleviated. Similarly, because the programs were generally non-prescriptive, land 
managers felt that the fear of restrictions was also alleviated. Nonetheless, some land managers in 
the region still desire legal assurances (Ayambire et al., 2021), especially considering that section 
80 of SARA allows the federal government to install an EPO to protect a listed species is still in 
force.  
5.6. Discussion: explaining the link between governance and management  
We began this paper by arguing that the link between environmental governance and management 
has been taken for granted. We also suggested that taking this link seriously could offer 
opportunities for better understanding the governance conditions and underlying processes that 
generate particular management outcomes. By doing this, environmental governance scholarship 
could become more relevant to policymakers who often need to act on the mechanism that 
produces management outcomes. Therefore, we used a mechanism-based explanation to unpack 
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the link between governance and management of species at risk in the SoD region. Drawing on 
Ayambire et al. (forthcoming), we hypothesized that several governance conditions interact to 
influence management outcomes in working landscapes. We posited that these governance 
conditions are also connected through underlying mechanisms which produced the management 
outcomes observed in the region. Indeed, the case study illustrated that multiple governance 
conditions – facilitative leadership, trust, local autonomy, and incentives – interacting through five 
underlying mechanisms produced management of species at risk in the SoD (Figure 5.2).  
Our mechanism-based approach offers a number of important insights for a better understanding 
of how governance influences management outcomes. First, in recent years, the unbridled 
excitement that accompanied incentive-based governance of species at risk has dwindled. In many 
examples, the participation of land managers in species at risk management has remained below 
expectations (Rolfe et al. 2018; Snilstveit et al. 2019). Consequently, scholars are beginning to 
look more critically at what factors might be constraining participation in management (Sorice et 
al. 2011; Sorice et al. 2013; Selinske et al. 2017). Much of this research has reported the need to 
diversify the portfolio of policy instruments and incentive programs to match the different interests 
of land managers (Selinske et al. 2017; Ayambire et al. 2021). This approach has been useful but 
to a limited extent as we only know, for example, that land managers may be motivated by other 
conditions aside from economic incentives. However, the how and why these conditions emerge 
as well as whether and how they interact to produce management outcomes, have remained under-
researched. The current case study suggests that the conditions are interconnected through series 
of underlying mechanisms, and triggering one mechanism in the governance system can spark 
further conditions and mechanisms. This finding is critical for two reasons. First, it expands the 
policy focus from only trying to meet landowner preferences towards certain governance 
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conditions (e.g., by replicating successful conditions) to also addressing why landowners prefer 
those conditions. This addition to policy helps direct efforts to policy actions that are more likely 
to generate successful outcomes in specific contexts. For example, results presented in this paper 
suggest that landowners may have ultimately accepted to manage their land for species at risk in 
the SoD not just because they prefer incentives but because the incentives alleviated their fear of 
harm. Focusing on this mechanism – the alleviation of the fear of harm – may suggest that there 
could be different conditions, aside from incentives, that may help alleviate land managers’ fear 
of harm in different contexts. Therefore, policymakers may increase the probability of success of 
conservation programs by also focusing on underlying mechanisms. Second, it suggests that it may 
not be useful to think of governance conditions as standalone factors that contribute to 
management outcomes. Rather, certain conditions may trigger others or even combine with them 
to facilitate management outcomes. Thus, depending on how the conditions and mechanisms 
combine, the management outcomes may be positive or negative. In this regard, while our case 
study demonstrates a positive outcome for species at risk management, we believe that a negative 
outcome is possible depending on how the mechanisms play out. For example, the institutional 
disruption could have resulted in chaos if it were not followed by institutional crafting at the local 
level to complement the top-down regulatory system. Similarly, the incentive programs that 
resulted from the program uptake would not necessarily yield positive management outcomes if 
they had not alleviated the land managers’ perceived harm.  
Second, our study shows that some positive management outcomes may emerge even if the 
governance system fails to address all the important conditions within the context of interest. For 
example, while equity (which was absent in the SOD according to respondents) was deemed 
important for research participants in the SoD, some positive management outcomes still emerged. 
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Although, the absence of equity in the region might be explained by the narrow focus of ranchers 
on Indigenous rights, it still helps explain the emergence of management outcomes because 
ranchers’ decision to manage land for species at risk is inherently determined by their perceptions. 
Therefore, the emergence of positive management outcomes despite the perceived absence of 
equity has important implications for policy. For example, there is a tendency for policymakers or 
program administrators to become complacent as a result of the initial positive management 
outcomes. However, as we have demonstrated in this paper, both land managers and program 
administrators desired to address issues of Indigenous rights. This desire, if not realized, could 
become a disincentive to participation in species at risk management. Also, we cannot say if the 
inclusion of equity in the SoD region would have meant better management outcomes than 
currently observed. However, we could surmise, based on the positive correlations between 
landowner values and preferences and participation in conservation programs (Sorice and Conner 
2010; Sorice et al. 2011; Sorice 2012), that the overwhelming support for equity may likely 
translate to positive attitudes of land managers towards the conservation program and consequently 
increase program participation and management outcomes. Finally, equity may not have been the 
only absent but important conditions; there is a possibility that many more of such conditions will 
emerge alongside new mechanisms that may change management outcomes. Therefore, it beholds 
policymakers or program administrators to continue to monitor new governance conditions and 
mechanisms that may emerge and affect management outcomes.  
Third, the achievement of some positive management outcomes, despite the perceived absence of 
equity, may suggest that there are necessary and sufficient conditions in the governance system 
(Cragun et al. 2016) that play out to produce management outcomes. However, we are unable to 
say if the conditions present in our case study represent sufficient conditions or any of the 
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conditions are necessary conditions since we did not test which of the conditions was deemed 
indispensable for the achievement of management outcomes. Nonetheless, our results point to a 
strong possibility that some governance conditions are necessary for other conditions to be 
effective. For example, our results suggest that incentives will be less effective in the absence of 
trust. This is a claim that has been supported in other studies (Ferranto et al. 2013; Muradian 2013). 
Similarly, local autonomy might not be achieved without facilitative leadership. Again, since we 
did not test necessity and sufficiency, we can only hypothesize that some governance conditions 
may be prerequisites for other conditions to emerge. This hypothesis is important in our quest to 
make environmental governance research more useful for policymaking because, as we have 
shown in this paper, multiple governance conditions interact through several underlying 
mechanisms to produce management outcomes. Yet, it is possible that the observations we have 
made are only present in our case study. Therefore, our ability to theorize about the relationships 
between individual governance conditions will help us develop strong mechanisms that are useful 
for policymaking in different contexts. We believe that enough theorization of the relationship 
between specific governance conditions will ultimately lead to the development of general theories 
that explain the governance-management nexus.  
Fourth, although this study was intended to demonstrate from a mechanisms perspective how 
governance is linked to the management of species at risk, it also shed some light on the 
institutional change processes that yield particular management outcomes. Perhaps, an important 
finding worth highlighting is that in our case study, top-down regulations that exhibited command-
and-control tendencies failed to deliver management outcomes. However, top-down regulations 
could become acceptable at the local level and foster the delivery of positive management 
outcomes if they allow room for institutional crafting and brokerage to occur. As we have shown, 
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SODCAP was created as a tool to implement the federal government-inspired South of the Divide 
Multi-Species Action Plan and, to a large extent, implement the section 11 conservation 
agreements under SARA. However, due to the opportunities for strong local involvement, most 
land managers in the region have considered SODCAP a local ally created to protect their interests 
alongside species at risk (Pittman 2019). This insight suggests that environmental governance 
scholars might be missing a critical piece in their quest to understand why many top-down 
regulations are less desirable in species at risk management (Innes and Frisvold 2009; Sorice 2012; 
Pittman 2019). Perhaps the problem is not that the regulations are top-down but because they do 
not offer leverage for further institutional work. Adopting a mechanism-based approach could help 
uncover why local actors such as land managers detest top-down regulations.  
5.7. Conclusion  
Environmental governance has been largely and rightly treated as an organizing framework but 
has been criticized for not providing enough policy guidance and does little to explain undesirable 
environmental outcomes (Partelow et al. 2020). We set out in this paper to illuminate a different 
dimension of environmental governance, which we believe has the potential to make governance 
scholarship more relevant to policy – i.e., the link between governance and management. We 
adopted a mechanism-based approach to uncover the link between environmental governance and 
species at risk management in a working landscape. In doing this, we treated management as a 
product of governance (Lockwood 2010), which allowed us to hypothesize about how governance 
conditions interact through underlying mechanisms to produce management outcomes. Our 
findings suggest that four governance conditions – facilitative leadership, trust, incentives, and 
local autonomy – interact to produce good management outcomes in the SoD region. However, 
these conditions are connected by five interlinked mechanisms: institutional disruption, 
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institutional crafting and drift, brokerage, program uptake, and alleviation of fear of harm. Among 
the mechanisms identified, the alleviation of the fear of harm is more likely to occur in most species 
at risk management contexts as the fear of restrictions and reduced profits are widely reported 
(Burton and Schwarz 2013; Hasund 2013; Polhill et al. 2013; Olive and McCune 2017; Kremen 
and Merenlender 2018). The other four mechanisms will likely vary according to context. For 
example, in contexts where there are already well-established local institutions that coordinate 
environmental protection, the institutional crafting mechanism may not occur or will be limited to 
institutional drift. Alternatively, already established institutions may undergo bridging. Similarly, 
in contexts where there are no command-and-control policies that trigger institutional disruption, 
local actors or policymakers interested in initiating species at risk management might begin to craft 
institutions.  
Our case study has demonstrated that a mechanism-based explanation can be useful for opening 
the black box connecting environmental governance and management, and by so doing, offer 
useful recommendations to guide policy. Also, the inductive process-tracing approach adopted in 
this paper helps identify potential causal paths which can be treated as hypotheses for testing in 
similar cases (Bennett and George 1997). Therefore, we do not claim that the mechanisms and the 
causal path illustrated in this case study will be the same or even similar in other cases. Rather, we 
see our findings as an important foundation for many more case studies that will contribute to 




Chapter 6: Adaptive co-management of environmental risks in 
Result-based Agreements for the Provision of Environmental 
Services: a case study of the South of the Divide Conservation 
Action Program 
6.1 Chapter summary 
Environmental risks pose a threat to the achievement of ecosystem outcomes in Results- or 
Outcome-based Agreements for species at risk conservation on agricultural lands. As a result, 
environmental risks can deter prospective land managers from participating in Results-based 
Agreements if not addressed. This qualitative case study examines a Results-based Agreement 
program implemented by the South of the Divide Conservation Action Program (SODCAP Inc.) 
in Southwestern Saskatchewan. We contribute to understanding the nature of environmental risks 
in Results-based Agreements and how SODCAP Inc., an emergent leader in grassroots-focused 
conservation governance in Southwestern Saskatchewan, works with land managers to address 
environmental risks. Using drought as an example of environmental risks, the study finds that 
drought is a common occurrence in the study area; therefore, land managers consider it a critical 
determinant when deciding to participate in Results-based Agreements. The study also reveals that 
environmental risks affect land managers involved with Results-based Agreements both by 
limiting their ability to achieve ecosystem targets and by forcing them to incur extra costs (i.e., 
extra management and opportunity costs) in their attempt to meet ecosystem targets under drought 
conditions. Finally, the case study illustrates a participatory and result-enhancing approach 
adopted by SODCAP Inc., which draws several parallels with adaptive co-management, to manage 
environmental risks. Our study findings contribute to a relatively limited body of scholarship in 
environmental risk management in Results-based Agreements. In addition to the study’s policy 
relevance, it also calls for studies into conservation programs that are result-enhancing.  
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6.2 Introduction  
Result-based Agreements (RBAs) or Outcome-based Agreements – i.e., conservation programs 
designed to reward producers of environmental services based on the achievement of outcomes as 
opposed to undertaking conservation actions (as is the case in Activity-Based Agreements 
(ABAs)) (Engel et al. 2008) – are on the ascendency (Whitten et al. 2007; Hanley et al. 2012). 
Hanley et al. (2012) suggest that the upsurge in RBAs is attributable to their non-restrictive nature, 
which gives land managers the flexibility to manage land according to their knowledge of the land 
(e.g., information on parts of the land that can maximize ecosystem services and alternative 
approaches to enhance ecosystem outcomes). This flexibility leads to the relatively efficient 
production of ecosystem services compared with payment for actions (Whitten et al. 2007; White 
and Sadler 2012). Also, RBAs tend to exclude land managers with a low probability of providing 
environmental services, hence reducing conservation costs (Gibbons et al. 2011). In addition, land 
managers value local autonomy in the management of their land (Pittman 2019); therefore, they 
favour conservation programs that afford them the flexibility and autonomy to decide on how to 
manage their land (Whitten et al. 2007; Henderson et al. 2014). 
On the other hand, RBAs are associated with higher risks to participating land managers. Other 
drawbacks of RBAs (although not exclusive to RBAs) may include leakages, lack of permanence, 
and non-additionality (Murray et al. 2007; Hanley et al. 2012; Van Noordwijk et al. 2012). 
However, in this paper, we focus on environmental risks in RBAs. These risks emanate from the 
fact that several factors determine conservation outcomes, some of which may lie outside the land 
managers’ control (Hanley et al. 2012; Burton and Schwarz 2013; Osbeck et al. 2013). One of 
such risks is the effects of environmental stressors (i.e., extreme climate events) on conservation 
outcomes. Extreme climate events such as drought, flood, sea-level rise, and heatwaves can 
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obstruct ecosystems' natural functioning, thereby affecting the efficient production of ecosystem 
services by land managers. This may induce a failure on the side of land managers to meet 
conservation targets outlined in RBAs and the non-payment of compensation by the regulator 
(Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). Due to this positive correlation between extreme climate events and 
the achievement of conservation outcomes, climate-vulnerable and risk-averse land managers tend 
to avoid participating in RBAs (Zabel and Roe 2009; Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010; Rolfe et al. 
2018). Therefore, conservation agencies (i.e., government agencies and NGOs) need approaches 
to help address these risks and enhance land managers' participation in the production of public 
environmental services under RBAs.  
While the literature on RBAs is growing, research on how to manage the associated environmental 
risks is in its infancy (Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). One of the earlier studies to consider 
environmental risks as a variable in the design of incentive schemes was by Loisel and Elyakime 
(2006). The authors used a set of theoretical modelling and simulation to assess farmers' relative 
preferences for incentive programs that accounted for the weather events compared with those that 
focused only on results. Matzdorf and Lorenz (2010) examined whether weather-related risks 
impact farmers' willingness to participate in RBAs. They concluded that while their study did not 
show clear evidence of negative impacts on farmers' willingness to participate, it pointed to the 
need for further research on how to account for weather risks in RBAs. Derissen and Quaas (2013) 
tackled how to address environmental risks in RBAs using a principal-agent model. The authors 
suggest combining ABAs and RBAs will provide optimal results under conditions of information 
asymmetry and environmental risks. However, all these studies have failed to examine the nature 
of the environmental risks and how they are addressed in real-life settings. Similarly, other risk 
management approaches such as financial insurance and conservation auctions have rarely been 
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applied to study RBAs, even though they also have the potential to address risks in RBAs (Connor 
et al. 2008; Hellerstein et al. 2015; Alexander et al. 2021; Loch-Temzelides 2021). We contribute 
to addressing this gap through a case study of land managers who participate in RBAs administered 
by the South of the Divide Conservation Action Program Inc. (SODCAP Inc.) in Southwestern 
Saskatchewan. Specifically, we use drought as an example of environmental risk to understand the 
nature of environmental risks, how the program administrator addresses these risks, and land 
managers’ perceptions about the risk management approach. By focusing on the environmental 
risk dynamics in a real-life setting, this paper reveals new insights that past simulation studies have 
failed to uncover.  
6.3 A case for managing environmental risks in RBAs  
RBAs follow a simple Input-Process-Outcome scenario, where inputs are expected to yield 
specific outcomes depending on the use of appropriate processes (Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). 
Inputs are the base resources required by the land manager, which are combined with processes to 
achieve outcomes. Inputs may include the land, knowledge, equipment, and finances. Processes 
are the specific activities, actions, or inactions that a land manager adopts towards achieving an 
RBA's target outcomes. Outcomes refer to the environmental services (e.g., habitat health, number 
of species) expected to be provided, measured by established outcome indicators. Under RBAs, 
land managers are paid compensation on the condition that they adopt appropriate inputs and 
processes towards achieving the desired outcomes (Engel et al. 2008; Osbeck et al. 2013). Thus, 
the inputs and processes are not regulated by the conservation agency and are not considered in 
the payment of compensation. In other words, conservation agencies focus on the results to 
determine whether to pay compensation to land managers or not. This uniqueness in RBAs ensures 
flexibility and allows land managers to use cost-efficient and workable knowledge (often based on 
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experience) (Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). This also supports recent shifts towards incorporating 
local ecological knowledge in environmental management (Saylor et al. 2017) and land managers’ 
quest for local autonomy (Pittman 2019).      
However, the use of outcomes to determine compensation payment implies that environmental 
risks that affect land managers at the input and process levels may not be accounted for by the 
conservation agency unless these risks are included in determining the overall compensation 
package (Russi et al. 2016). Indeed, in practice, most environmental risks are borne by the land 
manager (Loisel and Elyakime 2006; Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010; Osbeck et al. 2013). When 
environmental risks are treated this way, society stands to lose because profit-oriented land 
managers under conditions of environmental risks will typically decide to use on-farm 
agrobiodiversity as natural insurance for their private ecosystem services to the detriment of the 
public ecosystem services (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). For example, when faced with a 
drought, a profit-oriented livestock farmer is more likely to overgraze the fixed piece of land to 
maintain their profit levels than restrict the quantity of livestock feeding on the land to provide 
habitat for wild species. Some prior research suggests that land managers, as stewards of the land, 
manage conditions that support the production of public ecosystem services (e.g., habitat for 
species) as well as the production of private ecosystem services (e.g., livestock) (Bennett et al. 
2018). This perspective suggests that when environmental risks are increasing, the land manager 
is likely to increase the supply of on-farm biodiversity as insurance for his private interests, which 
in turn benefits society (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). While this is true for environmentally-
conscious land managers, the levels of on-farm biodiversity produced under such unregulated 
conditions remain “inefficiently low” (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). Therefore, society will be 
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better off providing extra incentives to land managers to help offset the negative impacts of 
environmental risks so as not to affect the production of public ecosystem services.  
6.4 Management approaches for environmental risks in RBAs  
Risk management is not new in the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scholarship. 
Indeed, over a decade ago, Schwarz et al. (2008), while supporting the use of RBAs as an 
alternative to ABAs, reckoned that one of the biggest challenges of adopting RBAs was the greater 
risks it posed to land managers. Therefore, they suggested that environmental risks and uncertainty 
must be included in the design of RBA programs. Two leading suggestions were made, including 
incorporating risk premiums and splitting the compensation payment “between a guaranteed 
element for participation plus a bonus upon delivery of the desired outcome” (Schwarz et al. 2008, 
p. 34). Several other authors have since proposed similar frameworks (e.g., Zabel and Roe 2009; 
Derissen and Quaas 2013). The work of Derissen and Quaas (2013) has been auspicious. The 
authors argue that combining ABAs and RBAs will provide optimal results under conditions of 
information asymmetry and environmental risks. They suggest that ABAs are only optimal if there 
is no information asymmetry, while RBAs are only optimal if there are no environmental 
uncertainties or risks. In practice, however, there are always likely information asymmetries and 
environmental risks; therefore, combining the two approaches is the only optimal option. While 
this approach is promising, it appears to suggest that in PES schemes, the regulator's interest is to 
attract land managers to join the program and ensure cost-efficiency. However, when too much 
emphasis is placed on cost-efficiency, there is the risk of neglecting approaches that can enhance 
ecosystem outcomes. This is because when land managers are forced to make conservation 
decisions under severe restrains to their socio-economic well-being, the ecosystem service 
outcomes are usually inefficiently low (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). Thus, as we suggest in this 
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paper, rather than only attracting land managers and ensuring cost-efficiency, it may be useful to 
adopt a participatory approach that is also result-enhancing.  
6.5 Materials and Methods  
6.5.1 Case study context: the emergence of RBAs in the SoD 
This study is based in the South of the Divide (SoD) (Figure 6.1) – an area within Saskatchewan, 
Canada. SoD is among the few places within the Northern Great Plains containing a sizable amount 
of Canada’s remaining intact native grasslands (WWF 2016b; WWF 2016a; Pittman 2019). In 
addition, as of 2014, the SoD was home to at least 13 species at various levels of risk of extinction 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2016). These characteristics make the SoD a priority 
place for conservation. More importantly, much of the land in the area is working landscapes 
managed by private land managers for crops and livestock production. Available estimates suggest 
that about 46% of the area's land is privately owned (Environment and Climate Change Canada 
2016). The remaining land, the majority of which is leased out to private land managers and 
grazing corporations/cooperatives, is shared between the provincial government (50%) and the 
federal government (3%), excluding the Grasslands National Park (GNP). This makes 
collaboration with private land managers an integral part of the governance of species at risk 
conservation in the area.     
The SODCAP Inc., a collaborative partnership involving land managers, conservation 
organizations (e.g., Ranchers Stewardship Alliance, Sustainable Canada), and government, 
administers RBAs in the SoD area. SODCAP Inc. is a federally inspired partnership established to 
help implement the South of the Divide Multi-Species Action Plan. While federally inspired, 
SODCAP Inc. has become locally rooted, often attempting to promote environmental protection 
while maintaining land managers' socio-economic well-being in the SoD area (Pittman 2019). It 
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is in line with this goal that SODCAP created the RBAs (Environment and Climate Change Canada 
2016). However, the RBAs are also aligned with a larger change in policy approach by 
Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Environment (MoE). In 2008, the MoE initiated a review of its 
existing, mostly command-and-control, approach to environmental protection (Condor and Wilson 
2013). The review recommended a move towards a results-based regulatory framework that 
promotes innovation and efficient use of the Ministry’s human and financial resources (Condor 
and Wilson 2013; Goverment of Saskatchewan 2014). 
SODCAP’s RBA model focuses on rewarding land managers to supply critical habitat for selected 
species at risk (e.g., Greater Sage Grouse and Sprague’s Pipit) in the SoD area. Therefore, in 
measuring conservation outcomes, SODCAP measures habitat features such as forbs, grass height, 
and litter cover rather than counting the number of species (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada 2016). Incentives are paid on an annual basis. Between 2015 and 2018, there were a total 
of 31 agreements signed, covering a total land area of about 126,000 acres (SODCAP Inc. 2016; 
SODCAP Inc. 2017; SODCAP Inc. 2018).   
One critical concern of land managers participating in the RBAs is the impacts of extreme climate 
events, mainly extended periods of drought, on the attainment of habitat targets. Indeed, drought 
is a perennial condition in the Canadian Prairies, including in the SoD area (Environment and 
Climate Change Canada 2016). Between 1900 and 2014, Canada’s Prairies experienced ten severe 
droughts (Bonsal et al. 2020). With greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions projected to increase, the 
occurrence of severe droughts will likely increase (Bonsal and Regier 2007; Bonsal et al. 2020). 
SODCAP Inc., in its 2018 annual report, suggested that the incidence of drought in the region 
affects the attainment of habitat targets by participating land managers (SODCAP Inc. 2018). 
Therefore, the continued success of the RBAs in the SoD area will partly depend on how 
105 
 
conservation agencies address drought in the payment of compensation to participating land 
managers. 
 
Figure 6.1. A map of the study region  
6.5.2 Data collection and analysis  
Data collection for the project took place over three months from May-July 2019. We adopted 
multiple qualitative approaches to collect the data, including in-depth interviews (n=14 ranchers), 
focus group discussions (n=2, 5 and 4 people per group, respectively), and participatory 
observation of habitat monitoring and the recruitment of land managers into the RBAs. The sample 
size is relatively small, considering the total number of beef farmers in the region (N=728) 
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(Statistics Canada 2016). However, because we were interested in ranchers with experience with 
SODCAP’s RBA, this sample covered many of the conservation leaders who participated in the 
program. In addition, we collected the data until we reached theoretical saturation (Suddaby 2006). 
We also consulted with the project’s advisory committee at strategic times to corroborate key 
observations made during interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). The interview and FGD 
participants were purposively selected from ranchers in the SoD area involved with community 
pastures, grazing corporations, or grazing cooperatives (n=4) participating in SODCAP Inc.’s 
RBA program. Ranchers were selected in consultation with SODCAP Inc. and other key 
informants involved with managing local community pastures, grazing corporations, or 
cooperatives. These ranchers were known as "good managers" who were actively engaged in 
conservation. They also are known to have multiple species at risk on their properties. In total, 23 
ranchers were either interviewed or participated in the FGDs. Interview participants were asked to 
share their experiences and concerns regarding the RBA program, emphasizing the effects of 
drought on meeting habitat targets and the approach adopted by SODCAP to address these 
concerns. They were also asked to describe scenarios or experiences under which they were or 
would not be paid compensation due to the occurrence of drought. A similar approach was adopted 
during the FGDs. However, in the FGDs, we focused more on identifying mutual experiences 
(Michel 2011) and verifying whether the collective ideas differed from those generated from the 
in-depth interviews. In all, the results from the FGDs confirmed those generated from the in-depth 
interviews. All interviews and FGDs were conducted in person and recorded using an electronic 
recording device. To gain an in-depth understanding of the selection and recruitment of land 
managers into the RBA program, the lead author followed the program recruitment officer to the 
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field throughout the data collection period. The lead author also received training and actively 
participated in habitat monitoring for onward assessment to determine compensation payment.  
We followed the basic coding processes for qualitative data analysis outlined in Creswell (2009). 
First, we transcribed the data verbatim. The transcribed data were then organized under individual 
questions or themes and read through to gain a general understanding of the responses. Second, 
we coded the data using NVivo qualitative data analysis software. Both inductive and deductive 
processes were used in the coding, where some themes – i.e., effects of drought on habitat health 
and land management, cost of drought to land managers, perceptions of risk management approach 
in place – were determined a priori through the review of the literature, and new themes were 
included as and when they emerged during the coding. Third, the coded data were segregated into 
themes and descriptions. Finally, the themes and descriptions were analyzed to identify 
interrelationships and then subjected to interpretation. The interrelationships were built into a 
decision tree model for identifying instances where drought can affect land managers (i.e., in 
compensation payment) in RBAs.  
6.6 Results  
6.6.1 Nature and effects of droughts on habitat management for species at risk 
Overall, research participants see drought as a perennial occurrence in the area, and its effects were 
dire. According to the land managers, in the two years preceding the interview, they had 
experienced extended periods of droughts, which negatively affected their operations and the 
production of habitats for species at risk. This was further explained as:   
It seems the drought comes in cycles about every five to ten years: it seems like we get hit with 
about two, three years of drought, and then we'll start to get some rain, and then we'll get some 
really wet years. …And when we do hit into drought, then that's when the habitats get hit harder 
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because guys don't want to sell their cows because they need those cows to produce calves to pay 
for stuff (Interviewee 1).  
Of course, the last two years, there hasn’t been a lot of recovery [of species’ habitat] because of the 
drought. That is one of the challenges. (Interviewee 2).   
The management [environmentally friendly management] is way more important in the bad years 
when you're abnormally dry or where you got abnormal rainfall.  And yet, it is the cows that pay 
the bills and not the species at risk. We can only do so much (Interviewee 3).  
Land managers recognize drought as a phenomenon that affects livestock production and as a 
critical determinant of whether habitats for species at risk were maintained. The claims of 
Interviewees 1 and 3 are particularly insightful. They suggest that during drought, and in the 
absence of incentive support, land managers are forced to choose between protecting their 
economic interest and conserving the environment. As the quotes posit, land managers are more 
likely to maintain their economic well-being. Choosing to protect their economic interests under 
conditions of drought does not mean that the land managers are not concerned about the 
environment; instead, it is an indication that land managers work within a limited resource budget, 
restraining the extent to which they can conserve the environment. This limitation makes incentive 
programs like SODCAP Inc.’s RBA a welcome intervention for land managers since it helps land 
managers simultaneously protect their economic interests while maintaining healthy habitats for 
species at risk.  
6.6.2 Experiences of drought and participation in RBAs  
Land managers were asked whether their knowledge of the drought situation and its effects on 
livestock production and habitat health played a role in their decision to participate in the RBA 
program. They unanimously believed that in one way or the other, they considered the implications 
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of drought on the attainment of habitat targets before accepting to be part of the RBA program. 
However, the motives of land managers were sharply divided. More than half of them believed 
that they were concerned that drought might prevent them from meeting habitat targets and, thus, 
be unfairly penalized. As one land manager puts it: 
When I was approached over the result-based agreement, I got mixed feelings about [the] result-
based agreement. We go into a drought like we did the last two years, and it affects your results. 
We were hoping that somewhere along the line, some of these environmental groups can realize 
that management for habitat is not just in the good years. I was happy when they [SODCAP Inc.] 
said they would consider it (Interviewee 4).  
In one of the field observations where a land manager was approached to become a participant in 
the RBA, he was emphatic about his reservations; “what happens when there is a drought like we 
had last year?”. This group of land managers was interested in being assured by SODCAP Inc. 
that drought would be considered a variable when determining payment of compensation.  
The remaining land managers appeared less concerned about the effects of drought on meeting 
habitat targets. They believed that they were already incurring extra costs to conserve the 
environment during droughts, even if it was a form of insurance or in readiness for any drought in 
the following year. Therefore, while they considered drought before accepting to participate in the 
RBAs, it was in regard to the fact that the compensation was a form of recognition for their ‘good 
stewardship.’ In order words, they viewed the incentive program as a support for them to continue 
to provide species habitat even under inclement weather. However, when prompted as to whether 
they would feel unfairly penalized if they were not paid compensation for a particular year because 
of drought, they responded in the affirmative. This implies that even though these land managers 
believed that their operations were environmentally friendly and the RBA was only a form of 
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recognition, they still felt that drought must be considered in the determination of compensation 
payment.  
6.6.3 Drought as a form of environmental penalty to land managers in RBAs  
As we have demonstrated above, drought is a critical determinant of ecosystem outcomes (i.e., 
habitat health) in the SoD area and can be a source of environmental penalties – the extra cost that 
land managers bear as a result of environmental events beyond their control – to participating 
land managers. But in what ways are these penalties experienced by land managers? Land 
managers described three scenarios under which they may be unfairly penalized because of 
drought. These scenarios are summarized in Figure 6.2 and discussed in detail below.  
Scenario 1 or Penalty 1: Land managers are not paid compensation because the drought prevented 
them from meeting their habitat targets   
The RBA model requires that land managers be paid compensation only if they meet the defined 
habitat targets. However, when a drought occurs, land managers may not be able to meet the habitat 
targets, thereby forfeiting their compensation. This scenario is referred to as penalty 1 – the 
forfeited compensation that is induced by the occurrence of drought (Figure 6.2).    
Scenario 2 or Penalty 2: Land managers’ management and opportunity cost increases in efforts 
to meet habitat targets in drought years  
Management cost refers to the costs associated with undertaking grazing rotations, water 
maintenance, fence maintenance, buying hay, and salt distribution on the landscape (Naidoo et al. 
2006; Pittman and Ayambire 2020). According to the land managers, in a typical drought year, 
these cost items increase above the average amounts spent in a non-drought year, even though they 
could not put figures on them. For example, regarding the grazing rotations, an interviewee posited 
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that in the last year, he undertook one extra rotation to avoid overgrazing due to the drought. They 
estimated that, on average, each rotation takes about 40-man hours, even though the number of 
hours varies according to the size of the livestock and distances between rotations (Pittman and 
Ayambire 2020). Also, because grazing intensity is reduced to accommodate the drought, land 
managers indicated that they often must either rent pastures or buy more hay to supplement the 
forfeited grazing.  
…I would say we even increase the amount of time doing the same job as normal years and what other 
people in other places do… for example, last year, we made one extra rotation just because we didn’t 
want to overgraze (Participant, FGD 1).  
Opportunity cost refers to the costs associated with reducing stocking rates to ensure the provision 
of multiple ecosystem services (Pittman and Ayambire 2020). Land managers revealed that they 
reduce their stocking rates below the recommended Animal Unit Month (AUM) to conserve 
species habitats and meet the RBA targets in drought years. Some land managers reduced their 
total stock by as much as 100 cows during the 2018 season: “We normally keep about 350 cows. 
We are down to 250 cows because of the drought last year” (Interviewee 1).  
In a drought year, the increase in both management and opportunity costs above the average cost 
in a non-drought year is a demonstration that land managers have exceeded their minimum efforts 
– the required amount of cost needed to ensure the optimum supply of grass for livestock and 
healthy habitat for species at risk (Figure 6.2). Sometimes, land managers are able to meet their 
habitat targets after exceeding their minimum efforts and hence are paid compensation. When this 
happens, land managers suffer what we refer to as penalty 2 – the extra cost incurred by a land 
manager, because of drought, in order to meet the habitat targets (Figure 6.2).   
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Scenario 3 or penalty 1+2: Land managers are concerned that they may not be paid compensation 
even after putting in extra efforts to meet habitat targets  
Exceeding the minimum effort is no guarantee that a land manager will meet the habitat targets. 
According to a participant in one of the FGDs, “you may even do all that [incurring extra 
management and opportunity costs] and still fail to meet the habitat targets. What do you do about 
that?” (Participant, FGD 2). If this happens, land managers are not paid compensation because 
they have failed to meet the habitat targets. In this scenario, land managers suffer from the forfeited 
compensation (Penalty 1) and the extra management and opportunity costs (Penalty 2). Therefore, 
they suffer a double penalty (Penalty 1+2) (Figure 6.2).  
The three scenarios suggest that environmental risks affect land managers involved with RBAs 
both by limiting their ability to achieve ecosystem targets and by forcing them to incur extra costs 
(i.e., extra management and opportunity costs) in their attempt to meet ecosystem targets under 
drought conditions. Furthermore, given that these risks, especially the extra costs incurred, are 
difficult to measure, it suggests that regulators need a participatory approach that engages with 














Figure 6.2. A decision tree for identifying environmental risks in RBAs  
In any given year, there are either droughts or not. In the absence of drought, RBA program administrators 
will not be required to undertake any action. However, when droughts occur, they are required to examine 
their effects on participating land managers as part of the decision-making process towards determining 
compensation payment. To be able to identify the true effects of the drought on land managers, program 
administrators should first determine whether land managers met the habitat targets. If land managers did 
not meet the habitat targets because of the drought, they have suffered penalty 1, which should be accounted 
for in the determination of compensation payment. If the land managers met their targets, the administrator 
should further inquire if they exceeded their minimum efforts to meet their targets. Where land managers 
did not exceed their minimum efforts, it implies that the drought did not impact the achievement of the 
habitat targets and hence no penalty. On the other hand, when land managers exceeded the minimum efforts 
as a result of the drought and met their habitat targets, land managers have suffered penalty 2, which should 
be accounted for in the determination of compensation payment. Sometimes, land managers will fail to 
meet the habitat targets even after exceeding the minimum efforts. This results in a double penalty, which 
should be accounted for in the determination of compensation payments.  
6.6.4 Dealing with environmental penalties in RBAs: the experience of SODCAP Inc.  
We inquired from land managers whether SODCAP Inc. had taken steps to address the penalties 
described above.  The authors also consulted with the project’s (the RBA) advisory committee to 
elicit from them the approach used by SODCAP Inc. to address the likely penalties (Figure 6.2). 
Both parties confirmed that mechanisms were in place to address environmental penalties. In 
particular, the land managers indicated that penalty 1 was accounted for in the payment of 
compensation through a pro-rata reduction from the agreed rate of compensation payment per acre 
of land. Furthermore, SODCAP Inc. reported in its 2018 annual report that “several producers 
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Yes 
No 
No action needed. 
Yes Minimum efforts exceeded? 
Penalty 2 
Penalty 1 No 
Yes 
Minimum efforts exceeded? 
Output indicators met? 
Penalty 1+2 
No penalty  
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received partial payments because the habitat targets were not met” (SODCAP Inc. 2018, p. 9), 
further confirming the claims of the land managers. However, according to land managers, penalty 
2 was not yet accounted for, even though they were optimistic that SODCAP Inc. was working 
with them to account for it in the future. Indeed, the advisory committee indicated that efforts were 
underway to adapt habitat targets to changing weather conditions. This claim was further 
corroborated by the SODCAP’s 2018 annual report, “species experts from the Saskatchewan 
Ministry of Environment and Environment and Climate Change Canada are assisting with adapting 
habitat targets as more research becomes available” (SODCAP Inc. 2018, p. 9).  
Overall, land managers seem satisfied with the approach SODCAP Inc. adopted to address likely 
environmental penalties. This was partly because land managers were actively involved in 
decision-making regarding how compensation was determined.  
Actor A 3and I worked together for I don't know how many years to get to this agreement. And they 
offered several different agreements, but it was of no advantage to us whatsoever. And so, Actor A 
worked really, really hard to get this agreement (Interviewee 5).  
I was concerned until we got this rain, that this was our third drought year. And I was told [by 
SODCAP Inc.] that it would be put in the factors when it comes to a payout time. (Interviewee 5).  
It is instructive to note that Actor A has firsthand knowledge of SODCAP Inc. and ranching in the 
area. Therefore, Actor A was aware of the impacts of drought on habitat health and the land 
managers' socio-economic well-being. Actor A’s position and the quotes from Interviewee 5 
suggest a high level of engagement and the involvement of actors that span the boundaries of 
 
3 Actor A is used as a pseudonym to protect the identity of the person involved.  
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program administrators and land managers. Therefore, land managers’ confidence that their 
concerns were being addressed is founded on the goodwill and trust in the program administrators.   
6.7 Discussion  
We applied multiple qualitative approaches, including in-depth interviews, FGDs, and 
observation, to obtain a detailed and thorough understanding of environmental risk dynamics in 
RBAs within their real-life contexts. To the best of our knowledge, no other study has done this 
before. Our case study results demonstrate that environmental risks, as they are outside the land 
manager's control, affect the attainment of environmental outcomes. Therefore, if not catered for 
in the design of RBAs, environmental risks could serve as a disincentive to prospective land 
managers (Whitten et al. 2007; Hanley et al. 2012; Derissen and Quaas 2013). Although several 
studies agree that environmental risks affect conservation outcomes, none of them describes the 
nature of these effects on land managers participating in RBAs. In fact, previous studies suggest 
that the only effect of environmental risks on land managers in RBAs is the risk of not meeting 
their ecosystem targets and hence the non-payment of compensation (Schwarz et al. 2008; Gibbons 
et al. 2011). However, it is crucial to note the managerial modifications that are likely to arise 
when land managers face environmental risks. Ignoring those managerial modifications could lead 
to underestimation of the real effects of environmental risks on land managers. Our results suggest 
that, indeed, under conditions of drought, land managers are forced to increase their management 
costs and opportunity costs in an attempt to meet ecosystem targets.   
The additional costs placed on land managers due to environmental risks can have dire 
consequences for society. This is because, under conditions of environmental risk, the profit-
oriented land manager is more likely to prioritize their private interests over the public interest 
(Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). Therefore, they may, for example, overgraze the land destroying 
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habitat for species at risk even if it means forfeiting the compensation. Even if land managers 
decide to protect their private interests and the public interests, the resulting ecosystem outcomes 
may be lower than when incentive support is provided (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). These 
findings suggest the critical need for conservation agencies to address environmental risks in 
RBAs, taking into account the impacts of their actions or inactions on ecosystem outcomes. In this 
regard, SODCAP Inc.’s approach to addressing environmental risks in its RBA is promising.  
Our study revealed that SODCAP Inc. is in the process of combining a pro-rata reduction and the 
use of environmentally adaptive outcome indicators (i.e., habitat targets) to reduce land managers’ 
risks (SODCAP Inc. 2017). SODCAP Inc. is already implementing a participatory approach that 
is focused on enhancing ecosystem outcomes. SODCAP Inc.’s participatory approach involves 
engaging land managers in an ongoing basis to determine how to pay compensation that accounts 
for risk events. While it is unclear at the time of this study how SODCAP Inc.’s environmentally 
adaptive outcome indicators would look like, past studies give an indication of what 
environmentally adaptive outcome indicators should entail. Heink & Kowarik (2010) argue that 
outcome indicators in PES must be sensitive to environmental change. They must also account for 
local climatic and soil conditions and historical events that have a bearing on the ecosystem service 
in question (Kaiser et al. 2010). The pro-rata reduction and the environmentally adaptive outcome 
indicators are not in any way unique to SODCAP Inc. However, SODCAP Inc.’s focus on 
enhancing ecosystem outcomes by supporting land managers through outreach and engaging land 
managers in decision-making on an ongoing basis regarding compensation payment during 
drought is promising. SODCAP, in addition to monitoring habitat targets, also monitors costs, 
which provide the information needed for adaptive management of the risks. Since SODCAP Inc. 
allows land managers to deliberate on the impacts of drought on management costs and the supply 
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of species at risk habitat, they can account for the extra management and opportunity costs that 
have been unaccounted for in many existing RBAs. Also, because the participation is on an 
ongoing basis, environmental uncertainties can be accounted for as and when they arise. Finally, 
the outreach events provide useful information that can help land managers reduce their exposure 
to environmental risks (Wandel et al. 2018).  
6.8 Conclusion: towards adaptive co-management of environmental risks in RBAs? 
This paper examines the nature of the effects of environmental risks on land managers participating 
in SODCAP Inc.’s RBA in Southwestern Saskatchewan. It also examines the approach adopted 
by SODCAP Inc. to address environmental risks. The results suggest that drought is a common 
occurrence in the study area; therefore, land managers consider it a critical determinant in 
participating in RBAs. In addition, the study reveals that environmental risks affect land managers 
involved with RBAs both by limiting their ability to achieve ecosystem targets and by forcing 
them to incur extra costs (i.e., extra management and opportunity costs) in their attempt to meet 
ecosystem targets under drought conditions. The additional costs placed on land managers due to 
environmental risks could have dire consequences for society if not addressed. These new insights 
call for a change in policy direction towards one that seeks to enhance ecosystem outcomes. An 
example of such change is SODCAP Inc.’s efforts to adopt a participatory and result-enhancing 
approach in its RBAs to help improve ecosystem outcomes.   
SODCAP Inc.’s approach draws several parallels with adaptive co-management (Plummer et al. 
2012; Plummer et al. 2013). Adaptive co-management emphasizes experimental and experiential 
learning, monitoring and evaluation, collaboration with multiple stakeholders (e.g., different levels 
of government, resource users, and local communities), integrating science and policy, and 
responsive management to address change and uncertainty (Plummer et al. 2012; Plummer et al. 
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2013; Hasselman 2017). As we have demonstrated throughout this paper, SODCAP Inc. itself is a 
collaborative partnership involving land managers, conservation organizations (e.g., Ranchers 
Stewardship Alliance, Sustainable Canada), and the federal and provincial governments. SODCAP 
Inc.’s RBA approach emphasizes continuous learning, integration of science, local knowledge, 
and policy, and monitoring, evaluation, and feedback (SODCAP Inc. 2016, 2017, 2018). These 
parallels make us wonder if we are seeing an emergence of adaptive co-management of 
environmental risks in RBAs.  
The academic scholarship on the successes of adaptive co-management (Plummer et al. 2012, 
2017) and the experiences from SODCAP Inc.’s RBA promise that such an approach within the 
context of RBAs might have positive effects. However, it is premature to conclude whether 
adaptive co-management of environmental risks is the way forward. Therefore, future studies 
should explore the potential of adaptive co-management as an alternative or an addition to more 
traditional economic-based environmental risk management in RBAs. Important starting points 
may include examining how adaptive co-management might enhance ecosystem outcomes in 
RBAs and how economic-based risk management approaches can work with adaptive co-




Chapter 7: Synthesis 
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the results from the three previous analyses (Chapters 
4, 5 & 6) into a coherent whole and identify their collective contribution to theory and practice. I 
begin by reiterating the purpose and objectives of the Ph.D. research. I follow this up with a 
summary of the key findings before explaining the contributions to theory and practice. Next, I 
state the study’s limitations. Finally, I provide some concluding remarks.  
7.2 Purpose and objectives 
I designed my research to advance our understanding of the working landscape approach in order 
to contribute to the planning of sustainable human-nature relations in rural environments. In doing 
so, I contribute to addressing the challenges emanating from our need for environmental protection 
and social-economic development. My research is based on the premise that governance provides 
a context, a set of theories, and processes (Pittman and Armitage 2016) which planners use to 
diagnose problems, make and implement sustainability solutions. Governance in this sense implies 
a new space for decision-making that helps deepen participation by permitting (1) the entry of 
multiple actors outside of the state into the decision-making space, (2) innovative approaches to 
problem-solving, and (3) emphasis on interactive and collaborative processes and the blurring of 
the boundaries separating the state, market, and the civil society (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Ansell 
and Gash 2008; Driessen et al. 2012; Roth and Dressler 2012; Bennett and Satterfield 2018; Stoker 
2018). Based on this premise, I use a governance perspective to frame my research question and 
objectives, which are as follows:  




Objective 1: to propose a framework for the working landscapes approach 
Objective 2: to examine the conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable working landscapes  
Objective 3: to examine approaches for addressing risks in the management of working landscapes  
In addressing these research objectives, I employed multiple qualitative research methods. Also, 
each objective is addressed in a separate manuscript presented as chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) 
in this dissertation. A discussion of the findings is provided under each objective below.  
7.3 Key findings 
In this section, I discuss the key findings in relation to each of the research objectives. Table 7.1 
provides a summary of the key findings.  
7.3.1 Objective 1: to propose a framework for the working landscapes approach 
The first objective aimed to propose a framework for the working landscapes approach. To achieve 
this objective, I conducted a review and synthesis of the literature on the governance dimension of 
working landscapes towards developing an integrated conceptual framework. The review focused 
on three major components: (1) the characteristics of the working landscapes approach, (2) the 
emergent governance challenges in working landscapes, and (3) the existing governance 
arrangements in working landscapes. First, the review found that the working landscapes approach 
has three main characteristics, including that (1) it focuses on integrating social well-being and 
environmental protection within the landscape, (2) it involves collective action among multiple 
actors, state and non-state actors, and (3) working landscapes shape and are shaped by their social-
ecological context. These three features collectively reveal critical governance challenges as 
apparent in the empirical scholarship on working landscapes.  
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Second, regarding the governance challenges in working landscapes, the review found that the 
challenges centre on the right to use resources and in what ways, the rules that control resource 
use, and how the rules are designed and enforced (Agrawal, Chhatre, & Hardin, 2008; Brockington 
et al., 2018). Specifically, the review found that the higher cost involved in managing working 
landscapes for both social well-being and environmental protection hinders the effectiveness of 
the working landscapes approach. This is especially important given that a large portion of working 
landscapes are managed by individuals and groups who bear the cost even though the benefits may 
accrue to actors spread out over larger spatial scales (Paavola 2016).  
Another challenge identified was the difficulty accessing and integrating diverse sources of 
knowledge to effectively manage working landscapes. Land managers do not trust knowledge from 
governments and other conservation agencies due to their past experiences of command-and-
control governance regimes (Bergmann and Bliss 2004; Ferranto et al. 2013; Farley et al. 2017). 
On the other hand, "trained experts" tend to leverage technical knowledge over other forms of 
knowledge, especially landowners' local ecological knowledge (Charnley et al. 2007; Armitage et 
al. 2012a). These barriers hinder access to appropriate knowledge and prevent the integration of 
knowledge from different sources. Furthermore, working landscapes face problems of fit. These 
include spatial fit – finding the appropriate spatial match between institutions and the 
environmental problem (Armitage et al. 2012a, 248) and social fit – the ability of institutions to 
match social processes and characteristics of the actors.  
Third, in response to these challenges, numerous governance arrangements have emerged from 
around the world, focusing on how communities, the state, and market actors interact to address 
concerns of cost, knowledge access and integration, and governance misfits or mismatches. While 
these governance arrangements vary in how they configure the relationships between 
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communities, the state, and market actors, there are essential commonalities (i.e., trust, incentives, 
leadership, local autonomy, and equity) that can inform the design of effective working landscapes. 
In addition, collaboration and multilevel institutional arrangements help facilitate interactions 
among the different actors and scales to make the working landscapes approach effective.  
These findings were synthesized to develop a conceptual framework that focuses on the local scale 
and how the local is embedded within multilevel governance arrangements. In the framework, the 
working landscapes approach is structured in terms of the social-ecological context, the key 
ingredients, collective action, and a linking mechanism. These elements, together, explain the 
social and ecological processes underpinning the approach and their impacts on social well-being 
and environmental protection. 
 7.3.2 Objective 2: to examine the conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable working 
landscapes  
The second objective applies the framework developed in the first objective to examine the 
conditions and mechanisms that foster sustainable working landscapes. I examined the link 
between governance and management as a means of understanding how governance conditions 
and mechanisms help create positive management outcomes in working landscapes. In this regard, 
positive management outcomes signal sustainable working landscapes. The analysis focused on 
identifying the key ingredients or governance conditions, mechanisms, and the most plausible 
pathway that contributed to the emergence of positive management outcomes in the working 
landscape. I applied this analysis to one case study in the SoD region. I found that four governance 
conditions (i.e., facilitative leadership, local autonomy, trust, and incentives) connected by five 
mechanisms (i.e., institutional disruption, institutional crafting and drift, brokerage or bridging, 
program uptake, and alleviation of fear of harm) produced positive management outcomes in the 
SoD. The most plausible pathway is that dissatisfied actors disrupt the existing governance 
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arrangements and create new ones that reflect their desire for local autonomy. Local autonomy, in 
turn, creates an atmosphere for local actors to form coalitions and build trust; trust enhances 
program uptake and the co-design and co-implementation of incentives, which then alleviates land 
managers’ fear of harm from participating in species at risk conservation programs.  
While some positive management outcomes emerged in the region, it was evident from this study 
that the inclusion of equity – a key ingredient identified in the framework (objective one) but not 
was perceived as absent in the study region – would have further enhanced positive management 
outcomes. This suggests that the emergence of positive management outcomes at a particular time 
alone may not fully explain the sustainability of working landscapes. Therefore, sustainability 
likely requires continuous efforts to understand the important governance conditions and 
mechanisms that might emerge to change management outcomes.  
7.3.3 Objective 3: to examine approaches for addressing risks in the management of working 
landscapes 
The third objective also applies the framework in objective one (Chapter 4) to understand 
environmental risk management in working landscapes. Chapter 4 suggested that the sustainability 
of working landscapes partly depends on how the social-ecological context factors affect collective 
action and shape the key ingredients towards influencing positive collective action. Chapter 5 
examined how the governance conditions (key ingredients) and associated mechanisms shape 
management (an example of collective action). However, Chapter 5 did not address how the social-
ecological context factors affect collective action or shape the key ingredients towards achieving 
sustainable working landscapes. Objective 3 (Chapter 6) responds to this gap by examining how 
environmental risks (social-ecological context factor) affect collective action and how the 
governance conditions are structured to address these risks. The analysis used SODCAP’s result-
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based conservation agreement as a composition of the governance conditions in the SoD region 
and used drought as an example of environmental risks to address research objective 3.  
Drawing on the experiences of land managers in the SoD, I found that drought affects the ability 
of land managers to meet both social well-being and environmental protection goals in working 
landscapes. Specifically, within the result-based conservation agreement framework, drought 
affects land managers by limiting their ability to achieve ecosystem targets and forcing them to 
incur extra costs (i.e., extra management and opportunity costs) to meet ecosystem targets. 
Therefore, if left unaddressed, drought can discourage land managers from participating in actions 
(e.g., enrolment, management) that would lead to the sustainability of working landscapes. 
Furthermore, I found that the incentive structure, which allows for a pro-rata reduction and the 
design of environmentally adaptive outcome indicators, helps reduce risks. Also, trust among 
actors and local autonomy facilitates continuous engagement between SODCAP and land 
managers to address the uncertainty and unpredictability associated with droughts.   
Table 7.1: Summary of Findings  
Research 
Question  
Research Objectives  Summary of Findings  Chapter  







to propose a conceptual 
framework for the 
working landscapes 
approach 
The collective efforts of multiple 
actors determine the sustainability 
of working landscapes; however, 
the collective efforts of these actors 
can be influenced by putting in 
place appropriate governance 
arrangements (key ingredients and 
interacting mechanisms) that fit the 
social-ecological context of the 




to examine the conditions 
and mechanisms that 
foster sustainable 
working landscapes 
Multiple governance conditions and 
linking mechanisms influence 
sustainable management of 
working landscapes. 
5 
to examine approaches 
for addressing risks in 
the management of 
working landscapes  
A flexible incentive structure that 
focuses on enhancing social and 
ecological outcomes through 
continuous engagement among 
actors and attention to the social-
ecological context helps address 




7.4 Contributions and emerging propositions 
Each of the key findings discussed in section 7.3 represents an independent contribution to the 
literature. However, the three analyses also collectively contribute to the theory and practice of 
environmental governance and rural-environmental planning. These contributions are outlined in 
this section. The contributions are presented as propositions – i.e., statements that convey the 
relationship between two or more concepts (Gay and Weaver 2011; Pittman 2016) – and are 
organized under environmental governance and rural-environmental planning. The contributions 
to practice associated with each proposition are also presented.  
7.4.1 Contributions to the environmental governance literature 
Proposition 1: Top-down regulations that offer opportunities for further institutional work 
improves their acceptability and likelihood of success.  
In recent decades, top-down governance regimes such as regulations have come under intense 
criticisms for the negative social and environmental outcomes that result from those governance 
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regimes (Armitage et al. 2012a). These criticisms are summed up by the theory of the pathologies 
of command-and-control, which suggests that governance of social-ecological systems by top-
down bureaucratic institutions results in negative consequences (Holling and Meffe 1996; Cox 
2016). Critics, therefore, further suggest that bottom-up or collaborative governance solutions that 
combine top-down and bottom-up approaches are better for governing social and ecological 
systems (Michael 2000; Innes and Frisvold 2009). In this regard, the idea that top-down 
governance can yield positive outcomes for social-ecological systems when combined with other 
modes of governance is not new. For example Pittman (2016) proposed that hierarchical 
governance and network governance can co-exist and interact to produce sustainable outcomes in 
the land-sea interface.  
However, my specific contribution is that the nature (i.e., whether the top-down regulations allow 
opportunities for further institutional work or not) of the top-down governance is important in even 
determining whether other modes of governance can emerge and the resulting social-ecological 
outcomes. As noted in Chapter 5, more collaborative approaches have historically yielded 
relatively sustainable social and environmental management outcomes than top-down approaches. 
However, my research has revealed that top-down regulations could become acceptable at the local 
level and foster the delivery of positive management outcomes if they allow room for institutional 
crafting and brokerage to occur. Based on this finding, I propose that top-down regulations can 
still foster sustainable social-ecological outcomes by creating opportunities for local actors to 
create new institutions and form coalitions among existing institutions to further their interests. 
This potential was clearly illustrated by the case of SODCAP presented in Chapter 5, where, 
although created to implement federal government regulations (e.g., SARA), it has become a 
grassroots-focused organization perceived by land managers as their ally.  
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Take-away messages for practice  
1. Top-down regulations from higher-level governments should create opportunities for 
further institutional work at the local level to improve their acceptability and opportunities 
for success.  
Proposition 2: Focusing on underlying mechanisms, rather than only governance conditions, 
enhances policy prospects 
Good governance is often perceived as a prerequisite for effective management, which is an 
indication of policy success (Pahl-Wostl 2009; Lockwood 2010). However, the link between good 
governance and effective management has remained unclear. The perception is that governance 
should create the context (e.g., rules, regulations, and institutional arrangements) (Pittman and 
Armitage 2016) and conditions needed (e.g., leadership, trust, equity, etc.) (Chapter 4) for effective 
management (Lockwood 2010). This perception has focused policy attention on creating the 
appropriate context and conditions (i.e., what made governance successful) to facilitate effective 
management. However, the underlying mechanisms (i.e., why governance was successful) that 
contribute to effective management has been ‘black boxed’. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, focusing 
on the mechanisms introduces new insights that can inform policy. For example, mechanisms help 
explain why certain governance conditions engender effective management whiles others fail. It 
also provides a different framework for thinking about policy solutions that are context-specific. 
This means that understanding the mechanisms that lead to effective management redirects 
attention of policymakers towards finding contexts (rules, regulations, and institutional 
arrangements) and conditions that will facilitate the occurrence of those mechanisms. For example, 
I found that land managers in the SoD ultimately accepted to manage their land for species at risk 
because the governance conditions alleviated their fear of harm. Therefore, if policymakers seek 
128 
 
to foster species at risk management in other contexts, they would seek conditions and strategies 
that will help alleviate land managers’ fear of harm in that specific context rather than trying to 
introduce the same governance conditions that were successful elsewhere. Furthermore, 
underlying mechanisms can help explain how certain governance conditions emerge or result from 
other conditions. For example, Chapter 5 demonstrated how facilitative leadership led to local 
autonomy through institutional disruption and local autonomy led to trust through brokerage, 
among others. This is important for policy because it provides guidance on the how different 
governance conditions interact to produce management outcomes.  
Take-away messages for practice  
1. Policymakers should also endeavour to determine why certain governance 
arrangements were successful in other contexts rather than only what made them 
successful.  
2. It is important for policymakers to understand how different governance conditions 
interact to produce management outcomes.  
7.4.2 Contributions to the rural-environmental planning literature  
Proposition 3: Multilevel institutional arrangements help focus planning interventions on both 
place and function  
One of the pillars of the sustainability planning theory (Campbell 1996; Wheeler 2004; Wheeler 
2016; Campbell and Zellner 2020) is that planning must (re)focus attention on place to prevent 
indiscriminate exploitation of resources and address the place-specific needs of local residents. 
However, the interconnectedness of ecological resources (Brondizio et al. 2009) makes too much 
attention to place undesirable because it might lead to misfits (functional and spatial misfits) 
(Wheeler 2004). Proposition 3 contributes to addressing this dilemma. I propose that multilevel 
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institutional arrangements, which helps link institutions at a larger scale (focusing on function) 
and institutions at a smaller scale (focusing on place) (Paavola 2016), enhances sustainable 
management of local resources, helps supply ecosystem services to the general public, and protects 
the interests of local people. As noted in Chapter 4, land managers of working landscapes supply 
ecosystem services at the landscape scale to beneficiaries spread out over larger spatial scales. The 
collective efforts of these land managers are coordinated by local institutions (e.g., SODCAP, 
grazing corporations and grazing co-operatives), whiles the payment of compensation is provided 
by state institutions through public taxes and other private benefactors (Chapter 5).   
A critical reason for the success of working landscapes is, therefore, dependent on how the local 
(place-centred) and state (function-centred) institutions collaborate through multilevel institutional 
arrangements. While multilevel institutional arrangements have been researched extensively in the 
conventional environmental governance scholarships (Armitage 2007; Brondizio et al. 2009; 
Paavola 2016), the planning scholarship has been slow to embrace them. My contribution is that 
planners, especially those interested in rural environments, can serve the place-specific demands 
of their residents and still respect the interconnectedness of ecological resources by establishing 
relationships between place-centred planning and function-centred planning institutions. 
Take-away messages for practice  
1. Efforts to plan for sustainable human-nature relations in rural environments should 
endeavour to establish linkages between place-centred and function-centred planning 
institutions.  
Proposition 4: Social well-being and environmental protection can provide normative guiding 
principles for planning in rural environments  
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Recent renewed interest among planning scholars to discover a theory of good city form (Talen 
and Ellis 2002) re-echoes earlier debates over whether planning should focus on process or 
substance. Advocates for a substantive theory argue that planning requires “well-validated, durable 
criteria for successful outcomes” (Talen and Ellis 2002, 36). While these debates have 
unfortunately only focused on cities, Hibbard and Frank (2019) and Selman (1995) have recently 
extended the debate to rural planning. Hibbard and Frank (2019) particularly proposed a 
framework to help develop a substantive theory of rural planning. Among other things, Hibbard 
and Frank (2019) suggest that one of the key components of any substantive theory for rural 
planning is an understanding of the “what” (i.e., what is the object of rural planning?) of rural 
planning. In order words, what are the “well-validated, durable criteria for successful outcomes” 
in rural planning? It is unclear what the object of rural planning is, given the diversity of rural 
areas. Nonetheless, as the sustainability planning framework suggests, planning needs to develop 
shared values even in the midst of the diverse values and interests in society (Wheeler 2016). Those 
shared values are being developed for rural environments.  
I contribute to the development of those shared values in rural environments by proposing that 
social well-being and environmental protection can provide the much-needed “well-validated, 
durable criteria for successful outcomes” for rural planning. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, social 
well-being and environmental protection provide overarching goals for integrating diverse 
interests within multifunctional landscapes. These goals help address both individual (e.g., profit) 
and public interests (e.g., species at risk management), which are central for addressing the 
conflicts planners face in their attempt to achieve sustainability (Campbell 1996; Campbell and 
Zellner 2020). Social well-being and environmental protection are broad enough to encapsulate 
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the diversity of rural environments (Chapter 4), yet they also provide enough specificity for the 
development of indicators for measuring outcomes (Chapters 5 and 6).  
Take-away messages for practice  
1. Planning efforts (e.g., land-use change and design and conflict negotiation) by rural-
environmental planners should aspire to achieve social well-being and environmental 
protection.  
2. Rural-environmental plans should be prepared to reflect how specific planning actions 
would lead to social well-being and environmental protection.  
3. The development of sustainable planning indicators can be guided by social well-being and 
environmental protection goals.  
Proposition 5: Incentive programs facilitate conflict negotiation in multifunctional landscapes  
Campbell (1996) put forward that sustainability planning demands a shift in focus away from 
adversarial planning and towards conflict negotiation. Also, John Forester and others have 
developed an impressive scholarly work drawing on how practitioners address everyday planning 
conflicts through negotiation and mediation (Fischer and Forester 1993; Forester 2008; Forester 
2013; Forester 2016; Schön 2017). However, there are still very limited tools available to planners 
who are confronted with conflict situations. I propose that in rural multifunctional landscapes, 
where planners face conflicts between social-economic development and environmental protection 
goals, incentive programs are viable tools for negotiating or mediating conflicts. I use incentives 
broadly to include motivators that are designed to guide actors towards desired actions or outcomes 
(Uphoff and Langholz 1998; Cetas and Yasue 2016). These motivators may be economic (e.g., tax 
credits, cost-sharing, annual payments), legal (e.g., assurances), or social (e.g., public recognition).  
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Like in proposition 3, incentive programs have also been widely researched in conventional 
environmental governance literature (Chapter 4) but are yet to be fully embraced by planners. 
Therefore, incentives should be developed as part of the suite of planning tools available for 
mediating conflicts over planning decisions in rural environments. As demonstrated in Chapters 5 
and 6, incentives were used in the SoD to alleviate land managers’ fear of harm and address 
environmental risks, respectively. These are both instances of conflict over whether to protect 
species at risk on working landscapes or not. As my research revealed, the conflict was resolved 
by paying incentives to land managers for the extra cost incurred in managing their land for both 
species at risk and livestock.  
Take-away messages for practice  
1. Efforts to address planning conflicts should embrace incentive schemes as tools for 
negotiation and mediation.  
7.5 Study limitations and priorities for future research 
While each manuscript pointed to some limitations and several opportunities for further research, 
I believe that there are three main limitations to my research: (1) the positioning of planners outside 
of the research, (2) focus on a single case, and (3) a limited focus on outcomes. These limitations 
also signal priorities for future research. Each of the limitations, as well as the directions for future 
research, are discussed below.  
7.5.1 Where is the planner?  
As I have argued in Chapter 2, an important contribution of my research is towards improving 
understanding of the theory and practice of planning sustainable human-nature relations in rural 
contexts. Because of this focus on planning, an obvious question that follows is where the planner 
is in a research that seeks to inform planning practice. This question is particularly crucial because 
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planning research developed around the role, approaches, and competencies planners use in 
solving societal problems (Weber and Crane 2012). I positioned the planner outside of the research 
for two main reasons. First, I intended to make an interdisciplinary contribution to the working 
landscapes literature, including to the environmental governance literature (propositions 1 and 2) 
and the rural-environmental planning literature (propositions 3-5). The second is to allow me to 
develop an interdisciplinary understanding of the working landscapes approach without ties to any 
specific field of practice. This is important for fostering interdisciplinarity and for learning across 
multiple disciplines. Also, the working landscapes literature is not traditionally tailored towards 
the professional practice of planning; hence any attempt to constrain the research question to 
professional planning would limit the lessons we can learn. Therefore, broadening the research 
question to encapsulate other fields of practice would offer important lessons for planning theory 
and practice, as I have demonstrated in this Chapter (propositions 3, 4, and 5).  
Regardless of the limited focus on professional planning practice, the study suggests that 
professional planners can play a critical role in governing working landscapes. For example, 
professional planners in Canada and elsewhere can leverage their competencies in communication, 
leadership, and interpersonal skills (Canadian Institute of Planners 2011) to foster collaboration 
among the multiple stakeholders in the working landscapes approach. They can also use their 
competencies in human settlements and plan and policy considerations to better integrate working 
landscapes policies within broader community development to increase social well-being and 
environmental protection. These provide useful starting points for better positioning professional 
planners within the working landscapes approach. Therefore, further studies should explore the 
role of planners and how they relate with other actors in working landscapes. These studies should 
frame planners as part of the governance system to understand how their interactions with others 
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can impact the natural environment and social well-being. This line of inquiry would also allow 
for further understanding of the key competencies required by planners who work in working 
landscapes and similar contexts of human-nature relations.  
7.5.2 Learning across contexts  
My research focused on a single case – the SoD region – except for Chapter 4 (the conceptual 
framework). The combination of the conceptual framework and the empirical investigation within 
a single case is advantageous for situating the results of the empirical investigation within a broader 
theoretical context. It also facilitates the production of actionable outcomes for the context under 
investigation. However, the use of a single case has its limitations: (1) it limits the ability to 
generalize about how to govern working landscapes and (2) it limits the ability to learn from similar 
contexts elsewhere to improve governance of working landscapes. These limitations are important 
because there is an increasing need for lessons to be learned across diverse contexts of working 
landscapes (Chapter 4) in order to advance sustainability. Therefore, future studies should apply 
the framework (Chapter 4) in other contexts to facilitate theorizing regarding how we can 
effectively govern working landscapes. In particular, researching the governance of working 
landscapes in developing countries where: (1) a large proportion of the population rely on natural 
resources for their livelihoods, (2) institutions are weak, and (3) there are relatively complex 
property rights regimes would provide useful insights for further advancing the working 
landscapes approach.  
7.5.3 Connecting governance to social-ecological outcomes  
An important feature of the working landscape approach, as shown in Chapter 4, is that working 
landscapes are managed to ultimately achieve social well-being and environmental protection 
outcomes. Yet, in applying the framework, I have only focused on how governance (key 
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ingredients) leads to management (collective action). While this is an important contribution to the 
literature, a key limitation with this approach is that there is no direct link between management 
and governance and outcomes (social well-being and environmental protection). Chapter 4 
attempted to address this by indicating examples of activities that come under social well-being 
and environmental protection, and Chapters 5 and 6 treated species at risk management and 
livestock rearing as proxies of environmental protection and social well-being, respectively. 
However, this treatment still fails to provide any certainty that the governance processes and 
management actions taking place in the SoD result in tangible social well-being and environmental 
protection outcomes. Therefore, future studies should, for example, investigate the governance-
management-outcomes pathway to understand how governance and management would lead to 
outcomes. This line of investigation would also require an in-depth understanding (e.g., by 
developing indicators) of social well-being and environmental protection as they apply to working 
landscapes.  
7.6 Concluding remarks 
This research contributes to an emerging body of scholarship on the governance of working 
landscapes. In doing so, I have also drawn useful lessons for planning sustainable human-nature 
relations in rural environments. My research emphasizes that the collective efforts of multiple 
actors determine the sustainability of working landscapes; however, the collective efforts of these 
actors can be influenced by putting in place appropriate governance arrangements (key ingredients 
and interacting mechanisms) that fit the social-ecological context of the working landscape in 
question. I have provided important insights regarding the governance processes that will help to 
improve the collective efforts of multiple actors in working landscapes. These insights can inform 
efforts to plan sustainable human-nature relations in rural environments.  
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My research also highlights the critical role of working landscapes in addressing global 
environmental challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss. Indeed, an essential step 
towards sustainability is recognizing that working landscapes do not only drive environmental 
degradation but can also offer solutions. Such recognition can drive global efforts towards 
conserving working landscapes. This is particularly important as national and international 
commitments to foster sustainability through the designation of protected areas continue to lag 
current and future sustainability thresholds. However, an important next step in driving the 
sustainability of working landscapes is developing governance and institutional systems that 
address the unique challenges of working landscapes. These governance and institutional systems 
are already developing globally. Through this dissertation, I have begun the efforts to consolidate 
our understanding of the governance of working landscapes and to open new doors for further 
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Appendix A. Interview Guide  
A. Background information about operations  
1) Please describe your current ranching/farming operation?  
Prompts  
o Total size of land 
o Ownership type  
o Size of livestock  
o Length of time in operation  
 
B. Species at risk management  
2) Are you aware of any species on your land? Which species are present on your land?  
Prompt: species at risk 
3) Do you think your lands currently meet habitat requirement for these species? Why? 
4) How do you manage these lands to promote habitat? 
Prompts  
o Stocking  
o Herding cattle to promote heterogeneous grazing 
o Access to alternative lands for seasonally-deferred grazing 
o Researching, observing, learning about, etc. species at risk, and  
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o Volunteering with organizations or going to meetings, etc. 
 
C. Cost information  
5) Please provide cost estimates for the different management activities you undertake to 
promote habitat for SAR 







Stocking     
Resting parcels     
Herding or luring     
Deferred grazing     
Opportunity costs     
Learning about SAR    
Meetings & 
volunteering 
   
Others    
 
D. Drought and species at risk management  
6) How would you describe your experience with drought in this region?  
Prompt: last time you experienced drought, intensity 
7) How does drought affect your operation generally?  
Prompts 
o Effects on livestock  
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o Effects on SAR management 
8) Did your knowledge of drought affect your participation in SODCAP’s RBCA program? 
How?  
9) Could you explain how drought affects your participation in the RBA? 
Prompt: Describe instances where you would not be paid compensation as a result of drought.  
10) How are these instances managed? 
Prompt: is compensation paid when drought makes it impossible for you to meet habitat targets? 
How?  
11) What do you recommend?  
Governance conditions and SAR management  
12) What made you sign up for SODCAP’s conservation program?  
Prompt: Incentives, leadership, equity, trust, autonomy 
13) Are there other conditions you wished were present?   
14) Describe in detail how these conditions came about. 
Prompt 
o History  
o Actors  
o Role you played  
o Outcome   
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Appendix B. Observation Guide  
Land manager recruitment  
1) How are land managers recruited into SODCAP’s programs? 
2) What do land managers consider important in deciding to participate in SODCAP’s 
programs? 
Habitat monitoring and result determination  




Appendix C. List of Provincial Legislations relevant working landscapes   
Provincial Legislation  Description  What it does 
The Wildlife Act, 1998 “An Act respecting the 
Protection of Wildlife and Wild 
Species at Risk and making 
consequential amendments to 
other Acts.” 
Establishes procedures for the 
administration, licensing, and 
prohibition of all wild species 
 
Set procedures that determine the 
at-risk status of species, 
establishing recovery plans, 
monitoring and enforcement.  
The Wild Species at 
Risk Regulations 
Regulations based on the 
Wildlife Act. “These regulations 
apply to all wild species at risk 
in Saskatchewan.” 
Provides a list of SAR in 
Saskatchewan and their 
respective levels of risks 
The provincial lands 
act, 2016  
“An Act respecting Provincial 
Lands, repealing certain Acts 
and making consequential 
amendments to certain Acts.” 
Establishes the terms for the 
disposition (i.e., sale, lease, or 
transfer) of provincial land 
(Division 2 & 5, Part 2) 
 
Establishes the terms for taxation 
related to provincial lands 
(Division 3, Part 2) 
 
Establishes the terms for 
improvements and restoration of 
provincial lands (Division 4, Part 
2) 
 
Establishes the terms for the 
designation, disposition or use of 
ecological reserves (Division 1, 
Part 3)  
The wildlife habitat 
protection act 
“An Act respecting the 
Protection and Management of 
Sets the terms for the designation 
of Crown lands as wildlife 
habitat and ecological lands. 
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Crown Lands for Agriculture 
and Wildlife.” 
 
Determines the management and 
use, and disposition of lands 
classified as wildlife habitat and 
ecological lands 
The Pastures Act  “An Act respecting the 
Operation of Pastures and 
making consequential 
amendments to The Department 
of Agriculture Act.” 
Sets out conditions for the 
designation, acquisition, use and 





Appendix D: Background data of interviews and Focus Groups 
Variable  % Of participants 
Co-op/Corp 1 (interviews)  
Land ownership (private land only) N/A 
Land ownership (leased land) 37.5 
Land ownership (private and leased land) 62.5 
 Female (12.5), Male (87.5) 
Co-op/Corp 2 (interviews) 
Land ownership (private land) N/A 
Land ownership (leased land) 33.3 
Land ownership (private and leased land) 66.7 
 Female (N/A), Male (100) 
Co-op/Corp 3  (FGD) 
Land ownership (private land) N/A 
Land ownership (leased land) 100 
Land ownership (private and leased land) N/A  
 Female (50), Male (50) 
Co-op/Corp 4  (FGD) 
Land ownership (private land) N/A 
Land ownership (leased land) 40 
Land ownership (private and leased land) 60 
 Female (20), Male (80)  
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